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The Constitutional Court, created in 1991, is the highest judicial body 
in Colombia. It also has the greatest responsibility of all Colombian courts. 
First, the Court has the responsibility of interpreting and preserving the 
integrity of a new, very progressive Constitution1 in a country that 
currently faces a sort of Leviathan. Colombia faces a recurring nightmare, 
where irregular armies and terrorism defy democratic institutions,2 and the 
 1. Some people think that the Constitution is best suited for Switzerland. Needless to say, that is 
not my opinion. Nevertheless, one of the first objections raised against the 1991 Constitution by those 
who defended the previous 1886 Constitution was that it promised too much for a country like 
Colombia, and that it seemed to have been conceived for a society that was living in peace. Hence 
these critics revisited the common phrase with which Víctor Hugo disqualified the 1863 Colombian 
Constitution, which also contained a generous bill of rights and followed the federal model: “it is a 
constitution fit for angels.” 
 2. It seems over simplistic to state that there exists a “culture of violence” in Colombia, or that 
Colombia is a “violent country.” See FERNANDO GAITAN DAZA & MALCOLM DEAS, DOS ENSAYOS 
ESPECULATIVOS SOBRE LA VIOLENCIA EN COLOMBIA (Tercer Mundo ed., 1995); INSTITUTO DE 
ESTUDIOS POLÍTICOS Y RELACIONES INTERNACIONALES, COLOMBIA: VIOLENCIA Y DEMOCRACIA 
(Gonzalo Sanchez ed., 1987); EDUARDO POSADA CARBO, REFLEXIONES SOBRE LA CULTURA POLÍTICA 
COLOMBIANA (2002). However, Colombia has in fact suffered the burden of different types of 
violence: the so-called “wars” of the nineteenth century, during which nine significant “civil wars,” 
two international armed conflicts with Ecuador, and dozens of regional revolts took place, especially 
during the “Federal” period. After those involving independence from Spain, the most important 
internal conflicts during this Federal period were: (a) the “War of the Supremes” (1839–1841), which 
raised with the pretext of countering a national law that suppressed monasteries with less than eight 
members and commited their assets to educational purposes, but which in fact served as an excuse to 
join a number of local leaders (remnants of the Independence period) with substantial popular support 
in the south of the country against the central government; (b) the 1854 Coup d’Etat, led by rebel army 
leader José María Melo with popular support, and the corresponding reaction by supporters of the 
government; and (c) the so-called “Thousand Day War” (1899–1902), which was a violent 
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state has to bear the enormous pressure of imposing its authority and 
regaining control over several parts of the national territory3 through 
military action. Second, the Court has the responsibility of safeguarding 
the rights of all citizens within an unequal society, where living a dignified 
life seems like a luxury for much of the Colombian population, most of 
whom live below the poverty line.4 Pervasive human rights violations5 are 
confrontation between liberal guerrillas and the ruling conservative government. Alvaro Tirado Mejia, 
El Estado y la política en el Siglo XIX, NUEVA HISTORIA DE COLOMBIA, VOL. 2 (1989). A second set 
of conflicts was deemed the so-called “Violence,” a period spanning roughly from 1948 to 1957, 
marked by extremely violent clashes between conservative and liberal factions across the country, 
especially in the countryside. A third set of conflicts includes the “communist insurgency,” an upsurge 
of emerging guerrilla movements originally initiated by a coalition of intellectuals and popular social 
movements, who adopted social reform slogans and aims, during the 1960s and 1970s. The movement 
evolved into an armed conflict with very different traits since the mid-eighties, (i) involving: clashes 
between the guerrilla and paramilitary armies for territorial control (strengthened by the trade in drugs, 
extortion and kidnappings); (ii) terrorist operations initially directed against public servants (then 
indiscriminately against the civilian population); (iii) a marked tendency for the conflict to expand 
from the countryside to the cities and other traditionally peaceful areas; (iv) fragile control of the state 
in several parts of the national territory; (v) powerful mini-cartels of drug traders in different areas 
which finance groups of mercenaries and interlink with other violent actors; (vi) and connections with 
the IRA, ETA, and foreign mercenary organizations. 
 3. Colombia occupies 1,141.748 square kilometers. Although there is disagreement as to the 
exact portion which is under the influence of irregular armed groups, some reports state that the FARC 
Guerrilla movement is present in over 450 municipalities nationwide (almost half of the total 
municipalities in the country). FARC Guerilla is organized into more than sixty rural commandos and 
several urban ones. In comparison, the ELN Guerrilla movement is organized into five large groups 
across the country, each one consisting of forty-five local commandos. See the different assessments 
published on the Ministry of Defense website at http://www.mindefensa.gov.co (last visited Mar. 1, 
2004). In order to strengthen state control across the national territory, different governments have 
resorted to social programs and military action. The military budget has rapidly risen during the 1990s. 
In 1994, public investments in defense and security amounted to 0.16% of the GNP. In 2002 this 
figure rose to 0.37% and peaked at 0.6% of the GNP in 1997. Departamento Nacional de Planeación 
(Colombian National Planning Department), at http://www.dnp.gov.co (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). At 
the same time, “social” investment with public funds has decreased during the same period from 
2.31% of the GNP in 1994 to 1.69% in 2002. Id. 
 4. According to the “Colombia Poverty Report,” published in 2002 by the World Bank, the 
number of Colombians living under the poverty line (national poverty rate) decreased from 80% in 
1978 to 60% in 1995; the extreme poverty rate decreased from 45% to 21% during the same period. 
However, from 1995 to 1999 the poverty rate increased to 64%, while the extreme poverty rate rose to 
23%. Other social indicators are also illustrative of the country’s current situation. MARCELO GIUGALE 
ET AL., COLOMBIA—THE ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF PEACE 92 (World Bank, 2002). Illiteracy rates 
for members of the population, who are twelve years and older decreased, from 5.3% in 1978 to 2.6% 
in 1999, while child labor from ages twelve to sixteen diminished from 12% in 1978 to 9.5% in 1999. 
Id. According to the calculations of the National Program for Human Development, which are based 
on the surveys conducted by the National Administrative Department of Statistics, the national 
illiteracy rate in 2001 was 7.5%, which marked a slight evolution from the 10.8% rate in 1990. PNUD, 
Departamento Nacional de Planeación, Agencia Colombiana de Cooperación Internacional Y 
Programa Nacional de Desarrollo Humano 10 años de desarrollo humano en Colombia 15, 21 
(2003), http://www.pnud.org.co (last visited Feb. 18, 2004). The evolution of access to public utilities 
is also significant. In 1988, 99% of households had access to electricity, 97% to water, 62% to 
telephone, and 94% to sewage facilities. In 1999, 99% of all households had access to electricity, 99% 
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increasingly eroding a stable democratic tradition that dates back to the 
nineteenth century. Third, the Court has the responsibility of keeping the 
promise of what was envisioned in the adoption of the new Constitution 
alive. It was seen as a nonviolent revolution towards peace, equality, and 
participation for all, because it was enacted among pervading political 
patronage, frequent corruption scandals,6 the worst economic recession 
since the nineteen thirties,7 and ceaseless criminal drug trafficking 
activity.8 Mainstream media may make Colombians believe that nothing 
to water, 84% to telephone, and 97% to sewage facilities. Id. at 23. Although most of the growth in 
coverage of public utilities resulted from its expansion to lesser covered cities, the World Bank report 
states that “the missing percentages mask thousands of individuals, concentrated in regional pockets of 
poverty, where these basic needs are not yet met.” Id. 
 5. Violence rates in Colombia are among the highest in the world. According to the National 
Institute for Legal Medicine and Forensic Science (Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal y Ciencias 
Forenses), a total of 26,311 people were murdered in Colombian territory in 2001, and 241,681 people 
were wounded. Colombia thus “has the highest homicide rate in the world.” GIUGALE, supra note 4, at 
96. According to the National Council for the Fight Against Kidnapping, in 2001 a total of 3,041 
people were kidnapped in Colombia, and between 1996 and 2001, this number increased threefold. 
Even though this kidnapping rate diminished during the 1990s, the incidence of other crimes, such as 
extortion, armed robbery, kidnappings, and car theft substantially increased during the same period. 
The National Foundation for the Defense of Personal Liberty of the Department of Defense, 
FONDELIBERTAD, http://www.antisecuestro.gov/principal.htm (last visited Dec. 30, 2003). The 
overwhelming majority of victims are non-combatant civilians. Id. 
 6. Serious public corruption scandals are frequent in Colombia. The most recent such scandals 
have emerged in the public banking sector (e.g., Banco del Estado, Caja Agraria), the social housing 
financing entity (e.g., INURBE), the ports sector (e.g., Foncolpuertos, Dragacol), and Congress (e.g., 
illegal contracts executed by the Chamber of Representatives).  
 7. Carlos Eduardo Velez et al., Shared Growth, Poverty, and Inequality, in COLOMBIA: THE 
ECONOMIC FOUNDATION OF PEACE 84 (Marcelo Giugae et al. eds., 2002). 
Since 1997, after two decades of positive and sustained growth, economic activity in 
Colombia plummeted to the point of reaching negative figures in 1999. Until the early 1990s, 
prudent management of the Colombian economy allowed for low government debt levels 
that, together with low inflation rates by Latin American standards, led to steady—although 
moderate—growth rates. However, public spending rose from 24 to 36 percent of GDP 
between 1990 and 1998. Fiscal imbalances helped push Colombia toward a slowdown after 
1996, and into recession in fiscal year 1998–1999. The fiscal position continued to deteriorate 
as the economic slowdown adversely affected tax revenues. 
Id. As a consequence, the poverty reduction trend was reversed, and the national poverty rate rose to 
64% in 1999, returning to pre-1988 levels. Id. Historical rates of unemployment doubled, and several 
key human development indicators have been affected, with a particular impact upon “young children, 
adolescents and the internally displaced population.” Id. at 95. 
 8. According to the figures published by the National Directorate for Drugs (Dirección 
Nacional de Estupefacientes), coca crops in Colombia occupied 45,000 acres in 1994 and 102,071 
acres in 2002, with a peak of 163,289 acres in 2000. This figure places Colombia far ahead of the other 
major Andean coca producers, Perú (46,700 acres in 2002) and Bolivia (24,400 acres in 2002). 
Dirección Nacionalda Estupefacientes (National Directorate for Drugs), http://www.dne.gov/co (last 
visited Dec. 12, 2003). It is well-known that the illegal armed groups that operate within Colombian 
territory, in their areas of influence, have recently gained significant control of the trade in drugs to 
finance their violent activities and gain commercial revenues. Id. Nevertheless, independent drug 
cartels also operate in different parts of the country. Id. Most of the drugs produced and processed in 
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has really changed, and that some of the inspiring dreams of the framers in 
the 1991 Constituent Assembly have faded away over the last decade. 
One may then pose a number of difficult questions, which are the same 
questions borne by delegates to the 1991 Constituent Assembly while 
discussing the creation of a Constitutional Court. How can a judicial body 
defend the rule of law in a land haunted by the empire of force and 
arbitrariness? Is it really the Court’s job to respond to deeply rooted 
economic and social inequalities, or should that task be left to the 
democratically-elected branches of government? Should the Court bear the 
burden of keeping the torch alive, which lit the way towards Colombia’s 
future over a decade ago? If the answer to these questions is, in part, yes, 
then what kind of Court does Colombia need? Why not maintain 
constitutional judicial review by the traditional Supreme Court, which had 
this power for almost one hundred years?  
These queries remain largely unanswered, because they remain at the 
heart of public controversy and debate in Colombia. Only one decade has 
elapsed since the promulgation of the new Constitution and the creation of 
the Constitutional Court. While this Tribunal has played a historically 
unprecedented role in Colombia, its very existence—not to mention the 
types of decisions it adopts, or their broad-spanning influence over every-
day life9—is still far from being unanimously accepted by some authorities 
and private powers. At the same time, however, the Court has positioned 
itself as an increasingly legitimate forum that responds to some of the 
most complex problems that affect Colombian society and institutions. Its 
doctrines on fundamental rights have visibly permeated social practice and 
discourse at unanticipated levels. Moreover, in recent times, social and 
political actors have gradually defered to the court for the resolution of 
their most difficult questions. It is not unusual to see hundreds of people 
marching and waving banners in front of the Palace of Justice, expressing 
their support or opposition to a given cause before the Court.  
Consequently, in order to visualize the Court’s position within the new 
Colombian constitutional order, it is useful to take into account the 
circumstances that surrounded its creation and the definition of its powers, 
the different constitutional doctrines and landmark judgments it produced, 
Colombia are consumed abroad, but internal consumption has been gradually increasing. Id. 
 9. Given the high social, political, and economic impact of the Court’s judgments and their 
frequent controversial effects, private organizations and even public officials occasionally launch 
proposals for restructuring the Court and its powers, merging it with the Supreme Court of Justice, or 
even suppressing the Court and reinstating the system of constitutional judicial review that existed 
before 1991. See infra Part IV (“Guarding the Guardians”). 
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and the impact of its decisions on law and politics in Colombia. I will 
explore each of these subjects separately. From the outset, I would like to 
clarify that my intention in this overview is to describe generally the 
origins and impact of the Constitutional Court and its main decisions. I 
will also provide a general overview of its role within the Colombian 
system—a comprehensive assessment that has not been fully carried out to 
date and that obviously requires much more space and time than is 
available for this specific presentation.10  
On a basic level, one might say that the creation of the Colombian 
Constitutional Court within the system of separation of powers and checks 
and balances introduced by the 1991 Constitution has infused the 
Colombian legal system with an entirely new outlook and perspective. 
Through its case law, the Court has contributed to the gradual 
abandonment of the formalist legal approach, which disregarded the 
importance of preserving constitutional mandates in real-life situations. In 
that sense, a substantial number of decisions in the field of fundamental 
rights, within which the Court has adopted a radically innovative 
approach, have been consolidated. Through its continuous interpretation 
and application of constitutional principles, the Court has substantially 
altered imbalances of power in the Colombian social, political, and 
economic spheres. In the protective spirit of the Constitution, the Court’s 
decisions are highly sensitive to social inequalities and to the needs of the 
vulnerable, weak, and marginalized. Still, the Court’s decisions are not full 
of sentimental populism, as some critics say.11 Moreover, the Court has 
become a forum where the most difficult, pressing, complex, and sensitive 
national problems have found increasingly legitimate responses. In equally 
important terms, the Constitutional Court has played a remarkably salient 
role in the construction of the rule of law; for the same reasons, it may be 
said that the Court has become an important actor in the collective process 
of maintaining open institutional channels for the peaceful resolution of 
social conflicts. It is my hope that the following account of the origins, 
 10. This paper draws on a number of other books and essays I have published on the same topic. 
MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA-ESPINOSA, LA CARTA DE DERECHOS : SU INTERPRETACIÓN Y SUS 
IMPLICACIONES (1993); MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA-ESPINOSA, INTRODUCCIÓN A LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 
1991 (1993); MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA-ESPINOSA, THE WRIT OF PROTECTION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS—
POWER FOR THE COMMON MAN IN COLOMBIA (1993); MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA-ESPINOSA, LOS 
DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991 (1997). 
 11. In regards to some of its economic judgments, the Court has actually been accused of 
populism by some analysts. For a complete review of the debate raised by these matters, see Facultad 
de Derecho, Universidad de los Andes, Justicia Constitucional y Política Económica, REVISTA DE 
DERECHO PÚBLICO NO. 12 (2001); see also infra Part II.B.3. 
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role, and impact of the Colombian Constitutional Court will give some 
credit to these affirmations.  
I. THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
The Court came to life as a result of the 1991 constitutional reform 
process, and it was entrusted with the task of preserving the integrity and 
supremacy of the new Constitution. The establishment of a constitutional 
system of judicial review was not, however, new to the Colombian legal 
system. Colombia’s first national constitutions had envisioned this type of 
control since the early decades of the nineteenth century, and the integrity 
of the pre-existing 1886 Constitution was officially preserved by a high 
judicial body: the Supreme Court of Justice. The real innovations, which I 
will explain in detail below, were: (i) the creation of a specialized tribunal 
at the head of a new “constitutional jurisdiction” to which all Colombian 
judges belong;12 (ii) the application of constitutional judicial review to 
concrete situations through the writ of protection of fundamental rights 
(acción de tutela); (iii) the expansion of abstract review of laws, whether 
ex officio or through actio popularis; and (iv) the adoption of a means to 
contextualize decisions adopted in abstract review. In order to portray the 
significance and extent of these transformations, I will discuss the main 
traits of the pre-existing system of constitutional judicial review and 
highlight the basic reasons that prompted its reform.  
A. The Constitutional System of Judicial Review in the 1886 Constitution 
The Supreme Court of Justice, as the guardian of the 1886 
Constitution, had the power to strike down national laws and particular 
types of presidential decrees, which were found to be contrary to the 
constitution. However, internal disadvantages of the system, such as the 
justices’ election scheme, the imprecise definition of the Supreme Court’s 
 12. The Colombian Judiciary had traditionally been divided into “jurisdictions,” specialized 
segments of the overall judicial branch, which are hierarchically placed under one of the two so-called 
“high courts”: the Supreme Court of Justice (which is the head of the “ordinary” jurisdiction, 
encompassing civil, criminal, and labor judges), and the Council of State (which is at the top of the 
“administrative” jurisdiction, in charge of adjudicating conflicts derived from the exercise of public 
administrative powers). The 1991 Constitution created a new “constitutional” jurisdiction, which is 
headed by the Constitutional Court, and encompasses every judge in the nation, when they decide 
tutela cases, including those before the Supreme Court of Justice and the Council of State. Other 
“jurisdictions” in Colombia include the special military criminal jurisdiction, the indigenous 
jurisdiction, and “judges of peace” (private citizens granted specific judicial powers by the 
Constitution and the law in minor cases). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
538 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:529 
 
 
 
 
 
 
functions, and the Court’s frequent jurisdictional clashes with other public 
authorities, together with external factors, such as the Constitution’s dim 
appeal to citizens’ ordinary lives, the Supreme Court’s controversial 
decisions striking down two constitutional reforms, several “emergency 
powers” decrees,13 and the scarce level of protection it granted to 
fundamental rights, eventually weakened support for this constitutional 
scheme of judicial review. These factors cunulatively triggered renovation. 
The situation was further enhanced by the very formalistic prevailing 
approach to legal issues. This in turn created a deep gap between the 
Constitution and social realities and needs. It was this gap that undermined 
the legitimacy of the whole system.  
1. The Origins and Features of the 1886 Scheme 
The origins of the Colombian constitutional system of judicial review 
may be traced back to the 1886 Constitution. This Constitution granted the 
President of the Republic veto power over bills passed by Congress that he 
considered incompatible with the constitutional text. If Congress overrode 
the veto, the Supreme Court of Justice was called on to resolve the conflict 
and decide the constitutionality of the objectionable bill.14  
This scheme was significantly broadened by Legislative Act No. 3 of 
1910, which introduced two things. First, it introduced a publicly 
accessible system of abstract national law review. This review can occur 
through a public unconstitutionality action (actio popularis) by which 
every citizen could file, in defense of the public interest, an 
unconstitutionality lawsuit against any national law before the Supreme 
Court. So far as I know, this review is the first one of its kind in the world 
to be effective at the national level. The Supreme Court decisions had erga 
omnes effects.15 Second, it introduced an “unconstitutionality exception” 
by which any judge or public official could decide not to apply laws found 
to be unconstitutional in specific cases.16 The decision adopted by the 
 13. See supra note 8; infra Part II.B.2.a. 
 14. CONSTITUCION POLITICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1886 (THE 1886 CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA), 
art. 90 (1886). 
 15. In 1904, a law created the unconstitutionality actio popularis action. Ley 2 de 1904 (Law 2 
of 1904). However, this action could only be directed against presidential decrees issued under state of 
siege powers. Nevertheless, the origins of actio popularis can be traced back to the first constitutions 
of Colombia and Venezuela. See A.R. BREWER-CARIAS, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN COMPARATIVE LAW 279 
(1989); see generally CARLOS RESTREPO PIEDRAHITA, CONSTITUCIONES POLÍTICAS NACIONALES DE 
COLOMBIA (1995). 
 16. The debate on the unconstitutionality exception had already emerged in Colombian legal 
circles in the nineteenth century. In 1887, a national law indirectly banned the application of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss4/2
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 539 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Court in regards to such seldom invoked “unconstitutionality exceptions” 
only had inter partes effects, so the relevant regulations could still be 
applied to other situations. After the 1968 amendment, the previous 
Constitution also permitted ex officio review by the Supreme Court over 
legislative decrees issued by the President of the Republic in the exercise 
of his exceptional powers during a state of siege or economic emergency.17
Therefore, the basic functions of the Supreme Court in its role as 
“guardian of the integrity of the Constitution” were to review bills vetoed 
as unconstitutional by the President, to carry out ex officio review of the 
legislative decrees issued by the Government in application of state of 
siege or economic emergency powers, and to examine actio popularis 
presented by citizens against any laws or presidential decrees issued in 
exercise of expressly delegated legislation powers (decreto con fuerza de 
ley). In addition, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of its own 
constitutional review functions through a number of landmark decisions. 
The Supreme Court aserted its jurisdiction in the form of actio popularis 
against constitutional amendments passed by Congress18 and laws that 
approved international treaties, which would be reviewed only for defects 
in the formation procedure.19  
The previous scheme also granted the Council of State20 constitutional 
judicial review fuctions, most notably in regards to actio popularis filed 
against administrative acts, and indemnity claims filed by victims of state 
abuse.21  
unconstitutionality exceptions and stated that legal provisions issued after the 1886 Constitution would 
be presumed constitutional and should be applied even if they appeared to be in contradiction with the 
Constitution. Ley 153 de 1887 (Law 153 of 1887), art. 6. This provision was introduced in order to 
modify a previous law, Law 57, which had stated that in cases of conflict between the Constitution and 
a law, the former should prevail. Ley 57 de 1887 (Law 57 of 1887), art. 5. 
 17. “States of Siege” (introduced in 1886) and “States of Economic and Social Emergency” 
(introduced in 1968) are currently referred to as “States of Exception” in which the President was 
temporarily granted extraordinary legislative powers, and enhanced attributions, in order to cope with 
specific circumstances for which ordinary presidential functions were insufficient. See infra Part II. 
 18. Decision of May 5, 1978 (text on file with author). 
 19. Decision of November 3, 1981 (text on file with author). 
 20. Under the 1886 regime, the Council of State was the highest administrative tribunal in 
Colombia; together with the Supreme Court of Justice, which was the hierarchical superior of every 
civil, criminal, and labor judge in the country. After the 1991 constitutional reform, the Constitutional 
Court and the Supreme Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura) have now come 
to share this privileged position. See supra note 3. A constitutional amendment to abolish the Supreme 
Council of the Judiciary, which is composed of two Chambers (a disciplinary one, with jurisdiction 
over judges and lawyers, and an administrative one, concerned with the organization and management 
of the whole judicial branch), is pending approval by Congress at the time of this writing. 
 21. The Council of State could also study the “illegality exceptions” rarely applied by judges or 
public officials to administrative acts that were deemed incompatible with laws in concrete cases and 
could apply an unconstitutionality exception to laws or administrative acts. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
540 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 3:529 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages of the System 
This system had a number of positive traits, including strong 
foundations of the Supreme Court’s century-old tradition, broad scope, 
and easy access for citizens to constitutional judicial review through actio 
popularis. 
In spite of these benefits, the scheme had an equally significant number 
of disadvantages, which gradually accumulated and prompted its 
transformation. These disadvantages included: (i) the unrepresentative 
election system; (ii) previous Constitution’s lack of appeal to citizens’ 
everyday lives and needs, despite amendments in 1936, 1945, and 1968; 
(iii) the absence of a responsive fundamental rights protection system; (iv) 
the imprecise definition of the scope of the Court’s functions, which 
created frequent conflicts with other authorities; and (v) the lack of 
mechanisms to harmonize the sometimes contradictory pronouncements of 
the Supreme Court and the Council of State. 
The first disadvantage was that the manner in which Supreme Court 
justices were elected was not democratic, which eventually eroded the 
legitimacy of their decisions. The Court nominated its own new 
members22 and required respect for political parity between the two 
traditional liberal and conservative political parties. This scheme seriously 
hampered the Court’s representativity, because while democratically 
elected bodies have no control over their composition, only lawyers 
affiliated with one of the two traditional parties could be appointed as 
justices. The tribunal’s consequent loss of legitimacy became evident in a 
series of controversial decisions that prompted proposals to change the 
whole system of judicial review. For example, the Supreme Court struck 
down the constitutional reforms promoted by Presidents Alfonso López 
Michelsen23 and Julio César Turbay.24 It also struck down the tax reform 
adopted by president Belisario Betancur based on his economic emergency 
powers.25 In contrast, the Court upheld the contentious state of siege 
“Security Decree” (Estatuto de Seguridad) issued by president Julio César 
Turbay,26 which heavily restricted human rights. It also upheld a 
 22. This so-called “co-option” (cooptación) system was designed in 1957 to preserve the 
independence of the highest level judiciary.
 23. Decision of May 5, 1978 (amendment authorizing the summonning of a Constituent 
Assembly) (text on file with author). 
 24. Decision of November 3, 1981 (amendment dealing mainly with the legislative and judicial 
branches) (text on file with author). 
 25. Decision of February 23, 1982 (text on file with author). 
 26. Decision of October 30, 1978 (text on file with author).  
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controversial law limiting foreign investment in the financial sector (the 
so-called “nationalization of banking” law).27  
A second disadvantage of this system was the Colombian people’s 
reluctance to defend the integrity of the 1886 Constitution, because of the 
weak link between its text and ordinary citizens’ lives. Therefore, although 
the actio popularis was public in theory, strong economic and other 
powerful pressure groups made use of it in practice, proving that the 
publicly available legal channel originally devised to defend the public 
interest had become an instrument for the promotion of cleverly disguised 
private interests.28  
Third, the system as a whole granted very poor human rights 
protection. It was simply unresponsive to the evolving nature of 
fundamental rights claims. Although the Supreme Court of Justice and the 
Council of State touched upon the topic in a number of decisions, they 
rarely analyzed the actual content or admissibility of restrictive measures 
placed under their review, not even those adopted under states of siege. 
Consequently, measures that today would be deemed unacceptable, met 
with significant and surprising judicial tolerance.29 But perhaps the most 
serious failure of the system in this regard was the absence of adequate, 
accessible mechanisms to secure the direct protection of human rights in 
concrete, everyday situations. The very idea of immediately enforceable 
fundamental rights was unknown to the system of constitutional law, and 
consequently to the Supreme Court’s case law.30
Fourth, the lack of clarity and precision in the definition and 
delimitation of the judicial review functions assigned to the Supreme 
Court. This lack of clarity led to serious inter-institutional conflicts, when 
the Supreme Court’s decisions were seen as intruding upon the functions 
of other branches of government. This occurred in a number of particularly 
sensitive cases, such as when the Court asserted its jurisdiction to decide 
formal claims filed against constitutional amendments, which led to the 
aforementioned declaration of unconstitutionality of two constitutional 
reforms. A second conflict occurred when the Court asserted its 
 27. Decision of June 16, 1976 (text on file with author). 
 28. Actio popularis was also used by law students to carry out academic assignments for their 
Constitutional Law courses or legal clinic practice in public law. 
 29. This happened, for example, with the repression of a trade union protest through exceptional 
Presidential powers. See Decision of October 30, 1978; Decision of December 1, 1986 (text on file 
with author). 
 30. For a balance of the decisions of the Supreme Court of Justice concerning fundamental 
rights, highlighting the importance of the bill of rights and the acción de tutela introduced in 1991, see 
LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991, supra note 10. 
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jurisdiction over laws that approved international treaties. A decision of 
this kind rendered the application of the Colombia-United States 
Extradition Treaty31 impossible, leading to serious consequences for 
Colombian foreign relations. Moreover, the decision significantly lessened 
the effectiveness of measures to fight international organized crime. These 
Court decisions were widely regarded as undue intrusions into the 
Congressional power to reform the Constitution and into Presidential 
authority to direct foreign relations. 
Finally, the system did not possess mechanisms to harmonize relevant 
case law. This situation often created unsolvable contradictions between 
the Supreme Court and the Council of State, which adopted opposite 
decisions in essentially identical cases. This happened, for example, with 
regard to the extradition procedures that were envisioned by the Supreme 
Court as administrative in nature, and, therefore, as procedures under the 
jurisdiction of the Executive branch. The Council of State, however, 
understood them as having a judicial component that required a 
preliminary opinion of the Supreme Court.32 In the same way, the 
possibility of holding a referendum to modify the Constitution was 
accepted obiter dicta by the Supreme Court in several decisions, but 
rejected by the Council of State in the ratio decidendi of a decision that 
stopped the initial stages of a referendum in 1988.33
In the end, these disadvantages proved that the Colombian system of 
constitutional judicial review required serious adjustments, and when the 
reform project was announced, very few voices actually defended it.34 The 
leaders of the two main political parties felt that the existing system had 
gone out of bounds. Progressive sectors, such as human rights NGOs and 
labor movements, felt that the Supreme Court had been too lenient 
towards Executive abuses of State of Siege powers. Citizens, however, 
remained indifferent to technical debates about constitutional topics, 
which seemed irrelevant to their ordinary lives. 
 31. Decision of December 12, 1986 (text on file with author). 
 32. After the Colombia-U.S. extradition treaty was struck down and presidential candidate Luis 
Carlos Galán was murdered, President Virgilio Barco issued a State of Siege decree authorizing 
extradition through administrative procedures. See generally VIRGILIO BARCO, UNA NUEVA 
CONCEPCIÓN DEL ORDEN PÚBLICO (1990).
 33. In 1988, the Council of State declared unconstitutional of a political agreement signed by 
President Barco and opposition leader Misael Pastrana, which outlined the steps to summon a 
referendum to reform the Constitution. For details on the manner in which this decision helped create 
the context to summon the 1991 Constituent Assembly, see MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA, INTRODUCCIÓN A 
LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991 (1993). 
 34. The members of the Supreme Court, of course, opposed it, using arguments that focused on 
the institution’s past performance in its task of safeguarding the agonizing 1886 Constitution. 
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3. The Prevailing Interpretative Approach and the Erosion of the 
Supreme Court’s Legitimacy 
A final factor that contributed to undermining the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the system was the organic-formalist interpretative 
approach. The Supreme Court often adopted this approach, and the 
approach helped broaden the gap between constitutional law and everyday 
socio-political life.  
This situation was perhaps most evident in the field of fundamental 
rights. Although the Supreme Court of Justice issued several judgments on 
the matter,35 the Supreme Court focused predominantly on questions such 
as the jurisdiction of the official who had issued the decision or the 
procedure by which it was adopted, as opposed to the substantive aspects 
of the problems at hand. The Supreme Court’s formal approach to the 
protection and interpretation of fundamental rights gave rise to decisions 
such as its 1978 judgment declaring the constitutionality of a very 
controversial state of siege decree.36 The decree stated that any criminal 
act committed by a member of the armed forces would be justified if it 
took place during previously planned operations launched to prevent or 
repress activities related to kidnapping and drug trafficking. Several 
justices expressed concern that this vague, exonerating provision was 
tantamount to a de facto authorization of the death penalty, but the 
majority of the Court did not support this thesis. The majority argued that 
the death penalty was strictly defined as “a legal figure by which, after 
regular procedures, the State imposes loss of life as a punishment for given 
crimes.” From this extremely formalist perspective, deaths caused by the 
armed forces under the foreseen circumstances did not fit the legal 
definition of the death penalty. Thus, the substantive approach was again 
rejected and the decree upheld. Other examples of this same sort of 
formalistic reasoning are the Court’s 1982 judgments that declared 
constitutional a number of provisions prohibiting judges, notaries, and 
public officials from being homosexuals, living in unmarried couples, or 
engaging in “socially unfit behaviour.”37  
 35. Some of the most notorious Supreme Court pronouncements in the field of fundamental 
rights include the Decision of March 13, 1937 (upholding the law that granted masonic societies the 
right to acquire legal personality, even though they contradicted Catholic morals) (text on file with 
author). 
 36. Decision of March 9, 1978 (text on file with author). 
 37. Decision of June 1, 1982, Ricardo Medina, J.; Decision of August 12, 1982, Manuel Gaona 
Cruz, J.; Decision of July 22, 1982, Ricardo Medina, J. (text on file with author).  
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The main consequence of this organic-formalist approach was a 
substantial increase in the distance separating the Constitution from 
society. Pre-1991 constitutional doctrine can hardly ever be read as a 
response to the challenges posed to the legal system by the harsh and 
complex Colombian realities. Without disregarding the quality of the 
judgments, constitutionality decisions issued by the Supreme Court before 
1991 were not felt by everyday citizens, political actors, or social 
organizations to represent a dialogue between the Constitution and the 
needs and expectations of the time. Many lawyers regarded this 
phenomenon as a virtue, in terms of autonomy of the law and isolation of 
the judiciary from contingent issues, public opinion, and majority trends. 
However, this lack of “dialogue” between the Constitution and reality, the 
privileged forum of which is the body in charge of constitutional judicial 
review, eventually gave rise to negative reactions. Many social actors 
reacted negatively because they felt that they did not fit into the 
Constitution or that the Constitution was indifferent to their legitimate 
claims for justice and political change. These social actors saw some of the 
Supreme Court’s decisions as barriers to the changes they were 
sponsoring. 
These problems became more severe during the eighties. The first two 
governments of this decade publicly expressed their dissatisfaction with 
some sudden changes in the Supreme Court’s doctrine. Regarding the 
states of exception, the Supreme Court’s doctrine became much more 
restrictive than the traditional line. This change occurred despite the 
upsurge in the country’s violence, which was fueled by narco-terrorism 
and a deep economic crisis. One exemplary case was the declaration of 
unconstitutionality of the tax reform adopted by President Betancourt 
during a state of economic emergency (yet during President López 
Michelsen’s government, the Court upheld a tax reform adopted under 
identical economic emergency decrees). In a second case the Supreme 
Court struck down the state of siege decrees issued by President Barco to 
respond to narco-terrorism and to speed up social investment in the 
poorest areas of the country where guerrilla influence was growing. This 
decision led the President to appear on television and ask the Court to 
consider the real context within which the government’s decisions were 
adopted. 
The proposal to create a Constitutional Court that would safeguard the 
integrity and supremacy of the Constitution gained more strength after 
these Supreme Court decisions. However, the real reasons that led the 
Constituent Assembly to create an independent, specialized constitutional 
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tribunal were not so much related to past controversies as to future needs 
and hopes.38
B. The 1991 Modification of Constitutional Judicial Review 
Let us go back to 1991.39 A Constituent Assembly, summoned in 1990 
through democratic elections under the leadership of President César 
Gaviria, repealed the 1886 Constitution and adopted a new constitution. 
The new Constitution was adopted after a thorough process of public 
debate, by far the most inclusive in the country’s recent history; even 
active guerrilla groups took part in the discussions.40 The 1991 
 38. One can appraise the constitutional system of judicial review that operated before 1991 from 
a different perspective. In spite of the deep and accelerated transformation of constitutional law in the 
United States and several European democracies during the second half of the twentieth century, 
Colombian constitutional case law seemed to lag behind, ignoring the advances achieved in these 
countries. The great issues of post-war constitutional law were not embodied in Colombian judicial or 
scholarly thought behind the 1886 Constitution. Among the broad array of eloquent silences and 
omissions, those that refer to the interpretation of rights, particularly the principles of equality, 
freedom of expression, and privacy, are noteworthy. This may be due in part to the fact that under the 
former Constitution, a very close cooperation among the different branches of public power probably 
inhibited the development of strong case-law tendencies in this field. But there are two additional 
factors. The first factor relates to the Latin American context. The impact of the opposition between 
capitalism and communism on the subcontinent, the cold war and the doctrines and policies that 
followed it in the western hemisphere, resulted in a generalized misrepresentation and sub-valuation of 
the issue of rights, placing them on the left side of the ideological spectrum. Armed conflict increased 
this noxious effect of the Cold War in Colombia, although the country did not give in to military 
authoritarianism, as many nearby states did. With the Constituent Assembly, rights became a subject 
of national consensus, and their effective protection a matter of general, not ideological interest. The 
second factor regards the prevailing influence of the French school of legal thought. Although there is 
no doubt that French legal culture has inspired key Colombian institutions and prompted important 
advances in our legal system, French constitutional law lost global prominence after the 1960s. 
German and Italian constitutional law, first, and then Spanish constitutional law, after the fall of 
Franco and the installation of the Constitutional Tribunal, replaced French law influence in several key 
areas. Although French constitutional scholars, such as Louis Favoreu and Olivier Duhamel, among 
others, noticed what was happening and promoted radical progress and comparative analysis, they 
were not as well known in Colombia as their administrative law colleagues, so their influence only 
began to be felt after 1991. See MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA-ESPINOSA, DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL 
JURISPRUDENCIAL (2001). 
 39. A very complex socio-political process evolved between the original proposal of a plebiscite 
to approve the creation of a Constituent Assembly. It was launched by President Virgilio Barco in 
January 1988, and the proclamation of the new Constitution on July 4, 1991 under President César 
Gaviria’s leadership. A generalized feeling of national compromise, reconstruction, and modernization 
was reflected in this new Constitution, which came to life as the result of the overall consensus 
reached by the seventy-two individual members of the Constituent Assembly. The Assembly 
represented all active political forces, four guerrilla groups, and most social sectors, including 
indigenous peoples. 
 40. Based on a popular mandate, the constitutional reform process began with a twofold purpose: 
(i) to promote participatory democracy or the empowerment of citizens for direct and effective 
involvement in the public and private decision-making processes, and (ii) to strengthen state 
institutions, especially the judiciary. The opening of strong participation channels for citizens, together 
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Constitution came to life as the symbol of a peaceful rebellion, held within 
institutional channels and against arbitrariness, exclusion, and abuses of 
power. Moreover, the new Constitution became a new, inspiring horizon 
in Colombia’s uphill battle for peace and equality in society.  
A series of innovative mechanisms and institutions were introduced in 
order to guarantee that the new Constitution, particularly its generous bill 
of rights, would transcend mere words and became a social reality. This 
constitutional enforcement system was to be composed of new bodies, 
new procedures, and new criteria to guide constitutional interpretation. 
New public entities were created, with the specific functions of 
safeguarding the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution (e.g., the 
Constitutional Court),41 and promoting and protecting fundamental rights, 
such as the public ombudsman (Defensoría del Pueblo).42 New procedures 
were introduced to safeguard different types of rights and interests 
protected by the Constitution, including those designed to protect 
fundamental rights (acción de tutela),43 to order administrative authorities 
to fulfil their legal mandates in specific situations (acción de 
cumplimiento),44 to protect collective rights (acción popular),45 and to 
secure the rights of specific social groups (acción de grupo,46 which is 
similar to class actions in the United States). In addition, the Constitution 
left the door open for Congress to create any other mechanisms and 
procedures deemed appropriate to safeguard constitutionally protected 
rights.47  
New criteria were established to guide the interpretation of the 
Constitution. These criteria were not initially adopted by the Constituent 
with the need to sustain the legitimacy of public institutions through a change in the traditional 
understanding of representative democracy, constituted the major arguments in favor of reinforcing 
democratic participation by reforming the Constitution. Within large segments of the Colombian 
population, the promotion of participatory democracy appealed to growing rejection and distrust of the 
prevailing political customs, patronage, and patterns of privilege and corruption. Moreover, the ideal 
of participatory democracy materialized before the public opinion in the very same Constituent 
Assembly’s creation process, thus exemplifying the feasibility of true participation, and prompting its 
incorporation, as a value, a principle, and a right, into the new constitutional text. From this standpoint, 
the entire Constitution may be viewed as a tool to promote democratic participation in public and 
private affairs.  
 41. CONSTITUCIÓN POLITICA DE COLOMBIA DE 1991 [THE 1991 CONSTITUTION OF COLOMBIA], 
Title VIII, Ch. 4 [hereinafter COLOMBIAN CONST.]. 
 42. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 281–283. 
 43. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 86. 
 44. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 87. 
 45. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 88. 
 46. Id. 
 47. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 89. 
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Assembly,48 and therefore not included in the Constitution’s text, but were 
later developed and applied by the Constitutional Court. These criteria 
include reasonability, proportionality, protection of the “essential nucleus” 
of constitutional rights, and direct application of fundamental 
constitutional rights even in the absence of legal regulations. Mandatory 
reference to international treaties when interpreting fundamental rights 
was included in Article 93 of the Constitution. 
Among these innovations, the creation of the Constitutional Court was 
an especially thorny issue that caused considerable debate among 
Constituent Assembly delegates. The actual proposal did not initially raise 
very much enthusiasm, because the Supreme Court had recently upheld 
the creation and election of the Constituent Assembly. However, the 
proposal eventually garnered enough support to build the necessary 
majority. The 1991 reform introduced other types of modifications to the 
constitutional system of judicial review, including a significant expansion 
of its scope and instruments and substantial changes in the constitutional 
judge’s functions and powers. The prevailing spirit of national 
transformation nutured the new system of judicial review with 
unprecedented vigour. 
1. The Debate Over the Creation of the Constitutional Court Within 
the Constituent Assembly 
The transformation of the constitutional system of judicial review gave 
rise to lengthy discussions within the Constituent Assembly. The first and 
perhaps most divisive topic was the need to create a Constitutional Court. 
Although this idea was not new to Colombian academic debates, none of 
the main political forces represented in the Constituent Assembly 
proposed that the Supreme Court lose the power of judicial review to a 
specialized Constitutional Court. The proposal was included in the 
Constitution project presented by President Gaviria’s government to the 
Assembly.49 The President actively supported the Constitutional Court’s 
 48. The new Constitution proposal presented by President Gaviria to the Constituent Assembly 
included some of those criteria. See Proyecto de Acto Reformatorio de la Constitución Política 
(Presidencia de la República, 1991). Nevertheless, two criteria suggested by the Government were 
expressly included in the Constitution: direct and immediate application of certain rights (although the 
list finally adopted in the Assembly is incomplete and anti-technical), and proportionality in the 
context of states of exception. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 85, 214. 
 49. Within President Gaviria’s Government, there were also serious internal disagreements on 
whether the proposal to the Constituent Assembly should include a Constitutional Court, or whether it 
would be preferable to maintain judicial review powers in the hands of the Supreme Court of Justice. 
This divergence, the most intense internal one, was finally resolved by President Gaviria in favor of 
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creation for practical considerations, such as the Supreme Court’s material 
inability to deal with the upcoming increase in its workload as arbiter of 
the Constitution. The Supreme Court would now be responsible for 
reviewing all judicial decisions enforcing fundamental rights. The 
President also recognized the need to entrust a new court with the mission 
of preserving the innovative spirit of the new Constitution. Although this 
proposal met with opposition from conservative quarters, it was eventually 
accepted by a short margin, and the new constitutional tribunal was 
created.50
The idea of setting up a court with the delicate and critical mission of 
safeguarding the integrity and supremacy of the Constitution had surfaced 
several times in the course of the previous four decades.51 Nevertheless, 
since the 1950s, these occassional proposals were simply presented as 
solutions to specific excesses or deficiencies in the Supreme Court’s work. 
The proposals did not raise much public controversy and quickly faded 
away. Despite this background, none of the political parties or groups 
represented in the Constituent Assembly proposed establishing a 
constitutional tribunal, except for President Gaviria’s government. 
This fact may be explained in several ways. First, as a consequence of 
the century-old tradition of constitutional judicial review in the hands of 
the Supreme Court of Justice, the proposal to create a Constitutional Court 
never really raised broad or sustained support among scholars and 
politicians. In that sense, the evident failures in the existing system of 
constitutional judicial review were visualized as specific problems that 
could be easily resolved through focused, isolated reforms for each 
individual issue. Second, nostalgic and proud fondness for tradition 
prevented anyone from daring to imagine a completely new system. Third, 
the political situation of the groups that favored major constitutional 
the creation of a Constitutional Court, against the position of his Minister of Justice, who was a former 
Supreme Court Justice. 
 50. For a comparison of some easy and difficult votings within the Constituent Assembly, see 
generally MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA,: LA ASAMBLEA CONSTITUYENTE POR DENTRO: MITOS Y 
REALIDADES (1993). 
 51. Some of the more salient (and failed) proposals to create an independent constitutional 
tribunal, include (i) a proposal by legal expert and Senator Carlos Restrepo Piedrahita during the 1968 
constitutional reform process giving rise to a constitutional chamber within the Supreme Court of 
Justice, which had, until then, carried out constitutional review functions through the Full Chamber; 
(ii) a proposal included in the constitutional reform proposal launched by president Alfonso López 
Michelsen and approved by Congress in 1976; and (iii) a proposal initially included in the 
constitutional reform process under President Julio César Turbay Ayala in 1979, which was rejected 
by Congress during a second round of debates. Other notorious political figures had supported similar 
proposals, such as presidential candidate Alvaro Gómez in the 1970s and presidential designee Darío 
Echandía in the 1950s.  
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transformations made it difficult for such groups to propose the creation of 
a Constitutional Court. These groups were factions of the liberal party and 
the “M-19 Democratic Alliance Movement” (Movimiento Alianza 
Democrática M-19), which was led by demobilized guerrillas. The liberal 
faction was divided because the party had not presented a consolidated list 
of candidates to the Assembly. Thus, there was no single liberal party 
Constitution project, but different proposals presented individually by 
liberal party delegates. As for the M-19 movement, it presented a 
consolidated list of candidates and a single Constitution project in two 
separate documents, but it did not include a proposal to create a 
constitutional court. The Movement refrained from doing so for two 
reasons. First, symbolicly, having initiated the violent seizure of the Palace 
of Justice in 1985, which resulted in the destruction of the Supreme Court 
Justice’s premises and the deaths of over half of the Justices,52 the 
Movement could not legitimately propose the abolition of the Supreme 
Court as a constitutional tribunal without exposing itself to severe 
criticism. Second, politically, the legal scholars who formed part of the M-
19’s group of delegates included ex-justice José María Velazco Guerrero, 
who had drafted the judgment by which the Supreme Court banned the 
“little Constituent Assembly” launched by President Alfonso López 
Michelsen in 1976.  
The conservative forces also did not propose the creation of a 
constitutional court. The faction led by Alvaro Gómez, a former sponsor 
of the idea, did not submit a new proposal for the constitution project. 
Instead, Gomez’s faction submitted a number of specific project proposals 
related to central issues on its agenda. Misael Pastrana’s faction did not 
present a Constitution project proposal and vigorously defended the work 
carried out by the Supreme Court of Justice. Quite curiously, the leading 
lawyers in Pastrana’s faction saw the creation of a constitutional court, not 
as the adoption of a European institution, but as an attempt to grant 
excessive strength to the judiciary. They also felt that it would give 
judicial decisions too much importance as sources of law, which were 
identified, paradoxically, with the US experience.  
For these reasons, support for the idea of creating a constitutional court 
was left exclusively in the hands of President Gaviria’s Government. The 
proposal was actively espoused and defended by the Executive from the 
beginning of the Constituent process, to ensure the future active 
 52. The exact number of casualties has never been established. 
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enforcement and development of the new constitution.53 Practical 
considerations were derived from the creation of the writ of protection for 
fundamental rights (acción de tutela), which would substantially expand 
the workload of the constitutional tribunal. There was a clear need to 
establish a sort of fundamental rights court with enough time and 
resources available to supervise the application of this new procedure by 
all the judges in the country, and therefore able to review most tutela 
decisions. The Supreme Court of Justice could not assume the high 
workload of this system because it was already overburdened with its 
function as cour de cassation or the highest tribunal for civil, criminal, and 
labor cases.  
The Government’s second argument in support of the creation of a 
constitutional court was the need to create a judicial body that could fully 
develop the contents of the Constitution. There was a need to build upon 
the broad and inclusive base that gave birth to the Constitution, and within 
the spirit of pluralism, participation, equality, and respect for human 
dignity that inspired it. A second need existed to guide the lower judges’ 
interpretations of the fundamental rights provisions that the Constitution 
contained. Third, a judicial body should have the power to adopt 
legitimate and final decisions to resolve disputes over the content or scope 
of the new Constitution.  
Despite their weight, these arguments were not enough to build a solid 
majority within the Constituent Assembly in favor of creating a 
constitutional court. Nonetheless, a blunt, timely, and persuasive address 
by President Gaviria to the delegates, in which he encouraged them to 
redefine the system of constitutional judicial review in order to preserve 
the new Constitution, charged the minds of many delegates:  
Sooner or later, the following questions will have to be answered: 
who is going to be in charge of the immense responsibility of 
interpreting and giving jurisprudential development to the new 
Constitution? To whom are you going to trust the task of promoting 
the constitutional innovations that will emerge from this Assembly 
in the decades to come? Who will ensure that that this new 
Constitution will last, and that it will adapt itself to the dynamic 
 53. The Minister of Government at the time, Humberto de la Calle Lombana, also played a 
crucial role in defending the proposal. The relevant debates can be followed in the official publication 
of the Constituent Assembly, GACETA CONSTITUCIONAL [THE CONSTITUTIONAL GAZETTE], No. 36, 7, 
26, No. 56, 5, No. 64, 11, No. 72, 9, No. 74, 3, No. 75, 16, No. 81, 16, No. 82, 2, No. 84, 7, No. 85, 12, 
14, No. 91, 4, No. 95, 2, No. 102, 2, No. 109, 31, No. 113, 17, No. 115, 19, No. 124, 3, 12, No. 127, 
32, No. 135, 7, No. 137, 4, No. 141, 10, No. 143, 7, 8. 
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Colombian reality? And above all, which body is going to have the 
mission of preventing any other powerful authority from hampering 
the transformations you are encouraging with laws, decrees, 
resolutions, orders, or any other administrative decisions or 
happenings? . . .Let us think of the future. The new Constitution 
requires, in order to be adequately applied, a new system of 
constitutional judicial review.54
One additional reason encouraged the creation of a Constitutional 
Court: active, public Supreme Court opposition to this proposal and to 
other innovations valued by the delegates. This attitude, and a good deal of 
bargaining, led to the final approval of the Court’s creation by secret 
ballot. The final count was forty-four delegates in favor and twenty-six 
against, with one publicly negative vote.55
The Constitutional Court must have an uneven number of justices.56 It 
is currently composed of nine justices.57 The system by which the 
members of the Constitutional Court are designated is radically different 
from the previous method of election of justices in Colombia. This change 
was intended to increase the Court’s representativity and strengthen its 
legitimacy. The cooptación scheme and the political parity requirement 
were abolished because of their incompatibility with the open and 
pluralistic spirit of the new Constitution. The Court’s members do not 
have to be public law experts, and the justices are now elected by the 
Senate of the Republic.58 As part of the process the Supreme Court, the 
Council of State, and the President of the Republic, each submit three lists 
of three candidates for consideration. Because the Senate is popularly 
elected, the Justices on the Constitutional Court are selected by indirect 
popular election. The justices serve one non-renewable eight-year period, 
 54. Informal translation. See LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN DE 1991, 
supra note 10. 
 55. Antonio Navarro Wolff, the M-19 leader and co-president of the Constituent Assembly, 
issued his negative vote publicly for the above-explained symbolic reasons. Now, as a member of 
Congress, he has actively supported the Constitutional Court’s existence and role, as he did when he 
was mayor of Pasto, the capital of the southern department of Nariño. 
 56. The number of justices, their election system and their period are governed by Articles 239 
and 240 of the Constitution. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 239–240. 
 57. The first transition Court (1992–1993) had seven justices, appointed for a one-year period as 
follows: two by the President of the Republic, one by the Supreme Court of Justice, one by the Council 
of State, one by the Public Attorney (Procurador General de la Nación), and two by these five justices 
from lists of three candidates submitted by the President of the Republic. Transitory Article 22 of the 
Constitution. 
 58. The Senate of the Republic is the second chamber of Congress, popularly elected by national 
constituency. 
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in contrast to the members of the Congressional and Executive branches of 
power,59 who serve four-year terms.  
2. A New System of Constitutional Judicial Review for a New 
Constitution 
In addition to the creation of the Constitutional Court, the 1991 
Constituent Assembly introduced other changes to the pre-existing system 
of constitutional judicial review in order to correct its malfunctions and 
adapt it to the new framework and future challenges. These adjustments 
may be grouped into four broad categories: (i) an expansion of the 
concrete review system through the acción de tutela, (ii) an extension of 
ex officio review to new types of norms, including a more precise 
definition of the types of acts and decisions subjected to the Court’s 
scrutiny, (iii) an overall broadening of the scope of application of the actio 
popularis and its procedure, and (iv) the adoption of means to 
contextualize abstract judicial review of laws.  
a. Acción de Tutela and Concrete Review 
Constitutional judicial review in specific, individual cases, or concrete 
review, was significantly expanded in 1991 with the creation of the acción 
de tutela60 (writ of protection of fundamental rights).61
The acción de tutela enables any person whose fundamental rights are 
being threatened or violated to request that a judge with territorial 
 59. The independence of the Constitutional Court is safeguarded by a number of specific 
provisions. First, there is a general principle of independence embodied in a fifty year old tradition. 
Second, financial autonomy, because the court’s budget is proposed and implemented by another 
judicial body (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura). Third, justices cannot be appointed by the 
Executive to any executive office until one year has elapsed since their retirement from the Court. 
Fourth, justices’ salaries must always rise at a rate equivalent to the average of all public salaries’ 
annual increase. Fifth, justices cannot accept nominations for posts, rewards or honors from any 
foreign governments or international organizations, nor can they execute contracts with such 
organizations without previous authorization. COLOMBIAN CONST. art 129. Sixth, justices are 
forbidden from participating in ex parte contacts. Seventh, the Constitutional Court adopts its own 
rules of internal procedure. Eighth, Justices cannot be dismissed or suspended from their posts, unless 
such measures are adopted within impeachment procedures by Congress (if Senate accepts a formal 
accusation by the House of Representatives in full). 
 60. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 86. 
 61. Concrete review was also expanded with the creation of three other judicial actions designed 
to protect specific types of rights or interests: acción de cumplimiento (created to order public 
administrative officials to fulfil their legal duties in particular cases), acción popular (designed to 
protect collective interests such as the environment or cultural heritage) and acción colectiva (similar 
to common law class actions). However, the Court’s main pronouncements in concrete review have 
been issued in relation to the first of these mechanisms, acción de tutela. 
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jurisdiction protect that person’s fundamental rights. This measure serves 
to protect the integrity of the Constitution. Citizens may file informal 
claims without an attorney, before any judge in the country. That judge is 
legally bound to give priority attention to the request over any other 
business. Judges have a strict deadline of ten days to reach a decision and, 
where appropriate, to issue a mandatory and immediate order. In 
accordance with the requirements of the specific situation, the tutela 
procedure allows judges to order the adoption of any measure necessary to 
protect threatened fundamental rights, even before rendering a final 
judgment. In addition, every single tutela judgment can be reviewed by the 
Constitutional Court, which will select those that it considers necessary to 
correct or pertinent for the development of its own case law, and issue a 
corresponding judgment. Except for decisions in which the Court seeks to 
unify its doctrine on a given matter (Sentencias de Unificación or 
“Unification Judgments”) or decisions that are adopted by the Full 
Chamber (Sala Plena), tutela judgments are issued by Review Chambers 
(Salas de Revisión). The Review Chambers are composed of three 
magistrates; there are nine Chambers, each one presided over by one of the 
nine magistrates.62
Although the tutela is formally defined in the Constitution as a means 
to protect fundamental rights in the Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
has issued numerous and uniform decisions expanding the catalogue of 
rights. These decisions have direct and immediate application beyond 
Chapter I, Title Two of the Constitution, which contains the formal 
catalogue of fundamental rights, including economic, social and cultural 
rights, and collective rights. The nature of the right depends on the 
circumstances of each case, the gravity of the allegations, and the 
vulnerability of the plaintiff. Still, the constitutional doctrine concerning 
the enforceability of such rights is still in the making.63 Moreover, the 
protective spirit that is usually present in Colombian constitutional case-
law has expanded in several ways. First, incorporated entities are now 
 62. Legislative Decree 2591 of 1991 regulates acción de tutela. Legislative Decree 2067 of 1991 
regulates the procedure for the abstract review of legal provisions. Statutory Law 270 of 1996 
regulates the organization and functioning of the Administration of Justice, and introduced some 
reforms to the above-mentioned decrees. 
 63. The Constituent Assembly devoted significant attention to the need to define the actual rights 
which would be enforceable through the acción de tutela, but the discussion eventually lost focus. In 
addition, the overall constitutional system for the protection of fundamental rights was the result of the 
work of three different subcommissions within the Assembly. In the end, certain aspects, such as 
actual rights, were not adequately defined. It was therefore left to the Court to define the catalogue of 
enforceable rights, and Decree 2591 of 1991 recognizes the Court’s wide margin of interpretation in 
order to carry out such task in each individual case. 
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allowed to make use of this action. This development recognizes the 
existence of fundamental rights on their behalf because of their definition 
as legal entities. Second, the writ now includes all state authorities and 
officials as potential respondents in such a claim, making them potential 
violators of fundamental human rights.64 Third, the jurisprudence allows 
the presentation of tutela claims against private persons in positions of 
power, provided that certain conditions are met. This substantial expansion 
of the tutela procedure’s admissibility has had the effect of granting a 
higher degree of protection to all types of constitutionally-protected 
fundamental rights. However, it has also excessively increased the Court’s 
workload, as will be shown later in Part II.A.1.65
b. The Expansion of Automatic (Ex-officio) Abstract Review 
The Constitution also expanded the catalogue of acts and decisions that 
must be reviewed ex-officio by the constitutional tribunal.66 Under the 
1886 Constitution, this review procedure was restricted to decrees issued 
under states of siege or economic emergency, and it was carried out after 
their promulgation. Today, in addition to the decrees issued under any of 
the so-called “states of exception,” the Constitutional Court must carry out 
an automatic review of the following types of laws: (i) all laws that 
approve international treaties, as well as the treaties themselves, which 
must be adopted by Congress and reviewed by the Court before the 
Executive can ratify them; (ii) statutory laws,67 which are reviewed by the 
 64. This is very important in the Colombian context, because no authority can claim either 
immunity or special fora rights. Therefore, the President of the Republic has been respondent in 
several tutela claims, as have active members of the Police and the Armed Forces. 
 65. Since the adoption of its first judgments, the Court rejected all formalist theses that sought to 
restrict the scope of the tutela and that were grounded on two arguments. First, a very literal one held 
that the only fundamental rights were those included in Chapter I of Title II of the Constitution, 
entitled “Of Fundamental Rights.” A second, highly formalistic thesis, held that judicial procedures 
before the ordinary and administrative jurisdictions were, by the sole fact of existing and being legally 
available, the adequate channels to resolve all controversies related to fundamental rights. Tutela 
actions would therefore only proceed when the legal system did not provide a specific solution. The 
Court emphatically rejected both arguments, and since Decision T-002 of 1992 the Court has 
developed an approach centered on guaranteeing the rights and principles that the tutela was created to 
defend, and progressively expanding the catalogue of such rights. The controversy is still alive, in the 
sense that the formalistic perspective is still influential in some legal circles. However, the prevailing 
trend within the judiciary and public opinion is that when a constitutional fundamental right is violated 
or threatened, tutela is the appropriate instrument to obtain judicial protection if ordinary channels are 
not effective. 
 66. The jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court is directly regulated by Article 241 of the 
Constitution. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 241. 
 67. This refers to laws that regulate specific matters enumerated in the Constitution, such as 
fundamental rights, participation mechanisms, states of exception, the Administration of Justice, and 
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Court before the President signs them; (iii) acts that summon a constituent 
assembly or a referendum to modify the Constitution, which can only be 
reviewed for procedureal validity; and (iv) approval or derogation 
referendums, as well as other democratic participation mechanisms such as 
national popular consultations and national plebiscites.68
c. The Broadening of Actio Popularis to Trigger Abstract Judicial 
Review 
Citizen access to the system of abstract judicial review is secured by 
the continuation of the pre-existing actio popularis (public 
unconstitutionality action), which was significantly broadened by the 1991 
Constituent Assembly. Actio popularis may be filed by any citizen against 
laws, constitutional amendments (with regard to their procedural validity), 
and decrees issued by the Government in exercise of delegated legislation 
powers. Pre-1991 laws that approve international treaties may also be 
challenged through actio popularis,69 but such laws if issued after 1991 are 
subject to automatic review by the Court before their promulgation.  
Actio popularis may be filed by citizens with few formalities, without 
representation by an attorney, and without having to demonstrate a 
specific legal interest in the subject matter of the claim. The public 
ombudsman (Defensor del Pueblo), created by the 1991 Constitution, can 
also file an actio popularis before the Court as part of her function as 
promoter of fundamental rights. Parties who may intervene in abstract 
review, apart from the plaintiff, include any citizen who wishes to support 
or oppose the claim, the Procurador General de la Nación, whose 
intervention is mandatory as part of her function as promoter of society’s 
interests, and the authorities who took part in the production of the norm 
then subject to review.  
other important topics that are deemed to be best protected through statutory laws’ special adoption 
procedure). 
 68. National Plebiscites may only be reviewed for procedural validity. “Popular consultations,” 
defined in Articles 104 and 105 of the Constitution, are participation mechanisms by which the 
President, governors, or mayors may pose a specific question of general interest to the people. The role 
of the people on such a question has binding effects only if the minimum participation conditions are 
met and a majority of valid votes are received. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 104–105. This figure is 
regulated by the Statutory Law on Popular Participation Mechanisms, Ley 134 de 1994 (Law 134 of 
1994). “Plebiscites” are defined by law as participation mechanisms by which the President of the 
Republic may summon the people in order to request its binding pronouncement on policies of the 
Executive that do not require approval by Congress, except for those related with states of exception 
and the exercise of the corresponding powers. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 103. This figure is also 
regulated by the Statutory Law on Popular Participation Mechanisms. Law 134 of 1994, supra. 
 69. Decision C-400 of 1998 (text on file with author). 
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The new structure limits procedural delays,70 which is resulting in a 
much higher number of abstract review decisions by the Constitutional 
Court than there was under the Supreme Court. Decisions are adopted by 
the affirmative vote of a majority of the members of the Court. Dissenting 
magistrates may express their opinions in separate documents attached to 
the judgment (salvamentos de voto). Justices who agree with the decision, 
but for reasons which are different or additional to those expressed by the 
majority, may write concurring opinions (aclaraciones de voto). 
A statute of limitations was introduced for an actio popularis 
challenging the procedural validity of any law or constitutional 
mechanism. Therefore, if one year has elapsed since their adoption, these 
acts cannot be struck down on the basis of procedural defects; laws can, 
however, be challenged and reviewed on substantive grounds.71
d. The Means to Contextualize Abstract Review 
The Court has broad access to any sources of specialized information 
that may aid in the delivery of its judgment, including the expert opinions 
of individuals, universities, or organizations. This option is widely used 
when professional or technical information is required. The Court may 
also take into account the opinions of the Executive Cabinet members, 
who are notified of every unconstitutionality actio popularis and summon 
public hearings to gather information on the socio-political context of the 
matter at hand.  
These innovations were intended to prevent formalistic judicial review 
and to introduce a more contentious procedure before the Court. Apart 
from these explicitly-stated objectives, the introduction of a means to 
encourage the participation of experts, social organizations, and public 
officials in the judicial review process also sought to bring facts and 
conflicting perceptions of social reality to the Court’s attention. This 
innovation was meant to help the Court review a given law within the 
Colombian context. The Court’s use this power to request that public 
 70. Once an actio popularis has been assigned to one of the Justices, she has ten days to decide 
on its admissibility. Once admitted, the claim is sent to the Procurador General de la Nación in order 
for him or her to issue a constitutionality assessment within the following thirty days. Simultaneously, 
the regulations at issue are published by the Court’s secretary in a special “list” for ten days, so that 
any citizen can intervene in the procedure. Once this period has elapsed and the Procurador General 
has sent the corresponding assessment, the individual Justice has thirty days to produce a decision 
draft, which is presented to the Plenary Chamber, which will then have sixty more days to adopt the 
decision. If these delays are violated, the justices can be dismissed. During ex officio review of state of 
Exception decrees, delays are cut by two thirds. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 242. 
 71. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 242. 
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officials argue in defense of the legislation under review and present 
relevant factual evidence. This has typically happened in two situations: (i) 
during the review of procedural defects in the adoption of a law,72 or (ii) 
during the review of decrees that declare states of exception, based on the 
need to solve critical public order situations or socio-economic 
emergencies.73  
This new system, and the broad functions it conferred on the Court, 
alerted some individuals and groups to the potential dangers that could 
arise from such an increase in the constitutional judges’ power. 
Nevertheless, since its inception, the Constitution submitted its own 
guardian too clear checks on its power by different parties. An overview of 
the checks and balances mechanisms is presented in Part IV below.  
II. THE ROLE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT: “ADJUDICATING” AT THE 
“CENTER OF THE STORM” 
A. The Jurisdiction and Work of the Court 
According to Article 241 of the Colombian Constitution, there are four 
mechanisms of access to the Court: (i) the public unconstitutionality action 
(actio popularis);74 (ii) ex-officio control of certain types of provisions, 
mainly presidential decrees of states of exception, laws summoning a 
constitutional referendum or a constituent assembly, laws approving 
international treaties, and statutory laws; (iii) review of bills as an arbiter, 
whenever Congress overrules a presidential veto in constitutionality 
 72. When a law is challenged for procedural validity, the Court usually requests that the relevant 
authorities send copies of the legislative dossier in order to verify the law’s compliance with formal 
requirements. One example would be decision C-557 of 2000, in which the law that approved the 
National Development Plan for 1999–2002 was challenged and struck down on procedural grounds. In 
this case, the Court requested that the General Secretaries of the Senate and the Chamber of 
Representatives, as well as the Director of the National Planning Department, issue official 
certifications concerning specific parts of the Law’s approval procedure.  
 73. In these cases, experts or public officials are usually asked to ascertain whether the precise 
factual constitutional requirements have been met. For example, Decision C-122 of 1999, Fabio 
Moron Diaz, J., In re Decreto No. 2330 de 1998 (Decree 2330 of 1998), while reviewing the 
constitutionality of Decree 2330 of 1998 (declaring a state of economic and social emergency), the 
Court requested specialized official opinions, from the Superintendent of Banks, the Governing Board 
of the Bank of the Republic, the Financial Institutions’ Guarantees Fund (FOGAFIN), the Minister of 
Public Finance and Credit, the General Controller of the Republic (Contralor General de la República) 
and the Director of the National Planning Department, on specific matters relating to the circumstances 
invoked by the President to issue said decree. 
 74. The Court can also review legislative referenda, consultive referenda, and plebiscites (the 
latter only procedural grounds). But there is a debate on whether these should be reviewed ex officio or 
after an actio popularis has been filed against them. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 241.3. 
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issues; and (iv) discretionary review of any tutela judgment issued by any 
judge in the country. The first three mechanisms trigger abstract judicial 
review.75 The fourth triggers judicial review in concrete cases. 
Through these four mechanisms, every single law passed by Congress, 
constitutional amendment (on the grounds of procedural requirements), 
and judicial decision issued by civil, criminal, labor and other judges 
throughout the country may be judicially reviewed. As a general rule, 
administrative acts are excluded from the Court’s jurisdiction, because 
their review would infringe on the power of the Council of State, which is 
the highest judicial authority within the “administrative” jurisdiction.76 
However, the Court is empowered to review the constitutionality of 
administrative decisions that violate or threaten fundamental rights in 
concrete cases. In the case of certain types of presidential decrees that are 
not considered administrative acts, the Court may also review the 
legislation. This includes administrative acts issued under delegated 
legislative powers, under states of exception, or under exceptional 
circumstances to promulgate the national budget or the national 
development plan.77 In addition, when the Court reviews a decision 
adopted by an administrative judge, it may render a judgment concerning 
not only the constitutionality of the judicial decision itself, but also the 
relevant administrative acts, if such action is necessary to protect the 
effective enjoyment of a fundamental right. 
It is no surprise that the Court has adopted thousands of decisions on 
most areas of the diverse and complex Colombian reality. In order to 
illustrate the magnitude and influence of its work, the following part will 
make a brief overview of some numerical aspects of its output over the 
past decade, and its main decisions and case law tendencies. 
 75. An additional abstract review trigger occurs when Congress overrides the Presidential veto of 
a bill. 
 76. Article 237 of the Constitution assigns the Council of State the following functions: (i) to act 
as the highest tribunal on administrative matters, (ii) to decide upon invalidity complaints presented 
against governmental decrees that do not fall under the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, (iii) to 
be the highest consulting organ of the government in matters pertaining to public administration 
(mandatory in cases of passage of foreign troops through national territory), (iv) to prepare and present 
constitutional amendment projects and bills, (v) to decide on the destitution of members of Congress 
(pérdida de investidura) when they are accused of violating conflict of interests laws or constitutional 
provisions, and (vi) to carry out any other function ascribed by law. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 237. 
 77. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 241.5 and 241.7. 
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1. A Quantitative Overview 
A look at the statistics will highlight the evolution of the Constitutional 
Court’s workload. First, the Court’s workload is truly immense, and it has 
steadily increased, going from 235 decisions in 1992 to 1123 decisions in 
2002—an approximate 477% increase. Second, there has been an 
especially sharp escalation in the number of tutela decisions. In 1992, 
8,060 tutela decisions reached the Court for discretionary review. By 
2001, that number reached 133,273—an almost sixteen-fold increase. This 
increase was a consequence of social and political factors which have led 
people to use this mechanism ever more frequently. Third, abstract review 
decisions have also increased in number going from fifty-three in 1992, to 
339 in 2002—an approximate 639% increase. This increase was mostly 
because actio popularis have also been increasingly filed by citizens in 
order to protect the abstract compatibility between the laws and the 
Constitution and to promote fundamental rights issues.78 Fourth, abstract 
judicial review amounts to thirty-two percent of the total final decisions 
rendered by the Court, while concrete review in tutela cases represents 
sixty-eight percent of this figure. Fifth, the Court has protected the rights 
of the plaintiff in fifty-eight percent of the total tutela cases decided. Sixth, 
the percentage of abstract review decisions in which the corresponding law 
or legislative decree has been declared unconstitutional, in whole or in 
part, is very high reaching twenty-seven percent. Finally, Magistrates’ 
voting, although divided in the most controversial cases, can be regarded 
as fairly unanimous—in seventy-seven percent of abstract review 
decisions no dissenting or concurring opinions were issued.  
The sheer numerical output of the Constitutional Court is impressive. 
In eleven years, it has issued a total of 9,442 judgments or an average of 
840 decisions per year. This figure illustrates the Court’s efficiency, but 
also reveals that the Court’s workload has become far too heavy. 
Comparing this annual average with the estimate for the Colombian 
Supreme Court before the 1991 Constitution, one finds that it is almost 
sixteen times higher. This high number of decisions corresponds to two 
variables: (i) abstract review procedures over laws, constitutional 
amendments, legislative decrees and treaties, and (ii) concrete review of 
tutelas. The latter variable has especially substantially increased the 
Court’s workload.79
 78. In 2002, 561 actio popularis were filed, and the Court rejected forty-five percent of them on 
formal grounds. 
 79. Although there are no figures available on the workload of the Supreme Court of Justice 
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TABLE 1: THE WORK OF THE COURT, 1999–2002 
 
YEAR 
 
TOTAL 
NUMBER OF 
DECISIONS 
NUMBER 
OF TUTELA 
DECISIONS 
% of 
total 
NUMBER OF 
ABSTRACT REVIEW 
DECISIONS 
% of 
total 
1992 235 182 77.44 53 22.55 
1993 598 394 65.88 204 34.11 
1994 582 360 61.85 222 38.14 
1995 630 403 63.96 227 36.03 
1996 718 370 51.53 348 48.46 
1997 680 376 55.29 304 44.7 
1998 805 565 70.18 240 29.81 
1999 993 705 70.99 288 29.01 
2000 1,734 1,340 77.27 394 22.72 
2001 1,344 976 72.62 368 27.38 
2002 1,123 784 69.81 339 30.19 
TOTAL 9,442 6,455 68.36 2,987 31.64 
Tutela decisions have increased significantly, especially since 1998, 
when there was a forty-eight percent increase. The largest leap occurred in 
2000, when the number of tutela verdicts reached 1,340, which was almost 
double the previous year in which a peak of 705 decisions were registered. 
This increase, which is set out in detail in Table 1, is owed to a number of 
social and political causes. The central cause is the frequent use of acción 
de tutela, perhaps as a result of citizens’ fast realization that constitutional 
protection of fundamental rights could have real effects over their 
everyday problems. Economic recession also led increasing numbers of 
persons seeking the enforcement of social rights, especially health, 
retirement pensions, and salaries. However, this does not mean that the 
Court always adopts a decision in favor of the plaintiff. As indicated in 
Table 2, in 58% of the total tutela decisions it adopted, the Court ruled in 
favor of the plaintiff.  
 
 
before 1991 in constitutional matters, it is clear that the workload did not exceed one hundred 
decisions per year, and it was probably much lower from the mid-1950s to the 1980s.  
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TABLE 2: ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 
ABSTRACT 
REVIEW 
DECISIONS 
Unconstitutionality 
27% 
Constitutionality 
57% 
OTHER(*)  
16% 
 
TUTELA DECISIONS 
 
Granted 
58% 
Denied 
42% 
(*) Other: res judicata judgments, or inhibitory decisions adopted on the grounds of 
the lack of procedural pre-conditions for deciding on the merits in specific cases. 
Another visible tendency is the increase in the number of abstract 
review decisions, mainly because of the increasing use of actio popularis 
by citizens. Although this public unconstitutionality action was initially 
devised to review the abstract constitutionality of legislation, citizens have 
filed a growing number of unconstitutionality suits based on the 
fundamental rights provisions in the Constitution. This may be explained 
by the effect generated by the existence of tutela, upon citizens’ perception 
of the Constitution´s potential impact in their daily lives. The Constitution 
becomes more relevant for citizens, in proportion to the possibility of 
accessing its protection channels through a direct, concrete mechanism in 
matters that affect them directly. The statistics in Table 3 illustrate that 
between 1992 and 2002 the number of public unconstitutionality suits 
more than doubled. In 1992, 247 actio popularis were filed before the 
Court, and in 2002 this number rose to 561. Because more than forty 
percent were rejected for not fulfilling the minimum procedural 
requirements, the numbers in Table 3 do not fully demonstrate this 
increase. 
Another figure in Table 1 proves that abstract judicial review of 
legislation has gained importance in Colombia: out of the total number of 
decisions issued by the Court in that decade, almost one third referred to 
abstract review over legal provisions. The proportion would have been 
much higher, had it not been for two causes. First, there was a remarkable 
increase in the number of tutela decisions (182 in 1992, 784 in 2002, and a 
1,340 peak in 2000). Second there was frequent rejection of unfit actio 
popularis (an average of forty-two percent of the total suits have been 
rejected for not fulfilling the minimum procedural requirements). The 
Court was initially very strict in this respect (ninety-three percent of all 
claims were rejected in 1992; forty-one percent were rejected in 1993), but 
between 1994 and 1998 the Court became more lenient. Finally, in 1999 
the Court again became more demanding, and in 2002 it rejected forty-five 
percent of the claims. 
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As shown in Table 2, the Constitutional Court frequently declares laws 
wholly or partly unconstitutional; this happened in twenty-seven percent 
of the cases. This relatively high percentage is perhaps one of the most 
significant peculiarities of the Colombian system after 1991. It has two 
main sources. The first is that laws adopted before the 1991 Constitution 
were more likely to be incompatible with it and can now be challenged 
through an action popularis. The second is that fundamental rights cases 
are now reviewed by the justices in a more activist spirit. 
TABLE 3: ABSTRACT REVIEW PROCESSES, 1992–2002 
KIND OF 
PROCESS 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 Total % 
of 
total
Actio 
popularis 
247 264 255 309 368 406 339 479 597 524 561 4,349* 91.2
Treaties 10 15 13 17 36 18 29 19 31 22 11 221 4.6 
Emergency 
decrees 
26 26 10 12 8 15 4 8 0 0 13 122 2.6 
Presidential 
vetoes  
0 3 1 4 4 8 5 4 9 17 5 60 1.3 
Statutory 
laws 
0 5 2 1 0 0 0 2 2 3 2 17 0.3 
TOTAL 283 313 281 343 416 447 377 512 639 566 592 4,769 100 
* Processes initiated before the Court do not always end in a final decision, because 
actio popularis lawsuits can be rejected for not fulfilling procedural requirements. 
The rate of rejections reached an unusual peak in 1992, when ninety-three percent 
of all claims were rejected. Overall, an average of forty-two percent of all 
unconstitutionality actio popularis are rejected by the Court. That is the reason why 
the figures included in the first row of this table do not coincide with those shown 
in Table 1, which refers only to final decisions in abstract review, and not to the 
total of processes initiated through actio popularis. 
Another important issue relates to the Justices’ voting. In France, 
members of the Constitutional Council may not formally express their 
individual opinions in each judgment, which produces an appearance of 
constant unanimity in the adoption of decisions. In Colombia, as in the 
United States, the Justices have been traditionally allowed to issue 
dissenting opinions when they disagree with the Court’s majority decision 
(salvamento de voto). Justices may also concur in the judgment but clarify 
specific aspects in which they do not share the Court’s majority argument 
(aclaración de voto). In recent years, this phenomenon led to the hasty 
conclusion that the Court is frequently divided, or even that there are fixed 
blocks of justices that always vote together against the other blocks. This 
is not true. However, the fact that these voting blocks are misconceptions 
does not mean that certain voting patterns are not present on specific 
subjects. Table 4 shows that seventy-seven percent of constitutionality 
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decisions have been adopted unanimously, and only in thirty-three percent 
of cases has there been one or more magistrates who disagree with the 
majority decision. A higher degree of division is evident in Table 5, which 
shows the level of unanimity in unification decisions under tutela actions. 
This is natural, because cases that reach the Full Chamber for unification 
of case law are generally difficult ones, where the coexistence of diverse, 
albeit legitimate, interpretations becomes likely. It is worth noting that 
even in unified tutela judgments, there are still relatively few “five-to-
four” decisions (seventeen out of 132 or twelve point eight percent). Since 
2000, “five-to-four” decisions have diminished (two out of forty-one or 
four point eight percent). 
TABLE 4: AGREEMENT AND DISSENT (1992–2002) 
ABSTRACT REVIEW DECISIONS 77% Unanimous 
UNIFICATION DECISIONS (Tutela) 53.03% Unanimous 
TABLE 5: AGREEMENT AND DISSENT IN UNIFICATION DECISIONS  
(1992-2002) 
YEAR Number of 
Unification 
Decisions 
Unanimous 
Decisions 
Divided 
decisions with 
a 5–4 voting 
Divided 
decisions with 
other votings 
1992 0 0 0 0 
1993 5 2 1 2 
1994 2 2 0 0 
1995 12 5 7 0 
1996 7 1 2 4 
1997 15 8 2 5 
1998 22 11 3 8 
1999 28 20 0 8 
2000 24 15 0 9 
2001 11 3 2 6 
2002 6 3 0 3 
TOTAL 132 70 17 45 
 
These statistics and brief comments show that the work of the 
Constitutional Court has been quite efficient, that the Court has vigorously 
exerted its independence, and that it has been instrumental in the 
protection of fundamental rights. They also prove that the Court’s 
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workload has evolved at the pace imposed by social needs and by the 
development of the Constitution. However, numerical assessments are 
insufficient to illustrate the importance of the changes brought by the 
Court’s work as the guardian and interpreter of the Constitution. It is 
necessary to pay attention to the basic types of decisions that the Court has 
adopted while fulfilling its institutional goals. This will show the 
complexity of the issues faced by the Court, and the mechanisms adopted 
to address them and to effectuate the Court’s decisions.  
2. Basic Types of Decisions and Their Effects 
In general terms, the Court adopts two types of decisions. First, it 
adopts abstract review judgments, as a result of the constitutional scrutiny 
of constitutional reforms, treaties, laws, legislative decrees issued under 
states of emergency or in exercise of delegated legislative powers, and 
bills vetoed by the President. Second, the court adopts concrete review 
judgments, which result from the scrutiny of specific tutela decisions. 
However, within these two broad categories, the Court has developed a 
complex classification of decisions, in accordance with the different types 
of effects that they may have. 
In this sense, one must recall that the Court has consistently affirmed 
its exclusive power to determine the effects of its own decisions, in both 
abstract and concrete review judgments, as part of its generic mission to 
guard the supremacy and integrity of the Constitution.80 These effects may 
vary in accordance with the different requirements posed by the defense of 
the Constitution in each specific case, as determined by the tribunal. Based 
on this exclusive power, in a 1993 verdict81 the Court struck down the 
procedural regulations82 that specified the cases in which abstract review 
judgments would have retroactive effects. The Court also clarified that its 
autonomy to determine the effects of its decisions finds its limits only in 
the Constitution’s text and spirit, as well as in the need to seek justice and 
balance conflicting constitutional interests in particular situations.  
 80. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 241. 
 81. Decision C-113 of 1993, Jorge Arango Mejía J., In re Artículo 21 del Decreto 2067 de 1991 
(Article 21 of Decree 2067 of 1991). 
 82. Decreto 2067 de 1991, art. 21. 
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a. Decisions Adopted in Abstract Review 
In principle, there are two possible types of abstract review decisions 
with erga omnes effects: those declaring the constitutionality of given 
regulations and those declaring their unconstitutionality.83 However, 
throughout its abstract review doctrine, the Constitutional Court has 
adopted many different kinds of judgments. The Court has established 
different classifications for these judgments, either from the point of view 
of the content of the decision or its effects over time. This practice, which 
the Court calls “modulation of the effects of decisions” (the corresponding 
judgments are called “modulative decisions”), has given rise to significant 
controversy. Some critics say that by adopting the former, the tribunal 
exceeds its own powers and invades the sphere of Congress.84
This is not exclusively a Colombian controversy. The problem has 
arisen in almost every country that has evolved towards a strong system of 
constitutional judicial review, as a consequence of constitutional judges’ 
commitment to safeguard the Constitution without causing unnecesary 
disturbances to the democratic societies in which they operate.85 What is 
more surprising is that “modulative” judgments are not new to Colombian 
constitutionalism; the Supreme Court developed a significant tradition in 
this field under the 1886 Constitution.86
The need to adopt “modulative” decisions may best be explained 
through an example. Imagine a provision that has been challenged as 
unconstitutional and subject to different reasonable interpretations, some 
of which are constitutional and some unconstitutional. In this case, the 
Court would not be able to fulfill its basic mission if it could only adopt 
“pure” constitutionality or unconstitutionality decisions, because simply 
upholding the provision would be the same as admitting the validity of a 
number of possible unconstitutional interpretations. Simply striking the 
 83. Res judicata and “inhibitory” decisions in which the Court decides to abstain from deciding 
are also possible. 
 84. A specific legal provision authorizes the Court to modulate the effects of its decisions, 
Estatutaria de la Admistració de Justicia (Statutory Law on the Administration of Justice), Ley 270 de 
1996 (Law 270 of 1996), art. 45, which states that the Court’s decisions shall have pro futuro effects, 
unless the Court decides on the contrary. 
 85. See MAURO CAPPELLETTI, GIUDICI LEGISLATORI? (Dott. A. Giuffrè ed., 1984); AJA ELISEO, 
LAS TENSIONES ENTRE EL TRIBUNAL CONSTITUCIONAL Y EL LEGISLADOR EN LA EUROPA ACTUAL 
(S.A. Ariel ed., 1998); THIERRY DI MANNO, LE JUGE CONSTITUTIONNEL ET LA TECHNIQUE DES 
DECISIONS ‘INTERPRETATIVES’ EN FRANCE ET EN ITALIE (1997).  
 86. For example, in 1912 the Supreme Court declared some of the articles of Law 40 of 1905 
unconstitutional, in those aspects related to the owners of emerald mines that fulfilled certain 
conditions and upheld those articles in regards to any other person or situation.  
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provision down would be tantamount to excluding constitutionally 
acceptable interpretations from the legal system and striking down a law 
that could be compatible with the Constitution. Both of these options 
would lead the Court to exceed the limits of its own functions. A 
reasonable alternative available to the tribunal is to uphold the provision 
under review, conditioning its constitutionality on the fact that only some 
of its interpretations are valid, while others are unconstitutional and must 
be rejected. In Colombia this is called a “conditioned constitutionality 
judgment.”  
As one might infer, “modulative” constitutionality judgments do not 
arise as a consequence of judicial interference with Congressional powers, 
rather they arise as a means to harmonize the necessity to preserve the 
Constitution with the Court’s deep respect for the decisions of the 
legislature. It is through such “modulative” decisions that the Court seeks 
to uphold the validity of laws as far as constitutionally possible. The Court 
has only struck down legal provisions when they are not subject to any 
reasonable interpretation compatible with the Constitution. 
One must note that the Court has not been consistent in giving strict 
technical treatment to its own modulative judgments. Although it has 
occasionally resorted to detailed classifications of the possible 
modulations it can order, the Court’s modulative decisions are usually 
formulated in wholly “interpretative” terms, even if they materially 
correspond to a different category of such decisions. That is, when the 
Court modulates the effects of its verdicts, it almost always states that it is 
using a wholly “interpretative” modulating technique, even though merely 
“interpretative” judgments are only one of the different kinds of 
modulative decisions that the Court has adopted throughout its case law. 
Notwithstanding this technical imprecision, one could classify 
“modulative” judgments according to two different criteria: (i) those that 
modulate the effects of the decision upon the content of the legal provision 
under review, and (ii) those that modulate the effects of the decision in 
time.  
i. 
“Modulative” judgments that affect the content of the provision under 
review may fall into three broad categories: “interpretative,” “expressly 
integrative,” and “materially expansive” decisions.  
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In the first category, in certain decisions the Court (a) determines the 
meaning that should be given to a particular legal provision and issues 
“strictly interpretative” judgments87 or (b) restricts the scope of application 
or the content of the regulations, by, for example, deciding that a given 
rule may not be constitutionally applied to X or Y persons, situations or 
things, or deciding that when it is applied, A or B specific consequences 
which would normally derive from the norm’s application will be 
excluded (“reductive” judgments).88 In a third scenario the Court 
incorporates additional requirements for the valid application of the norm, 
without actually expanding its scope of application to different 
circumstances or subjects (“additive” judgments).89 All of these are 
“interpretative” decisions, because the Court prescribes, strikes down, 
restricts, or expands certain possible interpretations of the law or provision 
and its effects, while upholding the legal validity of the provision.  
A second type of “modulative” judgment that affects the content of 
regulations, relates to the cases in which the Court does not strike down a 
given provision. The Court instead expressly expands the law’s scope of 
application to new subjects, situations, or things not initially foreseen, but 
which are nevertheless required by the Constitution in order for the 
provision at hand to be valid. In these “expressly integrative” judgments, 
the Court (i) determines the existence of a legislative omission with regard 
to the law’s scope of application, and (ii) gives direct application to 
 87. One example of an interpretative judgment is a 1994 decision in which the Court declared 
legal provisions prohibiting the organization of strikes in companies and providing for public services 
unconstitutional based on the understanding that such provisions referred to essential public services as 
defined by the legislature. Decision C-473 of 1994, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J., In re Artículos 
416, 430, y 450 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo (Articles 416, 430, 450 of the Labor Code). 
 88. This happened, for example, in the Court’s decision regarding the acceptability of euthanasia 
in Colombia, when it stated that the criminal provision penalizing “mercy killing” could not be applied 
to physicians who helped terminal patients die under very strict circumstances, see infra Part II.B.1.a.i 
and accompanying notes. It also happened when the Court upheld the rule in the Organic Statute of the 
Financial System that allowed for the capitalization of interest in long term credit operations, stating 
that interest could not be applied to credits granted for the financing and acquisition of housing, see 
infra Part II.B.3. 
 89. An example of “additive” judgment is Decision C-065 of 1997, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. and 
Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa J., José Gregorio Hernández Galindo J. 
dissenting), In re Artículo 22 de la Ley 42 de 1993 (Article 22 of Law 42 of 1993), in which the Court 
reviewed a rule that established limitations on official control over entities that managed public funds 
or were partially state-owned; the provision examined in this case stated that public control would be 
limited to the amount of state funds received or managed by the entity and to the level of state 
participation in the entity’s capital. Id. The Court upheld the provision, stating that it should 
nevertheless be interpreted in accordance with other applicable legal mandates, which stated that 
control should be carried out over: (i) the totality of contracts executed with public funds by privately 
owned entities, and (ii) the activities of all the constitutive segments of partly State-owned institutions. 
Id. 
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constitutional mandates in order to expand the law’s area of effectiveness 
to whichever subjects, situations, or things that the legislature unduly 
excluded. In other words, through “expressly integrative” decisions, the 
Court decides that an individual regulation is unconstitutional, not because 
of what it expressly states, but because of its insufficiency in foreseeing 
certain subjects that should have been regulated. This situation arises 
frequently in equality cases, in which the Court extends the application of 
certain rules to circumstances that were not initially foreseen by the 
legislature and were thus excluded from the law’s reach, in a 
discriminatory way, or with a discriminatory impact or purpose.90 It is 
perhaps the only type of decision in which the Court has sought to be 
technical, and regarding which the Court has outlined specific 
requirements throughout constitutional case law. For example, the Court 
has explained that “integrative” decisions are a direct consequence of the 
normative value of the Constitution, which the Constitutional judge injects 
into ordinary legislation in order to fill an apparent lack of regulation.91 
“Integrative” judgments are only admissible in those matters where clear 
constitutional mandates restrict Congressional discretion. Consequently, 
the Court has also stated that “integrative” decisions on matters on which 
the Constitution gives Congress a broad margin of configuration, would be 
undue intrusions by the Court into the sphere of legislative powers.92
The third type of modulative judgments within this group, comprises 
all the different types of decisions that do not fall under the other 
categories, but which the Court has nevertheless adopted since 1992 
 90. For an example of an “expressly integrative” judgment, see Decision C-109 of 1995, 
Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., and José 
Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 3º de la Ley 75 de 1968 (Article 3º of Law 
75 of 1968). In this case, the Court examined a provision in Law 75 of 1968, which restricted the 
possibilities that people born to married mothers have to judicially contend their alleged father’s 
paternity in order to establish the identity of their true father. Id. The provision at hand stated that 
“legitimate” sons or daughters could contend their father’s true parenthood whenever birth had taken 
place after ten months had elapsed since the moment when the father or the mother had left their 
spouse and home. The Court upheld this provision, but on the understanding that this situation was not 
the only possibility open to people who contest their alleged father’s identity because that 
interpretation would deprive such persons of the possibility of knowing their true identity and be 
discriminatory as there is no limitation on the father contesting paternity. The Court thus affirmed that 
Congress had omitted the inclusion of all of the other possible hypotheses of judicial investigation of 
paternity. The Court declared the constitutionality of the provision under review, stating that all of the 
other different possibilities for contending parenthood, which are regulated by the Civil Code, are open 
to sons or daughters in these circumstances.  
 91. Id. 
 92. Decision C-221 of 1997, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), In re El literal a) del 
artículo 233 del decreto 1333 de 1986 y el literal c) del artículo 1º de la Ley 97 de 1913 (Paragraph (a) 
of Article 233 of Decree 133 of 1986 and paragraph (c) of Article 1º of Law 97 of 1913). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss4/2
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 569 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(“materially expansive” judgments). An example of a materially expansive 
judgement would be a 1993 verdict, in which the Court: (a) struck down a 
provision that established the specific cases in which it could confer 
retroactive effects to its own decisions; and (b) stated that, according to the 
Constitution, it is up to the same Court to freely establish the effects of its 
judgments.93 In this case, the Court actually declared the law 
unconstitutional, but the Court then replenished the legal system with a 
mandate extracted directly from the Constitution’s text (a “substitutive” 
judgment). Another example of a “materially expansive” judgment would 
be the 2001 decision in which the Court reviewed the legal provision that 
criminalizes genocide and declared the unconstitutionality of the phrase 
that restricted the applicability of this crime to cases in which the victim 
group was “acting within the law.”94 In this case, the Court held that (i) no 
such restriction has been placed on the configuration of the crime of 
“genocide” by international humanitarian law or human rights treaties, and 
(ii) it would be clearly unconstitutional to allow the mass extermination of 
groups that act “outside” of the law. In the end, the Court actually 
expanded the legal provision’s scope of application by simply striking 
down the limitation involved. In other words, through a partial 
unconstitutionality decision, the Court included a broad array of new legal 
subjects and situations under the protection of the law. Formally, it was a 
pure (partial) unconstitutionality decision, and therefore, stricto senso, it 
was not expressly modulative. However, substantively the decision 
expanded the scope of the crime of genocide, as would have happened 
with an “integrative judgment” upholding the provision, since the decision 
added that genocide could not be committed against groups “acting 
outside of the law” either. 
ii. 
“Modulative” judgments can also refer to the moment at which the 
Court’s decision becomes effective. The general rule in Colombian 
constitutionalism is that abstract review judgments are effective pro 
futuro—the invalid provision is excluded from the legal system from the 
moment the judgment is communicated to the relevant authorities.95 But as 
 93. Decision C-113 of 1993, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 21 del Decreto 
2067 de 1991 (Article 21 of Decree 2067 of 1991). 
 94. Decision C-177 of 2001, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous) In re Artículo 322ª del Código 
Penal (Article 322ª of the Criminal Code). 
 95. Estaturia de la Administracián (Statutory Law de Fushticia on the Administration of Justice), 
Ley 270 de 1996, art. 45 (Law 270 of 1996).  
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an exception to this general rule, the Court has adopted two types of 
judgments in which it modulates the temporal effectiveness of its 
decisions, either granting them retroactive effects or deferring their 
effectiveness to a given point in the future.  
As a result of the general rule of pro futuro application of judgments, 
situations that materialized before given laws or provisions were declared 
unconstitutional are not modified. However, there are exceptional cases in 
which the Court has given its decisions retroactive effect. For example, the 
Court ordered the recalculation of housing loan beneficiaries’ outstanding 
debt, which had been quantified at very high interest rates based on an 
unconstitutional system that caused mainly poor or middle-class debtors to 
lose their houses.96 These judgments are called “retroactive” judgments. 
The first judgment of this kind ordered the Government to reimburse an 
unconstitutional tax, also retroactively, according to a state of exception 
decree.97
In other equally exceptional cases, the Court defers the effects of its 
unconstitutionality decisions. This occurs when the Court believes that 
immediate application of the judgment would generate negative 
consequences for the preservation of other constitutional values. For 
example, the Court deferred the effects of a 1997 decision declaring a 
provision that imposed a tax upon certain non-renewable natural resources 
unconstitutional. The Court argued that the immediate exclusion of such a 
provision from the legal system, in the absence of an alternative 
regulation, would cause the automatic application of the general royalties 
regime to the natural resources at hand—a situation, which had not been 
specifically approved by Congress. Therefore, in order to avoid intruding 
upon the legislative sphere, the Court postponed the application of its 
unconstitutionality decision for a period of five years. During this time 
period Congress was called upon to regulate the matter. In this case, the 
Court also ordered that, should Congress abstain from freely regulating the 
 96. Decision C-700 of 1999, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra J. and 
José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J., concurring; Alvaro Tafur Galvis J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz J. 
and Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. dissenting), In re Artículos 18, 21, 23, 137, 138 del Decreto 
Extraordinario 663 de 1993, Decreto Extraordinario 1730 de 1991, Artículos 3, 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18 y 
20 del Decreto Autónomo 677 de 1972, Artículos 1, 2 y 14 del Decreto Autónomo 678 de 1972, 
Artículos 1 al 10 del Decreto Autónomo 1229 de 1972, Artículo 5 del Decreto Autónomo 1269 de 
1972, y Artículo 1 del Decreto Autónomo 1127 de 1990 (Extraordinary Decree 663 of 1993, 
Extraordinary Decree 1730 of 1991, Autonomous Decree 677 of 1972, Autonomous Decree 678 of 
1972, Autonomous Decree 1229 of 1972, Autonomous Decree 1269 of 1972). For additional 
information, see infra Part II.B.3. 
 97. Decision C-149 of 1993, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), In re Artículos 
16, 17 y 18 de la Ley 6a de 1992 (Articles 16, 17, 18 of Law 6 of 1992). 
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issue within the given term, the decision would be made effective and the 
general royalties regime would be fully applicable to such resources until 
the legislature took action.98 From another perspective, the Court has 
upheld the temporary constitutionality of regulations whenever their 
exclusion from the legal system could generate a lack of regulation with 
constitutionally undesirable effects. This situation arose when the Court 
declared the system for financing access to social welfare housing 
unconstitutional. The Court invalidated the corresponding regulations on 
procedural grounds, but gave Congress a reasonable period to issue new 
regulations before the Court’s decision became effective.99 Therefore, the 
system was temporarily upheld so as to preserve public economic order. 
More recently, the majority of the Court has shown aversion towards the 
adoption of this kind of decision, when the impact of its judgments is not 
clearly detrimental to constitutional values in the broader context in which 
the judgments are rendered.100
b. Decisions Adopted in Concrete Review 
The second category of judgments issued by the Court is called 
concrete review decisions. In this type of decision, the Court evaluates the 
constitutionality of tutela judgments adopted by any judge in the country. 
In general, tutela decisions have inter partes effects because they only 
bind the parties to the specific case decided by the Court, and not erga 
omnes effects, as is the case with all abstract review decisions. 
In order to visualize the different types of decisions that may be 
adopted in tutela cases, one must understand that, through the tutela, 
judges have the liberty to adopt any measures that they consider necessary 
to preserve fundamental rights in concrete review cases. In other words, 
tutela cases have no defined remedy. Instead there are as many possible 
solutions as there are types of fundamental rights violations. In each 
 98. See supra note 92. 
 99. The regulations should have been adopted by a special kind of law mandated for certain 
economic matters (“framework laws”), which are developed by administrative decrees. Instead, they 
were adopted by presidential legislative decrees on the grounds of delegated legislation powers. See 
supra note 96; Decision C-747 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. and José 
Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. concurring; Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, 
J., Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. dissenting), In re Artículos 121, 134 del Decreto Ley 663 de 1993 (Decree 
Law 663 of 1993). 
 100. Decision C-155 of 2003, Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, J. (Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J., 
Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J., Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, J., Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, J. 
dissenting), In re Artículos 2 y 5 del Decreto 1604 de 1966, Artículo 11 del Decreto 2171 de 1992 
(Articles 2 and 5 of Decree 1604 of 1966, Article 11 of Decree 2171 of 1992). 
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particular case, judges must evaluate the interests and rights at stake in 
order to find a remedy that harmonizes them.  
This particular trait of the tutela system does not, however, exclude the 
possibility of classifying tutela decisions in accordance with two criteria: 
(i) the difficulty in enforcing the orders that they contain and (ii) the scope 
of their beneficiaries. 
Attending to the degree of difficulty with which they can be enforced, 
orders issued by tutela judges may be simple—when they order an 
authority or an individual to carry out a specific individual action or to 
abstain from doing something, or complex—when they adopt orders 
directed to different authorities and require a set of coordinated activities 
by all of them. Simple orders are the general rule, in, for example, 
decisions that order social security entities to register a given individual 
who had been denied access to the system due to an administrative error, 
or decisions that order a school to admit a student who had been expelled 
due to his personal appearance. An eloquent example of a decision 
involving complex orders was the 1998 verdict in which the Court 
declared the existence of an “unconstitutional state of affairs” in 
Colombian prisons—given the prevailing conditions of overcrowding, 
lack of essential services and security, and generally undignified living 
circumstances for inmates. The Court then ordered the relevant entities to 
fulfil their legal responsibilities so as to conform the prison system to its 
legal requirements.101 The Court granted these entities a period of three 
months to design the relevant plan, and four years to carry it out.102  
Tutela decisions may also be classified into two categories based on the 
beneficiaries: judgments with inter partes effects and judgments with 
effects beyond the formal parties to the case. The second type has had, 
until now, two manifestations: judgments with inter pares effects and 
judgments with inter communis effects. 
Inter partes effects are the general rule. In these decisions judicial 
decisions are only mandatory for the parties to the specific case that was 
decided. However, in order to seek a just and constitutional solution to 
 101. Decision T-153 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Manuel José Duque 
Arcila, Jhon Jairo Hernández et al. contra Ministerio de Justicia y del Derecho, y el Instituto Nacional 
Penitenciario y Carcelario (Arcila v. The Minister of Justice and the Nacional Penitentiary Institute). 
 102. The classification of the different types of orders that tutela judges may impart in concrete 
cases, as well as their power to adjust the content of such orders to the requirements of the situation 
under review, and the effects of non-compliance with the different types of decisions they adopt, were 
explained in Decision T-086 of 2003, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Evangelina 
Blanco de Zúñiga contra la Sala Civil y de Familia del Tribunal Superior de Cartagena (Evangelina 
Blanco de Zúñiga v. The Civil and Family Division of the Superior Court of the District of Cartagena).  
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every different situation, the Court has applied exceptions to this general 
rule, expanding the obligatory effect of its decisions in tutela cases to 
different spheres.  
This kind of expansion is illustrated by judgments in which the Court 
grants inter communis effects. In such cases, the Court has extended its 
decisions to persons who had not actually filed the corresponding tutela 
claim, but shared common circumstances with the plaintiffs, belonged to 
the same community of persons, and might be negatively affected by a 
decision that did not include them. The Court recently granted express 
inter communis effects for the first time in a 2001 tutela decision 
protecting the rights of the retired workers of a bankrupt company, who 
were owed their retirement pensions.103 Although only part of the 
company’s retired workers had actually filed the tutela claim, the Court 
extended the effects of its decision to all of them, arguing that, given the 
limited resources of the bankrupt entity, a judicial decision ordering the 
liquidator to pay only the plaintiffs’ pensions would have left the non-
plaintiffs in a worse situation than they were before. This effect would 
violate the non-plantiffs’ right to equal treatment. In this case, the Court 
established that this type of decision can only be adopted in exceptional 
circumstances, in which the protection of plaintiffs’ rights would affect the 
rights of non-plaintiffs who shared common circumstances.  
Another expansion of the beneficiaries of tutela decisions is illustrated 
by inter pares effects decisions. These decisions occurr when the Court 
orders that the constitutional ratio decidendi of a given decision be applied 
by all judges to every future case in which similar conditions arise. Inter 
pares effects have been adopted, until now, through three different means. 
The first is by ordering that the precedent should be followed in every 
future similar case (implicit and eventual inter pares effects). The second 
is by ordering every judge to stop applying a certain regulation in concrete 
cases, because it is, on its face, contrary to a fundamental constitutional 
right (explicit and fixed inter pares effects). The third is by ordering the 
respondent, usually an administrative agency, to design a plan that would 
benefit not only the formal plaintiff, but also all other persons in the same 
situation (practical and consequential inter pares effects). For example, the 
 103. Decision SU-1023 of 2001, Jaime Córdoba Triviño, J. (Jaime Araujo Rentería, J., 
concurring), Librada de Dios Viuda de Fajardo y Otros, contra la Compañía de Inversiones de la Flota 
Mercante S.A. y Otros (Librada de Dios Viuda de Fajardo et al. v. The Merchant Fleet Investment 
Company); Decision T-203 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Beatriz Helena 
Salazar de Karpf y Otros contra la Compañía de Inversiones de la Flota Mercante S.A. (Salazar de 
Karpf et al. v. Merchant Fleet Co.) (enforcing Decision SU-1023, supra). 
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Court granted inter pares effects in its 1992 decision on the recognition of 
the economic value of unmarried female housework. In that case the Court 
ordered that the doctrine established therein be applied to any future 
similar cases of women, who had been denied recognition of their 
contributions to irregular domestic unions.104 The Court has also recently 
established that, when it decides to apply the “unconstitutionality 
exception” by excluding the application of certain regulations in given 
cases, and applying constitutional mandates instead, such a decision has 
inter pares effect, and must be followed by every judge in the country in 
similar cases. For this to occurr the following conditions must be met: (i) 
the regulation must be manifestly contrary to the Constitution; (ii) there 
must be a clear constitutional mandate regarding the regulated issue; (iii) 
the content of the law should be unconstitutional in itself, in a clearly 
observable manner, without having to take additional facts or 
considerations into account; (iv) the provision that is being applied must 
regulate matters for which the Court has higher Constitutional 
responsibilities, such as acción de tutela or fundamental rights; and (v) the 
decision must have been adopted by the Court through a unification 
decision or affirmed several times by the Review Chambers.105 The Court 
justified its decision to grant inter pares effects to such 
“unconstitutionality exceptions,” based on the principles of prevalence and 
effective enjoyment of fundamental constitutional rights. The Court also 
did so because granting judgments only inter partes effects in these 
circumstances would violate the right to equal treatment of persons in 
similar situations. Several examples of the third type of decisions exist, 
because the Court sometimes orders the public administration to design 
and enforce plans or policies in order to avoid the repetition of the same 
claim by others, when it is clear that in that particular case the violation of 
the fundamental right resulted from administrative inaction.106 However, 
 104. Decision T-494 of 1992, Ciro Angarita Barón, J. (José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. 
dissenting) Ester Verela contra Juzgado 17 Civil Municipal y 9 Civil del Circuito, de la ciudad de Cali 
(Ester Verela v. 17th Municipal and 9th Civil Court of the Circuit of the City of Cali); see also infra 
Part II.B.1.b.i. 
 105. Auto 071, Feb. 27, 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Gloria Inés Pardo de 
González contra Crearsalud Ltda. (Gloria Inés Pardo de González v. Crearsalud, Ltd.). 
 106. In Decision, T-440 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Lucila Díaz Díaz 
contra las Resoluciones Nos. 01651 y 0075 de 1991, proferidas por la Junta Seccional de Escalafón 
Docente de Boyacá y la Junta Nacional de Escalafón Docente (Díaz v. Resolutions 01651 and 0075 of 
1991 promulgated by the Regional Educational Establishment of Boyacá and the National Educational 
Establishment), the Constitutional Court ordered the Minister of Justice to design and implement a 
plan for teaching sexual education in all of the country’s public schools with the help of a team of 
experts and within a twelve month timeframe. Similarly, in Decision T-510 of 2003, Manuel José 
Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Beatriz en contra del Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar–
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as I will point out in Part V of this Article, the Court does not issue this 
type of general order with enough frequency to avoid recurring violations 
of fundamental rights by some public entities. 
B. The Court’s Main Decisions and Case-Law Tendencies  
A presentation of the Court’s powers and workload within the new 
constitutional system of judicial review would be clearly insufficient to 
complete a picture of the role that the Court has played in Colombia. A 
summary of the Court’s key decisions and main doctrines in a number of 
matters, which have proven to be especially controversial and significant 
for Colombia, will facilitate an appreciation of the magnitude and impact 
of its work. This summary includes the main decisions adopted with 
regard to constitutional rights, the organization and functions of the 
branches of Government, the economy, and the limitation of private 
powers.107  
1. Decisions Concerning Rights 
Even though Colombia has earned a sad reputation as a country with 
one of the worst human rights records in recent history, the constitutional 
system adopted in 1991, which is highly protective of fundamental rights 
and liberties, will ameliorate this problem to some degree. Indeed, the bill 
of rights included in the new Constitution is one of the Colombian 
people’s most noteworthy collective achievements.  
The 1886 Charter did not grant significant protection to fundamental 
rights. Rather, the Charter merely stated a number of liberties and social 
guarantees, which were understood to be simple prerogatives given by the 
state to individuals, but without specific mechanisms to remedy violations. 
Also, public authorities were given broad powers to restrict such “rights” 
in order to facilitate the preservation of public order. In order to remedy 
the Nations’s long history of official arbitrariness and abuses of power and 
narrow the separation between the Constitution and reality, the 1991 
Constituent Assembly gave special attention to the introduction of a truly 
ICBF-, Regional Nariño (Beatriz v. Colombian Institute of Family Welfare), the Court ordered the 
Colombian Institute of Family Welfare to adopt a policy to ensure that consent procedures for adoption 
(i) guarantee that this consent does not contravene the Constitution and (ii) are sensitive to 
humanitarian issues. 
 107. Some of the Court’s most controversial judgments, in both abstract and concrete review, are 
summarized in Tables 8 and 9, infra. 
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effective system for the protection and promotion of a new, generous bill 
of rights.108  
The materialization and operation of the new and extensive catalogue 
of fundamental rights and duties thus posed one of the greatest challenges 
to the new constitutional enforcement system. Rights were now to be 
taken seriously. In other words, rights were no longer remote promises of 
the legal system, but rather real powers assigned to individuals. Rights 
were now directly and immediately enforceable in order to protect the 
most essential interests of the people. This new understanding of rights 
was underscored in the beginning of the Constituent Process, when bill of 
rights advocates publicly promoted the new conception by equating 
individual rights with individual empowerment and by depicting the new 
catalogue of rights as a necessary pre-condition for the transformation of 
Colombian society. The position adopted by two leaders who usually 
opposed each other but agreed in their support for these groundbreaking 
reforms, shows the consensus surrounding the adoption of a bill of 
rights.109 Misael Pastrana, ex-President of the Republic and conservative 
delegate to the Constituent Assembly, summarized the profound 
philosophical and political transformation that underlay the creation of this 
new approach, when he affirmed that the adoption of a strong catalogue of 
rights had “made our Colombian democracy a really democratic one.” 
Antonio Navarro, former guerrilla leader and co-president of the 
Constituent Assembly, introduced the M-19 Democratic Alliance Bill of 
Rights as a separate proposal, and the government publicly announced its 
advocacy of a generous bill of rights. These events are highly illustrative 
of the broad reach of this change in the Colombian context. Liberal 
President César Gaviria delivered an address before the Constituent 
Assembly on this same point:  
After more than 200 years, it has become clear that the separation of 
public powers is not a sufficient guarantee against abuses. The 
detailed enumeration of the functions of those who exercise 
authority is not enough either. What is needed is to give citizens 
 108. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 11–95. 
 109. Although other examples are available, two are symbolic. First, when the conservative 
president was elected on May 19, 1970, the M-19 Guerrilla movement was created, arguing that there 
was electoral fraud. Second, twenty-one years later, when an agreement was signed in 1991 to dissolve 
Congress in order to give immediate application to the new electoral rules adopted by the Constituent 
Assembly, Misael Pastrana resigned as delegate to the Assembly. At the same time, Antonio Navarro 
publicly defended the dissolution of Congress by the Constituent Assembly, and the summoning of 
new elections. 
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power, and to create mechanisms for them to exercise it in a specific 
and orderly fashion, through institutional channels, in any place and 
time. That is precisely what is done with a Bill of Rights and duties 
like the one we are submitting for this Assembly’s examination: to 
allocate power to ordinary citizens, so that when they are treated in 
an arbitrary manner, they can have an alternative to aggression, 
violent protest or subservient and alienating resignation. What we 
are proposing, and what is appropriate in a democracy, is for 
citizens to come before judges, before the defenders of fundamental 
rights or before the constitutional jurisdiction headed by the 
Constitutional Court.110  
If talking about rights is the same as talking about empowerment, then 
this is a redistribution of social power from the traditional and privileged 
to the ordinary citizen. It is, therefore, understandable that some of the 
Court’s most significant and controversial contributions to the 
transformation of Colombian society have been delivered in this field.  
One of the greatest challenges for the constitutional judge is to enforce 
fundamental rights provisions within a legal system, because of the 
difficulty of balancing conflicting interests in real situations. In each case 
the interpreter and guardian of the constitutional bill of rights must analyze 
a number of questions, which are quite difficult to solve. What does it 
mean to have a certain right within certain conditions? What are the 
permissible limitations to such rights, and just how far does this right 
legitimately extend? How will this right relate to other constitutionally 
protected values, such as fundamental rights or the missions of public 
authorities? Where should the line be drawn, and according to which 
objective criteria? The Court has provided different answers to these 
questions, in accordance with the facts of each one of the thousands of 
fundamental rights cases it has reviewed.  
To understand how the Court has dealt with this challenge, it is 
necessary to review some of the main decisions in this field. It is 
particularly helpful to analyze the areas in which the Court has delivered a 
number of important and highly controversial decisions and in which there 
is a clear trend in the case law. These areas include decisions regarding 
basic liberties, such as personal autonomy, freedom of religion, freedom of 
the press, and freedom of expression. These decisions also include those 
that deal with equality issues related to discrimination on the grounds of 
 110. MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA-ESPINOSA, LOS DERECHOS FUNDAMENTALES EN LA CONSTITUCIÓN 
DE 1991, supra note 10, at 2. 
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gender, sexual orientation, disability, poverty, or race, as well as those 
concerning social and economic rights, or collective rights—mainly with 
regard to indigenous peoples and environmental issues. 
a. Basic Liberties 
i. Personal Autonomy 
Explicit protection of personal autonomy was an innovation of the 
1991 Constitution. Article 16 of the Constitution entitles individuals to 
“freely develop their own personalities,” within the legitimate restrictions 
imposed exclusively “by the law or by other individuals’ rights.” This 
broad formula and the corresponding need to define the extent of the 
constitutionally protected sphere of personal autonomy, has given rise to 
some of the Court’s most notorious, controversial, and complicated 
decisions. Not only has the fundamental liberty issue spurred debates on 
highly sensitive topics, such as euthanasia, abortion, and drug 
consumption, but it has done so within a social context that is still highly 
conservative and thoroughly infused with a strong Catholic heritage. 
Through its different decisions in this field, the Court has proven to be 
quite liberal and open to innovations on a number of difficult matters. This 
factor places it at the forefront of current constitutional issues worldwide.  
A number of examples taken from different cases in which the Court 
has explored the extent and limitations of individual freedom illustrate this 
point: (i) the Court’s interesting position in relation to the right of 
individuals to make decisions that may cause them harm (personal 
consumption of drugs, euthanasia, and the mandatory use of safety belts), 
(ii) the Court’s consistent preservation of the right of individuals to 
determine their personal appearance, (iii) the more conservative case law 
tendency on abortion, and (iv) the Court’s difficult decisions concerning 
the right to determine one’s own gender identity. 
Interestingly, through these personal autonomy decisions, the Court has 
put an end to a number of debates which had been avoided by the 
Constituent Assembly. Indeed, while discussing the wording and the 
content of the constitutional article that protected the right to life (current 
Article 11), some of the delegates introduced the topics of euthanasia, drug 
consumption, and abortion. However, none of the motions to include 
specific constitutional provisions on these topics were approved, and most 
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of the corresponding substantial debates were expressly deferred.111 
Eventually, the Court became the forum for developing and resolving such 
debates. This practice shows that the Court has become a legitimate 
decision-making body on topics affecting national circumstances. This 
idea will be discussed further in Part III of this Article.  
(a) Personal Drug Consumption 
In one of its most contentious decisions, the Court declared a legal 
provision unconstitutional, which criminalized the possession and use of 
narcotic drugs and imposed penalties such as arrest and mandatory 
psychiatric treatment.112 The Court stated that the law may only impose 
upon individuals a given type of behavior when it affects others, and not 
with regards to conduct that exclusively concerns those individuals alone, 
because personal conduct is protected by an essential nucleus of personal 
autonomy. In other words, applying the rule that states that the right to free 
development of an individual’s personality can only be constitutionally 
restricted when it affects others, the Court struck down the criminalization 
of the possession and use of drugs. The Court argued that if the state finds 
it desirable to reduce drug consumption, then in order to avoid violating 
the Constitution, the state should resort to education, which is a less 
restrictive alternative. 
Four justices113 dissented, arguing that, in their view, actions intended 
to harm one’s own physical or mental integrity cannot be part of one’s 
own personal liberties. The dissenters stated that drug consumption is not 
a true personal option, because addiction and vice obstruct free individual 
will. The dissent also asserted that tolerating drug consumption would be 
tantamount to legitimizing the noxious effects of drug traffic, which in 
their view is a crime against humanity. 
Apart from its controversial nature in a country like Colombia, which is 
deeply afflicted with drug problems, this is the first abstract review 
decision in which the Court applied the rule that it is not legitimate for the 
state to interfere in a citizen’s decision to harm himself. This rule was later 
applied in the case regarding euthanasia (see below), and in a 1995 
 111. Id. 
 112. Decision C-221 of 1994, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., In re Literal j) del artículo 2o. y artículo 51 
de la ley 30 de 1986 (Law 30 of 1986). 
 113. José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, Hernando Herrera Vergara, Fabio Morón Díaz, and 
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa. 
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decision on the legal provision that imposed special penalties for criminal 
activities carried out under the effects of alcohol.114  
(b) Euthanasia 
In a notorious 1995 verdict, the Court examined the provision of the 
Criminal Code that penalized “mercy killing,” or murder motivated by 
pity. An actio popularis had been filed against this provision on the 
grounds that the slight nature of the penalty imposed (six months to three 
years in prison) was tantamount to an authorization to kill.115 Evaluating 
the proportionality and reasonableness of the measure, the Court found 
that these types of actions were motivated by humanitarian considerations. 
The Court found that these actions were meant to put an end to intense 
suffering and that it was precisely this subjective element that had led 
Congress to impose light penalties upon conviction.  
Regarding the issue of euthanasia, the Court asserted that it is a matter 
that should be approached in Colombia from a secular and pluralist 
perspective, fully respectful of the individual’s moral autonomy and other 
constitutional rights and liberties. The Court stated that individuals may 
not be forced to live in extreme circumstances in which they deem life 
undesirable. From a pluralist perspective, the assertion of an absolute duty 
to live is not sustainable, because life must not be understood as merely 
tenable, but instead as life with dignity. Therefore, because the state may 
not carry out its duty to protect life by completely disregarding an 
individual’s autonomy and dignity, the Court concluded that in the case of 
terminally ill persons who are experiencing intense suffering, the state 
should respect the informed consent of the patient that wishes to die a 
dignified death. As a consequence, the tribunal stated that the person who 
helps people in these circumstances die, would be acting out of 
humanitarian feelings, rather than a desire to kill. Therefore, the Court 
ordered that in cases in which the necessary conditions were met (i.e., 
terminal illness, intense suffering, informed consent of the patient that 
wishes to die), euthanasia was permitted. Nevertheless, to avoid risks of 
 114. Decision C-026 of 1995, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., Fabio Morón 
Díaz, J., Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., and José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. concurring), In re 
Artículos 44 y 59 del Decreto-Ley 100 de 1995 (Articles 44, 59 of Decree Law 100 of 1995) 
(declaring a provision constitutional that authorized judges in a criminal trial to impose a prohibition 
on alcohol consumption as a supplementary penalty for crimes in which alcohol consumption is one of 
the elements). 
 115. Decision C-239 of 1997, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., In re Artículo 326 del Código Penal (Article 
326 of the Criminal Code). 
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abuse and to protect the individual circumstances of patients, the Court 
held that the justification for applying euthanasia could only be invoked by 
physicians. It is noteworthy that the Court expressly called upon Congress 
to regulate euthanasia with the seriousness and detail required by the 
complex nature of the problem. The Court also ordered that in the absence 
of such a regulation, future cases of euthanasia must be initially 
investigated by the judicial authorities in order to determine whether the 
strict conditions outlined for exonerating doctors are met.116
This extremely divisive decision was accompanied by strong dissenting 
and concurring opinions. The dissentees argued that the Court had invaded 
legislative functions and that the majority decision had diminished the 
constitutional value of life. The dissenters believed that the decision to die 
under such circumstances can never be a truly free one, and thus cannot be 
protected as an expression of personal liberty. The dissent stated that the 
right to freely develop one’s own personality is not absolute and should be 
limited, above all, by the value of life.117 On the other hand, one justice 
issued a concurring statement in which he emphasized that, in addition to 
the conditions outlined in the majority decision, the physician should have 
provided the terminally ill patient with some form of treatment that 
alleviated her suffering but did not extend her life in an artificial 
manner.118 This formulation ensures that the final decision to cause death 
is not a result of a desire to kill, but of a desire to put an end to intense 
suffering, even if death comes as an indirect, unintended consequence. 
 (c) Mandatory Use of Safety Belts 
The rule regarding whether the state can prevent individuals from 
inflicting harm upon themselves was restated in a 1997 decision in which 
the Court upheld the constitutionality of the law requiring use of safety 
belts in automobiles.119 In this case, the Court affirmed that the state may 
adopt measures that are adequate to preserve life, but may not restrict 
personal autonomy for the sake of protecting individuals from themselves. 
 116. The new Criminal Code, Ley 599 de 2000 (Law 599 of 2000), addresses this issue. Article 
106 states that whomever kills another person out of pity, in order to put an end to intense suffering 
derived from a bodily injury or a grave and incurable disease, shall be punished with one to three years 
in prison. Id. art. 26. 
 117. Issued by justices José Gregorio Hernández, Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, and Hernando Herrera 
Vergara. 
 118. Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. 
 119. Decision C-309 of 1997, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. and 
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. concurring), In re Artículo 178 del decreto 1344 de 1970 (Article 178 of 
Decree 1344 of 1970). 
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Thus, the Court set out a proportionality test to determine when a specific 
legal provision is respectful of personal liberty. Under this test, such 
provisions should: (i) seek to promote constitutionally protected values, 
(ii) be tailored to the specific objective, and (iii) represent the least 
restrictive alternative to obtain the goal. The higher degree of personal 
autonomy at issue, the lesser the degrees of state regulation permitted. In 
this case, although the Court admitted that the use of safety belts almost 
exclusively benefits the user, it upheld the provision at stake, because it 
fulfilled all the requirements of the test.  
The Court resolved the contradiction with the proposition that 
individuals may not be bound to take care of themselves when it stated 
that riding in vehicles, as opposed to using drugs, was not ordinarily 
related to deep life or death decisions. Also, when accidents occurred in 
public places and safety belts were not used, there were often third party 
and societal effects. Congress, therefore, had a legitimate interest in 
legislating on the issue in the appropriate proportional manner. 
(d) Personal Appearance 
The Court has protected an individual’s right to determine her own 
personal appearance, because this right is considered part of the essential 
nucleus of personal autonomy and the expansive right to develop one’s 
own personality. The classic cases in this area have arisen when academic 
institutions impose dress codes, which include maximum hair length, 
prohibitions on make-up, and restrictions on certain types of attire in 
school. The Court, however, has not been entirely consistent in this area. 
Initially, the tribunal stated that students’ personal appearance could 
not be transformed into a means to justify denying rule violators their right 
to an education. In that sense, the Court argued that personal appearance 
standards, while permissible in certain institutions (e.g., military 
academies), could never be forcibly imposed upon students.120 However, 
the Court also argued that the establishment of mandatory appearance 
regulations in schools was not in itself a violation of personal autonomy, 
because it formed an integral part of the educational process, which 
parents and pupils had freely consented to upon entry into the institution. 
 120. Decision T-095 of 1993, Ciro Angarita Barón, J. (José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. 
dissenting), Gonzalo Perdomo Cabrera y Jaime Pelaez Guzman contra Colegio Salesiano (Cabrera v. 
Salesiana School); Decision T-248 of 1996, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. (unanimous), Andrés Felipe 
Alvarez Cuervo y Jaime Andrés Arias Contreras contra de Sebastián Mena Palacios, rector del Liceo 
San Pablo (Andrés Cuervo et al. v. Sebastián Palacios). 
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However, the Court stated that the measures imposed may not be 
disproportionate, unreasonable, or contrary to human dignity.121 Finally, 
the Court attempted to harmonize both interests, stating that a 
proportionality and reasonability test should be applied in each case in 
order to assess whether the provision at issue is, on its face, contrary to 
personal autonomy.122
One personal appearance case examined the right of small children to 
determine their personal appearance. In a 1998 tutela case, a four year-old 
girl attended a nursery school that required children to have short hair.123 
The girl’s mother argued that, because the child had refused to cut her 
hair, the child should be entitled to have long hair based on the child’s 
right to personal autonomy. In this case, the Court stated that the right to 
free development of one’s own personality is universal, regardless of the 
individual’s age, and could only be subjected to reasonable and 
proportional restrictions. In addition, the Court asserted that the scope of 
those restrictions should be progressively diminishied as the individual 
grows in age, because the extent of the right to personal autonomy is 
directly proportional to maturity. The bounds of this right should expand 
to a maximum in those matters that do not affect either the rights of third 
parties or objective values protected by the legal system. In this particular 
case, given the maturity of the child, the Court found the restriction on the 
child’s personal autonomy to be disproportionate and unreasonable, 
because the child was already aware of her own image and had shown a 
considerable level of independence. Additionally, because no third party 
rights or legal interests were affected by the girl’s decision and there were 
less restrictive and more effective means to promote hygiene, the tutela 
was granted. 
 121. See Decision T-366 of 1997 José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Oscar 
Rodriguez Avila contra Colegio Cooperativo Champagnat (Oscar Avila v. Champagnat Cooperative 
School), Decision T-633 of 1997, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. (unanimous) Mauricio Cortes 
Zabaleta y Danny Zamudio Valencia contra el Colegio Externado Nacional Camilo Torres (Mauricio 
Zabaleta v. National Camilo Torres School); Decision T-636 of 1997, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. 
(unanimous) Cesar Augusto Lindado Castro contra Normal Nacional de Varones de Tunja (Cesar 
Castro v. National Male Normal-School of Tunja). 
 122. Decision T-124 of 1998, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Ana Mercedes Díaz 
Blanco contra Colegio Externado Nacional Camilo Torres (Ana Blanco v. National Camilo Torres 
School). 
 123. Decision SU-642 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. and 
José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. concurring), Jairo Alonso Carvajal contra la Directora del jardín 
infantil “El Portal” de la penitenciaría “La Picota” (Jairo Carvajal v. Director of “El Portal” Nursery 
School of “La Picota” Penitentiary). 
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(e) Freedom to Determine One’s Gender  
One of the most complicated cases that the Court has decided 
concerned the personal freedom to determine one’s own gender identity. 
This case involved an eight-year old child who was born a 
hermaphrodite.124 The child’s mother requested that the social security 
system authorize an operation to anatomically define the child’s gender as 
a female. The infant’s doctor and mother believed that it was urgent to 
carry out the operation before puberty for both medical and psychological 
reasons. The social security entities refused to authorize the procedure, 
arguing that, according to the case law of the Constitutional Court, the 
child had to consent to the operation. The Court faced the complex 
problem of determining whether, in cases where there is no risk of death, 
parents or legal guardians of child-hermaphrodites are permitted to 
authorize operations that would define the child’s sex. 
In deciding the case, the Court took into account an enormous amount 
of technical evidence from national and international sources, recognizing 
that this case posed a remarkably difficult constitutional problem. The case 
involved medical, legal, social and ethical issues. There was indeed a great 
potential for human suffering for the child and the family given the social 
stigma associated with hermaphroditism. Moreover, the Court stated that 
any decision adopted, would cause suffering for the parties involved. In its 
decision, the Court recalled the basic constitutional rules regarding the 
medical treatment of minors. First, in general, children are not sufficiently 
autonomous to consent to medical treatment. Second, children’s rights to 
life and health, which are fundamental, can be protected by parents and 
authorities, even against the child’s apparent dissent. Third, parents may 
not adopt any medical decision concerning the minor, because the child is 
also free and autonomous and not the property of the parent. In that sense, 
the Court stated that parent’s right of intervention cannot disregard the 
child’s health or life, and, in order to determine the scope of the parent’s 
discretion, three criteria should be applied: (i) the urgency of the 
treatment, (ii) the risks entailed and the impact on the child’s present and 
future autonomy, and (iii) the age of the child.  
After a very complex evaluation of the inconclusive state of scientific 
knowledge on hermaphroditism and of the particular circumstances of the 
 124. Decision SU-642 of 1999, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Madre de la menor 
impúber N.N. contra Estado, representado según ella por el Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar 
Familiar y el Defensor del Pueblo (Mother N.N. of a Minor v. State Represented by the Colombian 
Institute of Family Welfare). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss4/2
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 585 
 
 
 
 
 
 
case, the Court concluded that it was not sufficiently clear that the infant 
required an urgent treatment and that the operation was highly invasive, 
irreversible, and decisive in nature. Based on these considerations, the 
Court decided that it was not permissible for the mother to give consent 
without the child’s consent, because uncertainty as to the results of the 
operation made it preferable to avoid any potential damage. It was better 
then, in the Court’s opinion, to defer the decision on the operation until a 
time when the child had acquired sufficient maturity to grant consent. 
Although the court denied the tutela, it did order the social security entity 
to establish a multidisciplinary team to supervise the child’s case and help 
the child to make a mature decision at an appropriate time.  
(f) Abortion 
Abortion was one of the subjects debated by delegates to the 
Constituent Assembly when discussing the constitutional right to life and 
the time from which this right would receive legal protection. However, no 
specific provision was adopted on the matter, and its resolution was 
deferred to a later time. When the issue of abortion was brought before the 
Court, it turned out to be one of the issues on which the Court has adopted 
a more conservative stance. In a salient 1994 decision, the Court upheld a 
provision in the 1980 Criminal Code that imposed penalties upon women 
who opted for abortion as well as upon persons who carry out abortions 
with the pregnant woman’s consent.125 In this case, the Court affirmed the 
constitutional protection of life that extends to unborn human beings, who 
are regarded as “existentially different from the mother.” The Court ruled 
that Congress has the power to select the measures it considers adequate to 
protect human life, including criminal penalties. Although the Court 
recognized that conflicts between the rights of the mother and the fetus are 
possible, the Court concluded that it is for Congress, and not a judicial 
body, to design an adequate criminal policy for these situations.  
Three justices issued a dissenting opinion, in which they agreed with 
the majority position concerning the legislature’s power to criminalize 
abortion, but strongly criticized the absolute character of the criminal 
provision under review, because the provision did not account for the 
possibility of the cases in which abortion is a less damaging alternative for 
both the mother and the legal system. The dissenters felt this was the case 
 125. Decision C-133 of 1994, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J., 
Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., and Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 343 del Código 
Penal (Article 343 of the Criminal Code). 
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when the abortion takes place in the first trimester, or in cases of rape, 
malformation of the fetus, or danger to the mother’s life.126 The dissent 
also expressed its concern with the attribution of legal personality to the 
unborn fetus and the effect that an absolute criminalization of abortion 
could have in Colombia, such as irregular, “secret” abortions. Perhaps it 
was the generally violent situation in Colombia and the resulting constant 
disregard for the value of human life that prompted the magistrates to 
defer the decision on whether to decriminalize abortion to “legislative 
criminal policy.” 
Later, in a 1997 decision, the Court reviewed an actio popularis 
presented against the provisions of the Criminal Code that established 
lower penalties for mothers convicted of abortion or child abandonment, 
whenever their pregnancy had resulted from sexual offenses or 
unconsentual artificial insemination or embryo implantation.127 The 
plaintiff argued that the low penalties in the law were unconstitutional 
insofar as they minimized the value of human life. The Court reaffirmed 
the doctrine established in its 1994 judgment on the legislature’s power to 
criminalize abortion and upheld the constitutionality of the provisions 
under review. The Court found Congress’ measures neither unreasonable 
nor disproportionate. Thus, Congress had not exceeded the scope of its 
power in criminal policymaking, especially because abortion remained a 
crime. It must be noted that this decision expressly defined abortion as an 
action that should be “repudiated,” and quoted a number of Papal 
Encyclicals to support its line of reasoning—a matter expressly 
disapproved of by the dissenting magistrates.128  
However, after the new justices were elected in 2000, the Court, in a 
very divided decision, took a more moderate stance. This more moderate 
position is evident in a recent judgment, in which the Court examined the 
constitutionality of the provision in the new Criminal Code, which 
authorizes judges to abstain from imposing a penalty for abortion when it 
occurred under “extraordinary and abnormal conditions of motivation.”129 
Rather, this time, Congress had gone in a different direction, and accepted 
 126. Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, and Alejandro Martínez Caballero 
 127. Decision C-013 of 1997, José Gregorio Hernández, J. (Jorge Arango Mejía, J. concurring; 
Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., and Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. 
dissenting), In re Artículos 328, 345, 347 y 348 del Código Penal (Articles 328, 345, 347, 348 of the 
Criminal Code). 
 128. Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, and Alejandro Martínez Caballero.  
 129. Decision C-647 of 2001, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J., 
Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., Jaime Araujo Rentería, J., and Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, J. concurring; 
Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. and Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 124 de la Ley 
599 de 2000 (Article 124 of 599 of 2000). 
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that certain abortions could remain unpunished in certain cases. However, 
Congress did not go as far as to decriminalize certain types of abortions or 
to forbid completely the criminal investigation and judgment of women 
who decided to have an abortion under “extraordinary and abnormal 
conditions of motivation.”130 Congress only allowed the judge to waive the 
imposition of a punishment. Because of legislative discretion in criminal 
policy, the Court considered that, given the extreme nature of criminal 
penalties, and their requirements of fairness, proportionality and necessity, 
judges should evaluate the degree of social damage caused by criminal 
conduct and impose the appropriate punishment or lack thereof in the 
interests of justice. Thus in this case, the Court, by a scant majority of five 
justices, upheld the provision at issue. This was a particularly difficult 
decision for the Court, because only seven justices sat for the case. Two 
justices with more liberal views had recused themselves.131 In addition, 
two magistrates dissented, stating that the provision should have been 
declared unconstitutional, not only on procedural grounds, but also 
substantive grounds because it gave way to imposing restrictions upon 
life.132 The most innovative aspect of this case was that four justices133 
wrote a concurrence stating that the decriminalization of abortion is 
constitutional in certain cases in which (i) the mother’s autonomy is 
clearly violated (e.g., rape), or (ii) the interest in protecting fetal life is 
diminished (e.g., severe malformation).134
In comparison with the jurisprudence of other constitutional tribunals 
worldwide, Colombian jurisprudence on abortion, represents an 
intermediate stance. On the one hand, decisions like the one adopted by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in Roe vs. Wade, recognizing the right of women 
to choose to carry out an abortion and the qualitative difference between 
state protection of unborn humans vis-à-vis protection of born persons, 
represent the most pro-choice position. Other courts have adopted an 
intermediate stance, such as the German Constitutional Tribunal, for 
which the fetus receives full state protection. This stance supports the 
criminalization of abortion, but also admits that, under certain 
 130. Id. 
 131. One had been co-sponsor of the new Criminal Code, acting as vice-national public prosecutor 
(Jaime Córdoba Triviño). Id. The other one had intervened in the legislative process, as vice-national 
attorney general (Eduardo Montealegre Lynett). Id. 
 132. Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra and Rodrigo Escobar Gil. Id. 
 133. Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, Jaime Araujo Rentería, and Manuel 
José Cepeda Espinosa. Id. 
 134. In a later decision, the Court upheld this same provision on procedural grounds, see Decision 
C-098 of 2002, Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, J. (Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J., Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J., and 
Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, J. dissenting) (text on file with author). 
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circumstances, the protection of the mother’s rights becomes more 
important than the interest in the fetus’ life. This stance then gives rise to 
exceptions in the law’s application.135 The German court’s attitude is 
probably the one that most resembles the Colombian Court’s position, 
especially in light of the new Colombian Criminal Code and the recent 
2001 decision.136 In Latin America itself, the Colombian position seems 
more flexible than other states to arguments against punishing abortion in 
every single circumstance.137
ii. Freedom and Equality of Religions 
The Court has also granted consistent protection to freedom of religion, 
despite the overwhelming Catholic majority in Colombia.138 In this 
respect, it must be underscored that, while the 1886 Constitution clearly 
preferenced the majority religious group, the 1991 Charter focuses on the 
protection of religious pluralism and tolerance of minorities. The Charter 
therefore includes generous provisions, which separate church and state, 
require state neutrality towards religious groups or affiliations, and 
guarantee the freedom of religion and the equality of all religions before 
the law.  
In order to understand the impact of the Court’s decisions in this field, 
it should be borne in mind that since 1886, despite the constitutional 
protection of religious freedom, the Colombian Government had made 
substantial efforts to reinforce its links to the Catholic Church, granting it 
institutional privileges over other religions. International treaties, laws, 
decrees and judicial decisions were adopted to support the high degree of 
cooperation that existed between religious and political leaders. Since the 
promulgation of the 1991 charter, however, based on the express 
 135. With regards to the treatment given to the topic of abortion by foreign courts, see VICKY C. 
JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999); LOUIS FAVOREU & LOÏC 
PHILIP, LES GRANDES DÉCISIONS DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL (1995); DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (1997). 
 136. A number of factors are significant when debating the desirability of a complete 
liberalization within the Colombian context, such as: (i) increasing “underground” abortion clinics 
resulting in the public health problem of a high incidence of death among poor mothers, (ii) 
unsuspected rates of sexual assault in urban and rural contexts, often resulting in pregnancy, especially 
amongst teenagers, (iii) low levels of sexual and reproductive education, especially in lower 
socioeconomic strata, and (iv) the devaluation of human life in the general climate of violence. 
 137. The Latin American position on this matter is reflected in the American Convention of 
Human Rights, Article 4-1, which states that “Every person has the right to have his life respected. 
This right shall be protected by law and, in general, from the moment of conception. . .” American 
Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, art. 4(1), 9 I.L.M. 673.
 138. COLOMBIAN CONST., art. 19. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss4/2
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 589 
 
 
 
 
 
 
affirmations of religious freedom and equality among religions, the Court 
has started to reverse the old trend. Thus, the Court struck down a number 
of legal provisions that linked the Catholic Church and the government. 
These judgments have caused a great deal of controversy. 
(a) The Concordat Case 
One of the Court’s earliest decisions in this area139 was related to the 
constitutionality of a treaty between Colombia and the Holy See—the 
“Concordat,” which established a number of privileges for the Catholic 
Church, such as special cooperation between the Church and the 
government for the “promotion” of the conditions of indigenous peoples, 
exclusive church jurisdiction to dissolve Catholic marriages, a higher 
degree of educational autonomy, the contribution of public funds to the 
maintenance of catholic institutions, mandatory catholic education in 
public schools, privileged promotion of the catholic religion in marginal 
areas, presidential intervention in the nomination of Bishops and 
Archbishops, special catholic services for members of the armed forces, 
exclusive criminal jurisdiction over Bishops for the Holy See, and special 
procedural rules for clerics. The constitutionality of the Concordat had 
already become a matter of debate within the Constituent Assembly. In 
fact, the delegates had eliminated the pre-existing reference to the 
possibility of entering into treaties with the Vatican in order to respect the 
new mandate of religious freedom and equality.  
All of the above-mentioned prerogatives were deemed unconstitutional, 
because they discriminated against other churches and because they 
violated the right to religious freedom. One justice expressed his dissent 
on the grounds that Court lacked jurisdiction to review treaties ratified 
before 1991.140 The decision on the Concordat prompted citizen awareness 
of the implications seriously enforcing rights and principles under the 
constitutional system of judicial review. It also stirred a reaction from the 
Catholic Church, which sponsored a referendum on the issue and initiated 
talks to adopt a new Concordat; both initiatives failed. 
 139. Decision C-027 of 1993, Simón Rodríguez Rodríguez, J., In re Ley 20 de 1974 (Law 20 of 
1974).  
 140. José Gregorio Hernández Galindo. 
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(b) The Sacred Heart Case 
A similar decision on religious freedom was the 1994 verdict declaring 
unconstitutional the legal provision that officially dedicated the 
Colombian State to the Sacred Heart of Jesus and prescribed a number of 
celebrations.141 The Court abolished this provision because of the pluralist 
nature of the Colombian State, of which religious diversity is one of the 
foremost components. The Court rejected the argument that the law was 
merely recognizing the social and historical reality of the Catholic 
majority in Colombia. The Court found that such an assertion was not 
sufficient to justify the formal endorsement of one Church over others in 
difiance of the Constitution. This decision is not in agreement with later 
ones rulings that upheld the officially obligatory character of Catholic and 
Sunday holidays.142 In these cases, the Court held that although these 
holidays were initially conceived in a religious context, they had now been 
adopted by society as a neutral holiday tradition. In addition, a 1994 
decision upheld the constitutionality of the 1887 Law, which provided that 
custom not contrary to Christian morals may be a subsidiary source of 
law.143 In this case, the Court found that Christian morals, as an essential 
element of the social order and the grounds for the majority’s moral 
position, might be legally relevant. The Court has recently stated that, it 
will use several criteria to determine when a law has a religious purpose, 
effect or connotation and thus violating the Constitution.144
(c) The Religious Freedom Statutory Law Case 
In the 1994 decision on the constitutionality of the Statutory Law that 
regulates religious freedom,145 a number of important rules were 
established. I would like to emphasize the following ideas: (i) the idea that 
 141. Decision 350 of 1994, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., 
Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., and José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. dissenting), In re Leyes 33 de 
1927 y 1a de 1952 (Law 33 of 1927, Law 1a of 1952). 
 142. Decision C-1261 of 2000, Martha V. Sáchica de Moncaleano, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 
25 de la Ley 50 de 1990 (Article 25 of Law 50 of 1990). 
 143. C-224 of 1994, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. (Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., Alejandro Martínez, J., 
Caballero, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., and Fabio Morón Díaz, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 13 de 
la ley 153 de 1887 (Article 13 of Law 153 of 1887). 
 144. Decision C-152 of 2003, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., Jaime 
Araújo Rentería, J., and Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, J. dissenting in part), In re Artículo 1 de la Ley 
755 de 2002 (Article 1 of Law 755 of 2002). 
 145. Decision C-088 of 1994, Fabio Morón Díaz, J., In re Revisión previa del Proyecto de Ley 
Estatutaria sobre Libertad Religiosa No. 209 (Revision of the Draft Law on Religious Freedom No. 
209). 
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legal protection of religion may be of a positive or negative nature (i.e. 
freedome to practice or abstain from religion versus religiously motivated 
harassment or coercian); (ii) the idea that although there is no official state 
religion, the State supports and protects the free exercise of religion; (iii) 
the idea of excluding practices defined by the law as psychic, 
parapsychological, satanic, magical, superstitious, spiritist or similar 
practices from the category of “religion”;146 and (iv) the idea of forbidding 
the conditioning of a student’s access to academic institutions on 
acceptance of religious education. 
(d) Protection of Minorities Cases 
A number of tutela decisions issued by the Court have focused on the 
protection of the rights of members of minority religious groups, which 
are often discriminated on the grounds of their religious belief by public 
and private powers. The Court has consistently upheld the right to abstain 
from compulsory catholic education in academic institutions at all 
levels,147 the right not to be dismissed from work for observing religious 
traditions (e.g., the Sabbath),148 and the rights of minority churches to 
receive state recognition of their autonomy and hierarchies.149
From another perspective, defending human dignity and religious 
practices, the Court has protected minorities even when they are within a 
given religion. In a highly publicized case, the Court recently protected a 
disabled minor’s right to dignified treatment. The minor had been denied 
holy communion by a Catholic priest, who publicly argued that, due to the 
minor’s mental capacity, the child could not comprehend the meaning of 
the ritual at hand, and thus was “like a little animal.”150 Although the Court 
did not order the priest to administer the Communion because of the 
religious authorities’ autonomy over the matter and the absence of a 
unjustified differential treatment, the Court did order the priest to retract 
 146. The Court qualified all of these practices as valid and protected manifestations of human 
behavior that may be protected under freedom of expression, but not as religions in themselves. 
 147. See id. Decision C-555 of 1994, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), In re Artículos 6 
y 16 de la Ley 60 de 1993, Artículos 23, 24, 92, 94, 95, 96, 105, 143, 155, 159, 160 y 162 de la Ley 
115 de 1994 (Law 60 of 1993, Law 115 of 1994); Decision T-421 of 1992, Alejandro Martínez 
Caballero, J. (unanimous), Amparo Bedoya Díaz y José Raúl García García contra la Escuela Pública 
“Julio Zuluaga” (Diaz v. The Public School “Julio Zuluaga”). 
 148. Decision T-982 of 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J., Ana Chávez Pereira contra la 
Caja de Compensación Familiar del Amazonas (Cafamaz) (Pereria v. Bank of Amazonas). 
 149. See supra note 145. 
 150. Decision T-1083 of 2002, Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, J. (Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. 
dissenting), Alexander Morales Bailón contra de Fernando Moreno (Bailón v Moreno). 
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publicly his statement that people with mental discapacities are like 
animals. The Court held that such a position disregarded the most basic 
dignity of any human being. 
iii. Freedom of the Press151
Colombia is, by far, the most unsafe place in the world for journalists, 
who are frequent victims of the nation’s internal armed conflict. 
Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court has made significant achievements 
in the definition of the scope of freedom of the press, and of the rights 
related to the flow of information.152 Strong trends in decisions exist in 
relation to (i) the potential conflicts between the right to individual privacy 
and the right of the media to inform, and (ii) the mass media’s social 
responsibility. Both of these issues have received particular recognition in 
the inter-American region. Other judgments in this area have earned the 
Court widespread criticism, such as the judgment on the 1996 “television 
law.”  
(a) Freedom of the Press in Conflict with Privacy 
The first tutela decisions of the Court concerning the press addressed 
the classic conflict between freedom of the press and the right to privacy. 
Some of the most debated cases in the field of freedom of the press have 
arisen when the power of the media clashes with the individual’s right to 
privacy, especially that of public figures or other well-known persons. In 
the beginning, the Court tended to protect privacy, visualizing the press as 
a huge power which could invade privacy without restraint. Thus, in a 
1992 decision the Court examined the tutela filed by the widow of a 
popular singer against several newspapers that had given substantial 
 151. The Court has examined the freedom of the press many respects. Due to space 
considerations, no description of cases on other important topics is included herein. On the right of the 
media to obtain information, see Decision T-066 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), 
Heber Jair Otero Velasco contra la Revista Semana (Velasco v. “Revista Semana” Magazine); 
Decision T-094 of 2000, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (unanimous), Omar Enrique Benjumea y de la 
Sociedad Salsamentaria San Martín Ltda. contra el Canal Caracol (Benjumea v. Channel “Caracol”). 
For rights of access to airwaves, see Decision C-445 of 1997, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. 
(unanimous), In re Artículo 16 de la Ley 335 de 1996 (Article 16 of Law 335 of 1996); Decision C-
350 of 1997, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., 
Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., and José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J.dissenting), In re Artículos 1, 
2, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28 de la Ley 335 de 1996 (Law 335 of 1996); Decision C-329 of 
2000, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J., In re Artículos 49 a 57 del Decreto 1900 de 1990 (Articles 49 
through 57 of Decree 1900 of 1990).  
 152. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 20. 
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coverage to her husband’s death and to his previous extra-matrimonial 
affair.153 In this case, the Court determined that the media organizations 
are private organizations with great power and social influence and that 
they can therefore harm the rights of individual citizens on a grand scale. 
Consequently, the Court expressly affirmed that the constitutional 
protection of freedom of the press is circumscribed by the media’s duty to 
disseminate true and impartial information, social responsibility, and 
respect for the rights of others. Thus, the media may not invoke freedom to 
inform as an excuse to invade the constitutionally protected rights of 
individuals, such as the right to privacy. This rule is all the more important 
when the rights of the family and of children are concerned, even in the 
case of well-known figures, whose right to privacy may be more diffuse 
but nevertheless present. The Court granted the tutela, ordering that the 
media abstain from disseminating any more information on the case, and 
imposing an unquantified penalty upon the defendants.154 This same line 
of reasoning was adjusted in a later decision,155 in which a distinction was 
made between information made public by the media and information 
made public by a socially notorious person and then disseminated as true 
and impartial facts by the media. In this case, the Court denied a tutela 
filed by the claimant, regarding the dissemination of facts that the claimant 
himself had made public. In fact, in the tutela decisions adopted after the 
mid 1990s, the Court made a distinction between the privacy of ordinary 
citizens and the more reduced privacy of public officials and figures. The 
Court has said that in those cases, the importance of freedom of the press 
within a democracy, and its functions for facilitating the accountability of 
those in power to the people justify the dissemination of information that 
may reveal facts about the personal lives of public officials and figures.156
 153. Decision T-611 of 1992, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Clara Elena 
Cabello de Orozco contra Varios Medios de Comunicación (Orozco v. Various Periodicals). 
 154. Article 25 of Decree 2591 of 1991 enables tutela judges, under certain conditions, to impose 
in genere or “abstract” penalties upon violators of fundamental rights. The quantification of these 
penalties is left to ordinary judges, in front of whom plaintiffs must reappear in order to obtain a 
specific indemnity. 
 155. Decision SU-1723 of 2000, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Diomedez Díaz 
Maestre contra Telecolombia Ltda. (Maestre v. Telecolombia, Ltd.). 
 156. See Decision SU-056 of 1995, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), Rosmery Montoya 
Salazar, Margarita Vásquez Arango y Libia González de Fonnegra contra Germán Castro Caycedo, 
Lucrecia Gaviria Diez y Editorial Planeta (Salazar et al. v. Caycedo et al.); Decision T-048 of 1993, 
Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Rafael Carbonell y Caronell contra La Tarde (Carbonell v. La 
Tarde); Decision T-066 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Heber Jair Otero Velasco 
contra la Revista Semana (Velasco v. La Revista Semana Magazine).  
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(b) Dissemination of Classified Information and Personal 
Reputation Issues 
Although the Court has ordered the media, including television news 
programs, to retract false information that seriously affects individual 
reputations, usually the Court has protected the freedom of the press, the 
media’s criticism of the government, and, occasionally, the dissemination 
of information deemed disrespectful by public officials.157  
It must not be overlooked that given the prevailing social and political 
conditions in Colombia, it is not unusual for people who are the object of 
public accusations in the press and related to armed conflict to be victims 
afterwards of attacks or threats to their person. A salient case in this area 
was the 1998 verdict158 on a tutela filed by the mayor of a municipality 
against a prominent weekly magazine that had named him in an article 
about mayors purportedly associated with local guerrillas. The magazine 
cited unspecified army documents as the source of its information. The 
plaintiff, in response promptly requested that the magazine publicly clarify 
his innocence and cited the severe security problem created for him by the 
article. However, the magazine’s response was limited to a brief note 
published in a secondary section that specified the vague nature of the 
sources it had consulted. The army denied supplying the magazine with 
any information, which was, in any case, deemed “classified.” The Court 
stated that “classified” nature of documents is only binding on public 
officials. However, the Court held that the media, in fulfilment of their 
natural function as scrutinizers of public power, can seek and publish such 
information under the condition that the information be truthful and 
presented in an impartial manner and that the affected persons have an 
opportunity to establish his or her version of the facts. In so deciding the 
Court recalled previous case law regarding the clash between a right to 
privacy or the good reputation of public officials and the right of the media 
to inform. When it is not possible to harmonize both interests, the latter 
should prevail based on the media’s function as a scrutinizer of political 
power. The article on the plaintiff in this case, therefore, was considered a 
manifestation of the magazine’s exercise of its legitimate functions. In this 
case, however, the Court determined that the requirement that the 
 157. In Decision T-206 of 1995, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. (unanimous), Manuel Francisco Becerra 
Barney contra María Elvira Samper Nieto y María Isabel Rueda Serbousek (Barney v. Nieto et al.), the 
Court affirmed, based on the condition of fairness, a tutela decision ordering a popular television news 
program to rectify the information that it had broadcast about the corrupt activities of a public official. 
 158. Decision T-066 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (Velasco v. La Revista Semana). 
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information be truthful—a standard applied more or less strictly depending 
on the nature and impact of the topic—was not been met. The Court also 
criticized the evident lack of visibility of the note of “clarification,” 
asserting that the note and the article should, in all fairness, be equally 
visible. The tutela was granted and the magazine was ordered to rectify its 
untruthful assertions. 
The Court has also addressed the conflict between freedom of the press 
and personal reputation in its abstract review of legislation. In the most 
recent decision in this area, the Court recognized that the legislature could 
favor freedom of the press over honor, which is an important value in 
Hispanic culture. The provision at issue allowed the press to stop any 
criminal procedure for libel by publicly retracting information that could 
affect an individual, even without or against the consent of the plaintiffs. 
The Court upheld the provision on the grounds that, criminal responsibility 
would not be necessary, because honor could be reestablished once the 
press retracted harmful information. One Justice concurred, arguing for 
allowing a more broad and open democratic debate through an active 
protection of freedom of the press and the establishment of other less 
restrictive means to protect individual reputations (e.g., tutela).159
(c) Journalists’ Licensing 
One particular case concerning freedom of the press that has raised a 
significant degree of public debate was a 1998 constitutionality decision160 
in which the Court banned a law requiring journalists to carry a 
professional card. This requirement had, in practice, created a kind of 
licensing system. The primary argument advanced by the Court was the 
fact that the Constitution does not restrict freedom of expression to those 
who can prove they have obtained a certain type of education or 
qualifications in journalism. In other words, no specific group can claim 
control over the exercise of an activity classified by the Constitution as a 
fundamental freedom for all persons. The Court also asserted that the 
exercise of a given profession or occupation can only be regulated when it 
entails some type of social risk and found that the risks involved in 
allowing the freedom of opinion implicit in a democratic system are 
 159. Decision C-489 of 2002, Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. (Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. 
concurring), In re Artículos 82 numeral 8° y 225 de la Ley 599 de 2000 (Articles 82, 225 of Law 599 
of 2000). 
 160. Decision C-087 of 1998, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. concurring), 
In re Artículos 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9 y 10 de la Ley 51 de 1975 (Law 51 of 1975). 
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preferable to the risks of suppressing it. In the end, the Court declared the 
law unconstitutional.  
The Court recently ratified this doctrine when it struck down part of a 
bill, which the President had vetoed. In the Court’s view, the bill was an 
attempt to reintroduce a licensing system by defining professional 
journalists as those who held a university degree in journalism, or were 
certified by the Ministry of Social Protection and had worked as 
journalists during the past ten years. After expounding upon the crucial 
function of a free press within a democracy and highlighting various 
previous forms of control over the press that are forbidden by the 
Constitution, the Court declared that any person can become a journalist 
because of her right to freedom of expression. Nevertheless, the Court 
accepted that a law can grant labor and social security benefits to 
journalists, as well as protect them against violent threats, insofar as: (a) 
these protective measures are narrowly tailored to exclude any risk of 
governmental intervention with the free press; and (b) the enjoyment of 
these benefits depends exclusively on objective criteria.161
(d) Covert Retaliation Against Criticism 
Another controversial judgment was a 1998 decision162 in which the 
Court rejected an unconstitutional actio popularis presented against Law 
335 of 1996 (“Law”) regulating television services. The plaintiff argued 
that the Law, as a whole, was an illegitimate instrument devised by 
Congress with intimidatory and persecutory aims to retaliate against 
television news channels that had carried out investigative journalism 
activities during the so-called “Proceso 8.000.” This was a highly 
publicized set of criminal and political investigations involving the then 
President of the Republic and a number of high public officials and 
political figures. These investigations unleashed in 1995 when the 
presidential campaign was publicly accused of receiving money from 
druglords. The plaintiff’s argument was supported by the fact that the Law 
ordered the non-renewal of contracts then operating between providers of 
television services and the state. The law also required the initiation of a 
new public tender to select future providers. As a consequence of this 
 161. Decision C-650 of 2003, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous) (text on file with 
author). 
 162. Decision C-456 of 1998, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., 
Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., and José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. dissenting), In re Ley 335 de 
1996 (Law 335 of 1996). 
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tender, television service suppliers who had broadcast news programs 
denouncing powerful politicians were refused air time, and their television 
spaces were reassigned to different companies. The Court stated that it is 
both normal and acceptable for laws regulating the duration of public 
contracts to be proposed by members of Congress. The Court also stated 
that the democratic process is a guarantee that the final provisions adopted 
as law will be the result of public and pluralistic debate, even if the 
drafting congressional members had personal interest stakes in the new 
law. In light of its 1997 decision163 on the constitutionality of the same 
legal provision, the Court held that it is within the scope of congressional 
autonomy to regulate the conditions of concession contracts with 
television service providers, including their non-renewal. The Court also 
held that the launch of a new tender did not in itself violate equality of 
treatment as all of the providers were given equal opportunity to 
participate. Finally, while the Court asserted that a given law could be 
declared unconstitutional on the grounds of some discriminatory or 
coercive purpose or impact, this particular case was not such a situation. 
(e) Freedom of the Press and Public Order 
Despite grave disturbances to the public order and enduring armed 
conflict, the Court has preferred the rights of a free press over claims for 
public order. The Court has stated, for example, that only in extreme 
situations in which information may pose a clear and present danger to 
life, physical integrity, or an ongoing military operation may a presidential 
decree to punish, not for the purpose of censorship, the publication of such 
information.164 The Court upheld a presidential decree based on this 
exception that forbade the publication of any text or verbatim declarations 
issued by guerrillas or paramilitary groups, and the live transmission of 
information on military operations when it could imperil the lives of 
soldiers.165 In an ordinary law approved by Congress, however, the same 
 163. Decision C-350 of 1997, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., Vladimiro 
Naranjo Mesa, J., Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., and José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. dissenting), 
In re Artículos 1, 2, 8, 10, 11, 13, 16, 20, 21, 25, 26, 28 de la Ley 335 de 1996 (Law 335 of 1996). The 
Court struck down provisions of the Law that allowed for the evaluation of new programs and the 
provisions that would result in censorship. Id. 
 164. See Decision C-197 of 1994, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. 
concurring in part), In re Artículo 1o. de la Ley 54 de 1989 (Article 1o. of Law 54 of 1989) (upholding 
the statutory law concerning presidential powers during states of exception). 
 165. Decision C-045 of 1996, Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. (José Gregorio Hernández, J., and Jorge 
Arango Mejía, J. concurring; Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J., and Eduardo 
Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), In re Revisión constitucional del Decreto 1902 del 2 de noviembre de 
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provision was struck down as an excessive intrusion on the freedom of the 
press, reasoning that no circumstance or level of public disorder justified 
such a permanent measure.166 Recently, the Court struck down a 
presidential decree stemming from the exception that restricted access by 
journalists to zones of declared armed conflict on the grounds that it 
violated access to information and gave way to censorship.167
iv. Freedom of Expression  
Two particularly interesting sources of case law dealing with freedom 
of expression168 relate to the protection of literary and artistic works, and 
the freedom of opinion.  
The conflict between creative expression and the right to privacy or 
good reputation was brought before the Court in 1995.169 Two citizens 
filed a tutela against a writer, arguing that their reputations and privacy 
had been violated by seemingly false information in that author’s literary 
work. The Court stated that, in principle, freedom of expression—as 
opposed to the freedom to impart and receive information—has no 
restrictions, and is not subjected to the same requirements of truthfulness 
and impartiality. In this case, there was no proof that the author had 
resorted to an unlawful intrusion on the plaintiffs’ privacy in order to 
obtain the information, and the Court categorized works of art and 
literature as intangible units. The tutela was denied, and the Court 
expressly rejected the plaintiffs’ request that an order of modification be 
issued to require changes to specific parts of the book.  
Another example of the Court’s commitment to constitutional freedom 
of expression and opinion arose in a 1998 tutela decision170 defending a 
university professor who had been fired from his position after actively 
participating in a student protest against the policies of the law faculty. In 
this case, the Court stated that the right to freely express one’s own 
1995 (Constitutional Revision of Decree 1902 of 1995). 
 166. Decision C-425 of 1994, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., 
Jorge Arango Mejía, J., Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., and Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. concurring), In 
re Artículos 94, 95 y 97 de la Ley 104 de 1993 (Law 104 of 1993). 
 167. Decision C-1024 of 2002, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., In re Decreto Legislativo No. 2002 de 
2002 (Legislative Decree 2002 of 2002). 
 168. COLUMBIA CONST. art. 20. 
 169. Decision SU-056 of 1995, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), Rosmery Montoya 
Salazar, Margarita Vásquez Arango y Libia González de Fonnegra contra Germán Castro Caycedo, 
Lucrecia Gaviria Diez y Editorial Planeta (Salazar et al. v. Caycedo et al.).  
 170. Decision SU-667 of 1998, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Dario 
Velasquez Gomez contra la Universidad De Medellin (Gomez v. University of Medellin).  
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thoughts, opinions, ideas, concepts, and beliefs places clear restrictions on 
the abilities of both public authorities and those who occupy positions of 
power in public or private entities to impede, interfere, or obstruct the free 
flow of nonviolent expression through legally accepted channels. The 
Court found this all the more relevant to academic circles, especially in 
law faculties, and declared that authorities could not punish, prosecute, or 
exclude a member of the academic community for criticizing university 
policies. Consequently, the University was ordered to reinstate the plaintiff 
to his original position.  
b. Equality 
While the right to equality was not expressly protected by the 1886 
Constitution, its existence had been recognized by the Supreme Court of 
Justice and the Council of State in their interpretation of other 
constitutional provisions protecting liberties.171 Both tribunals, however, 
espoused a formal vision of equality, understood as equality before the 
law. In contrast, the Constituent Assembly declared the right to equality to 
be the forerunner for all fundamental rights and an essential goal of state 
activity. Delegates were especially keen on promoting a substantial, and 
not merely formal, notion of equality. This call was issued a number of 
times throughout the history of Colombia’s profoundly unequal society. It 
was most sharply voiced by assassinated popular leader and presidential 
candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. Gaitán declared in the 1940s that “the 
people do not require rhetorical equality before the law, but real equality 
before life.”  
The Constituent Assembly thus focused its efforts on trying to balance 
power relationships, ensuring a more equitable distribution of social and 
economic resources and benefits, interpreting the needs of the 
marginalized and the weak, and alleviating social injustice in general. 
Consequently, the 1991 Constitution contains strong provisions on 
universal, formal, and substantial equality. Article 13 includes six basic 
elements: (i) a general principle of equality of treatment, opportunity, and 
 171. In a 1970 judgment (Sept. 4, 1970, per Justice Eustorgio Sarria), the Court pointed out that: 
it is hard to conceive of equality as a right, or at least as a right distinct from other individual 
rights, when it is nothing different than the logical consequence of the right that men have to 
possess rights derived from their human nature, and that must, comnsequently, be equal. 
However, this human equality is neither absolute nor mathemacal. It must be understood . . . 
in the sense that all ment must be equally protected by the law; that the charges imposed must 
not be arithmetically identical, but proportional. 
(informal translation) (text on file with author). 
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protection, as well as equality before the law and in the enjoyment of 
rights; (ii) a prohibition on discrimination based on sex, race, national or 
family origin, language, religion, and political or philosophical opinion; 
(iii) a state duty to promote the conditions necessary to attain real and 
effective equality; (iv) the possibility of creating advantages for 
discriminated or marginal groups; (v) a directive to grant special 
protection to the weak; and (vi) a mandate to punish those who abuse and 
mistreat vulnerable persons. The role of states in establishing and 
preserving equality among their citizens was radically redefined to reflect 
modern constitutional tendencies. Instead of merely preventing 
discrimination, the state must now affirmatively correct the numerous 
inequities that pervade social and economic life. The state’s duty is one 
that has been developed through myriad Court judgments. The examples 
that follow must be understood in light of Colombia’s complex 
constitutional mandate. However, the Court’s decisions on the equality 
clause have not lived up to the potential of the Constitutional mandate nor 
have those decisions sufficiently alleviated enduring social inequalities. 
i. Gender 
The importance of the decisions of the Court dealing with gender 
equality is apparent when one notes that, well into the twentieth century, 
women in Colombia had limited political rights, were legally equivalent to 
minors, had no legal authority over their children, and were forced to use 
their husbands’ surnames. These constraints are only a sample of available 
evidence of the grave structural problem of gender-based 
misrepresentation, subordination, and violence that the Court’s case law 
wrestles with.172
The Court has divided cases involving discrimination against women 
into two groups and assessed those cases according to an interpreted 
constitutional mandate for the enforcement of gender equality.173 The first 
group includes highly visible and frequent forms of gender discrimination, 
such as pregnancy related cases, the exclusion of women from public and 
private spaces, and restrictions on women’s participation in many 
endeavors and opportunities. In these situations, the Court has typically 
decided in favor of the women presenting the tutela and has established 
 172. For a comparison of the Constitutional Court’s decisions on sexual and reporductive rights 
with those of other Latin American high courts, see LUISA CABAL ET AL., CUERPO Y DERECHO: 
LEGISLACIÓN Y JURISPRUDENCIA EN AMÉRICA LATINA (2001). 
 173. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 43. 
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clear rules for securing women’s substantial equality in society. The 
second group of cases pertain to a more profound level of “systemic” or 
“structural” discrimination comprised of ideas, practices, and attitudes that 
are far more deeply entrenched in social and cultural practice and belief, 
but are often less visible or discussed. Tribunals have, consequently, given 
a special degree of protection to women made vulnerable by a 
combination of their social position and the cultural element of 
“machoism,” so prevalent in Latin American societies. In addition, the 
Court has approved and upheld affirmative action measures that tend to 
secure equality at the foundation. 
Colombia’s Constitution grants pregnant women and mothers a special 
degree of protection.174 As a result, the Court has consistently upheld the 
rights of pregnant women in discrimination cases that involve expelling 
pregnant teenagers from public schools, pressuring parents to withdraw 
their pregnant daughters from private schools, and denying university 
readmission after early withdrawal from classes due to pregnancy or 
childbirth. In 1997,175 for example, the Court reviewed a case involving 
students from a religious school who were expelled during the academic 
year for becoming pregnant. In this case, the tribunal decided to reinstate 
the students, invoking the special constitutional protection for pregnant 
women and single mothers. Hopefully, this ruling will help to avoid the 
stigmatization of pregnant women and allow them to achieve a healthy 
childbirth and assume their social responsibilities and duties as mothers. 
The Court has also enforced special protections for pregnant workers who 
are dismissed from their jobs or do not receive constitutional treatment as 
a result of their pregnancy.176  
The Court has also enforced women’s equality in cases involving overt 
discrimination on the basis of gender. Examples of this overt 
discrimination include denying women access to military training 
schools,177 requiring that weddings be in the woman’s domicile,178 or 
forbidding women to work night shifts.179  
 174. Id. 
 175. Decision T-393 of 1997, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Luz Mery Pulido 
Ríos y Otras contra Varios Establecimientos Educativos (Ríos v. Various Educational Establishments). 
 176. Decisions T-902 of 2000, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Dignora María 
Henao Alvarez contra La Empresa Industrias Astro Ltda (Alvarez v. The “Industrias Astro” 
Corporation); Decision T-270 of 1997, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous) Mariela Trillos 
Vásquez contra Caja de Previsión Social de Barranquilla (Vásquez v. Bank of Barranquilla); 
Decision T-161 of 1998, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Yira Luz Castañeda 
Patiño contra “CAPRECOM E.P.S.” (Patiño v. CAPRECOM). 
 177. Decision T-624 of 1995, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Adriana 
Granados Vásquez contra la Escuela Naval “Almirante Padilla” (Vásquez v. Naval Academy of 
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The Court has also tackled systemic and structural patterns of 
discrimination. At the outset, it appeared that the Court had accepted that 
the stereotype of women’s economic dependence on men was a 
consideration in legal regulation. In a 1992 judgment,180 it was deemed 
constitutional to grant the daughters of military men greater social security 
benefits than their brothers because women are dependent upon men for 
their livelihood in Colombian society. While this case was criticized by 
some as perpetuating gender-inferiority stereotypes through their 
institutionalization in social security systems, the Court has also 
consistently rejected any provisions, decisions, or situations that foster 
male dominance or degrade women. The Court has, in fact, fought “the 
social stereotype that women are not the principal source of income,” by 
ordering the social security system to register as beneficiary a man who 
was dependent upon his wife’s salary, even though this situation was 
unforeseen by the drafters of the relevant regulation.181 The Court has also 
upheld the constitutionality of a social security law that established a 
lower retirement age for women on the grounds that, as a result of 
widespread patterns of gender discrimination that prevail in Colombia’s 
male-dominated society, even women who work outside the home 
typically bear the burden of domestic chores and have no free time for 
themselves. Consequently, the Court held that the state should not merely 
assume a neutral position. Rather, in order to promote equality as a 
substantive principle, the state must “overcome secular injustice,” inter 
alia through the adoption of affirmative measures, such as the statute 
granting women earlier access to a pension.182
One landmark case in this field dealt with the economic value of 
female housework and the equal rights of unmarried women vis-à-vis 
married women.183 The plaintiff, Ester Varela, was a woman who had been 
“Almirante Padilla”). 
 178. Decision C-112 of 2000, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., José 
Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. concurring), In re Artículo 126 del Código Civil (Article 126 of the 
Civil Code). 
 179. Decision C-622 of 1997, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. (Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. 
concurring), In re Artículo 342 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo (Article 342 of the Labor Code). 
 180. Decision C-588 of 1992, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 
250 del Decreto 1211 de 1990 (Article 250 of Decree 1211 of 1990). 
 181. Decision T-098 of 1994, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Amanda Cardona de de 
Los Rios contra Caja de Seguridad Social de Risaralda (Los Rios v. The Bank of Social Security of 
Risaralda). 
 182. Decision C-410 of 1994, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), In re Artículos 33, 36, 61, 64, 
65, 117 y 133 de la Ley 100 de 1993 (Law 100 of 1993). 
 183. Decision T-494 of 1992, Ciro Angarita Barón, J. (José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. 
dissenting), Esther Varela contra Juzgado 17 Civil Municipal y 9 Civil del Circuito, de la ciudad de 
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in a relationship for twenty-four years with a man she never married, but 
with whom she had shared her livelihood and a house.184 When her 
companion died, the home the couple shared, which was legally in his 
name, was passed on to his sister via inheritance. The civil judge in the 
matter ordered the plaintiff to move out of the house. The Court, having 
found sufficient evidence of the shared life of the plaintiff and her partner, 
declared that the everyday housework perfomed by women and myriad 
other contributions of women to the economy of informal households must 
be valued in economic terms and viewed as the female contribution to the 
kind of patrimonial arrangements protected by the law and the 
Constitution. The Court consequently granted the tutela, overruling the 
Supreme Court civil judgment grounded solely on Civil Code rules of 
inheritance. The Court then ordered the civil judge to suspend the eviction 
order while the plaintiff’s entitlement to the house were reevaluated by a 
family judge. The Court also ordered the application of this doctrine to any 
future cases of a similar nature. This precedent is especially significant for 
a society where more than half of the population is organized into de facto 
families. The case of Ester Varela has since exerted substantial influence 
over legal and political circles, pushing them to remedy social security 
difficulties of many unmarried homemakers. 
Perhaps the most important gender equality decision of the Court 
related to the establishment of a quota to ensure the effective participation 
of women in the decision-making processes of organs of public power. 
This law stipulated that thirty percent of the decision-making positions in 
the Colombia’s executive branch be assigned to women. The regulation 
thereby secured the equality of opportunities between genders in public 
sector selection procedures. The Court generally accepted the measures 
included in this law and characterized these measures as affirmative action 
provisions. In this case, the Court held the law was constitutional because: 
(i) there was ample evidence of women’s under representation in such 
decision-making positions and of systemic gender discrimination in 
Colombia, and (ii) because equality for women should be defended both 
by guaranteeing equal educational and access opportunities (“equality at 
the starting point”) and promoting equal representation in government 
(“equality at the destination point”). 
Much change is still required in order to remedy discrimination against 
women in Colombia. The pattern of work division on the grounds of 
Cali (Varela v. 17th Civil Municipal Division of the City of Cali). 
 184. Id. 
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gender, the degrading social and cultural representations of women in 
society, the perpetuation of stereotypes in education, the rates of sexual 
violence, internalized gender discrimination patterns among women, and 
the male-dominated culture are issues that will surely come before the 
court in the future. Regardless, the process has begun, and with 
unsuspected force. 
ii. Sexual Orientation 
Homosexuals have also been the object of highly controversial 
decisions, given the Colombian sociocultural context. Nevertheless, these 
decisions have granted unexpected groups of individuals collective 
protection from discrimination and harrassment and allowed their greater 
participation in both public and private spheres. Homosexuality was 
criminally punished in Colombia until 1981 and, before 1991, 
homosexuals could be excluded from their professions and sanctioned by 
disciplinary authorities. Thus, it seems clear that Court decisions can 
generate important changes in social status, individual opportunities for 
self-fulfilment and the protection of human dignity. As with abortion, 
homosexuality is an area in which the Court has proven more 
conservative; Colombia is just starting down a very long road.  
Actio Popularis claims filed by homosexuals have generally arisen, 
when homosexuals are excluded from institutions or denied opportunities, 
when regulations impose disciplinary sanctions or discriminatory 
measures based on sexual orientation, or when regulations exclude 
homosexuals from certain benefits. The Court usually strikes down 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. When it comes to 
extending to homosexual persons the legal benefits granted to heterosexual 
couples and families, however, the Court has adopted a much less tolerant 
position. 
A number of tutela claims have been filed to prevent discrimination on 
sexual-orientation grounds when individuals are treated differently or 
excluded from certain institutions. Homosexual individuals have filed 
numerous complaints against the army, navy, air force, and police as a 
result of their exclusion from service—these exclusions are typically under 
the pretext of disciplinary reasons. In one case, the Court granted the 
claimant protection and affirmed that, the condition of homosexuality 
itself was not a valid ground for excluding someone from a particular 
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institution.185 In that ruling, the Court ruled that disciplinary codes may 
only punish sexual acts, heterosexual or homosexual, that take place on 
official premises. Homosexuals were also protected from forcibly 
declaring their sexual orientation.  
This same reasoning was followed in a 1998 constitutionality 
decision.186 In this instance, the Court adopted a more liberal position 
when examining a legal provision in a statute concerning public teachers. 
This statute classified homosexuality as a behavior worthy of disciplinary 
action and imposed penalties. The Court reaffirmed that, given the 
Constitution’s prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of sex, any 
difference in treatment because of sexual orientation is, in principle, 
forbidden on the grounds that sexual orientation is: (i) a trait probably 
acquired at birth; (ii) a consequence of historical segregation patterns; and 
(iii) not a useful category for distribution of social goods or duties. The 
Court stated that sexuality should also be protected because it is a 
manifestation of personal autonomy and a valid personal lifestyle choice. 
Therefore, the Court concluded, any difference in the treatment of 
homosexuals was presumed unconstitutional and subject to strict 
constitutional review. In the case at hand, the Court considered that the 
statute would not: (i) protect minors from potential abuses because there 
was no proof that homosexuals are more prone to abusive conduct; and (ii) 
prevent minors from “becoming” homosexual because there was no 
evidence to prove that a teacher’s sexuality bears a conclusive influence 
on a pupil’s personal development. The statute was therefore deemed 
unconstitutional and was struck down. 
Nevertheless, two recent decisions have proven that a divided Court 
still regards homosexuals as essentially different from heterosexuals on 
family issues, especially because there is no Congressional statute on the 
rights of homosexual couples.187 The first of these cases188 concerned a 
 185. Decision T-097 of 1994, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. 
concurring) José Moisés Mora contra Gómez contra el Director Escuela de Carabineros Eduardo 
Cuevas (Mora v. School Director Eduardo Cuevas). 
 186. Decision C-481 of 1998, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. 
concurring; Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. José Gregorio, J. Hernández Galindo, J., and Hernando Herrera 
Vergara, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 46 del decreto 2277 de 1979 (Article 46 of Decree 2277 of 
1979). 
 187. Some think that not even the Legislature, and least of all judges, can recognize homosexual 
couples’ family rights beceause the text of article 42 of the Constitution says that a “marriage between 
a man and a woman” is one of the ways to form a family. The Justices who dissented in the following 
cases disagreed with this interpretation of the marriage clause, arguing that the Constitution, in the 
same article, as well as in others, protects different kinds of families within a pluralist and democratic 
society. 
 188. Decision SU-623 of 2001, Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J., César Augusto Medina Lopera contra 
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homosexual man’s request that the social security system register his male 
partner as his beneficiary. The plaintiff’s request was denied on the 
grounds that the legal system only extended benefits to the “families” of 
affiliates, and not to homosexual couples. In this case, the constitutional 
tribunal supported the legislature’s discretion to determine the criteria by 
which the social security system is progressively extended. The only 
restriction on this support was that no one criterion could violate or unduly 
restrict the fundamental rights of the individual. When the Legislature 
decided to extend some benefit to “family,” but not to same-sex partners, 
as with the regulation applied by the social security entity in this case, it 
was not considered the result of any arbitrary or unreasonable action. 
Instead, the Court asserted that the Legislature implemented the 
constitutional protection of the family because of its essential role in 
society. The Court explicitly stated that homosexual couples do not 
constitute “families” in a legal sense or, therefore, for purposes of 
receiving social security benefits under the current regime. This 
proposition does not, however, affect the fact that homosexuality, for the 
Court, remains a valid personal option protected by the Constitution. In 
contrast, the position of a homosexual couple is fundamentally different 
from that of a heterosexual couple. The Court has also specified that this 
exclusion from family status does not bar homosexuals from being 
registered with the social security system, and although they will not be 
treated as beneficiary partners of other registrants, homosexuals are of 
course themselves affiliates. The Court was very divided on this issue—
four justices wrote a unified dissenting opinion arguing that the Court 
should have granted homosexual couples the same social security rights as 
those afforded to heterosexual couples.189
Another recent decision190 in this same line upheld the constitutionality 
of a provision under which only heterosexual couples may adopt children. 
However, four justices191 dissented on the grounds that the decision 
violated the homosexual individuals’ rights to equality and the free 
development of personality. The dissenters argued that it was not enough 
to allow any individual, regardless of sexuality, to adopt; equality requires 
Comfenalco E.P.S. (Lopera v. Comfenalco). 
 189. The dissenting Justices were Justices Jaime Araujo Renteria, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, 
Jaime Córdoba Triviño, and Eduardo Montealegre Lynett. Id. This decision prompted a (faile) bill to 
extend social security protection to homosexual couples. 
 190. Decision C-814 of 2001, Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, J., In re Artículos 89 y 90 del 
Decreto Ley 2737 de 1989 (Articles 89, 90 of Decree Law 2737 of 1990). 
 191. The dissenting Justices were Jaime Araujo Renteria, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, Jaime 
Córdoba Triviño, and Eduardo Montealegre Lynett. Id. 
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express recognition of the right of a homosexual couple to engage in 
adoption. 
iii. Persons with Disabilities 
Disabled persons, whether mentally or physically, are another group 
granted special protections under the Constitution.192 The Court has a long 
line of decisions dealing with the interpretation and scope of their 
fundamental rights and the nature and extent of the state’s obligations on 
their behalf. While disabled persons’ ordinary rights as citizens cannot be 
unduly restricted because of their condition, the Court has gone further in 
its interpretation of relevant constitutional mandates and assigned this 
group special, positive rights. These rights include: (i) access to a broad 
array of benefits and services from which they are usually deprived 
because of their disabilities; (ii) the right to be free of discrimination based 
on their disability; and (iii) other rights in other fields, such as labor law. 
Most of the Court’s cases in this area involve the special treatment that 
disabled persons are entitled to from both the state and society in order to 
secure their right of equal access to public services and benefits. In a 
landmark 1995 tutela verdict,193 the Court examined a claim filed against 
the authorities and sports clubs responsible for the construction of a 
stadium in Cali. These parties had failed to provide special facilities for 
disabled spectators and provided seating only in higher up areas of the 
stadium. The stadium authorities invoked regulations that restricted the 
admissibility of people on the track during matches. The Court ordered the 
respondents to relocate the seating for handicapped individuals to the track 
and to build special facilities. First, the Court found that those responsible 
for the administration of a public space had a duty to actively protect the 
rights of disabled persons. Second, the Court found that, in the case of 
disabled individuals, an equal opportunity right was not merely an 
objective in itself but a means to ensure their other fundamental rights 
such as a full participation in social life. Finally, the court held that 
disabled individuals’ right to equality is violated both by actions and 
omissions that unduly restrict their rights, the special treatment to which 
they are entitled. 
 192. COLOMBIAN CONST. art 47. 
 193. Decision T-288 of 1995, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Reinaldo Botero Bedoya 
contra Clubes Deportivo Cali y América, la División Mayor del Fútbol Colombiano y el Fondo de 
Vigilancia y Seguridad del Municipio de Cali (Bedoya v. Sports Clubs of Cali and America et al.). 
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In similar decisions concerning the handicapped, the Court emphasized 
the special constitutional protection granted to the disabled with regard to 
the right of access to public space, work opportunities, education, 
transportation, and communication services. These protections place 
disabled persons on an equal footing with the rest of the population. In 
1999,194 the Court explained how history has traditionally and silently 
marginalized disabled persons by promoting the ideal of a fully able 
individual. In order to combat the ramifications of this state position, 
obstacles to material and substantial equality of the disabled must be 
removed material and substantial conditions. A 1992 judgment195 granted 
the tutela requested by a child with learning difficulties who had been 
denied access to school for having failed to report the results of special 
psychological and neurological tests that the school had ordered. The 
Court has recently affirmed this precedent. The Court has stated that 
educational institutions have an obligation to grant disabled persons access 
to their premises and services in order to contribute to their social 
integration; this measure is required even if it results in an additional 
burden for those institutions.196  
In a similar vein, the Court issued a judgment in 2000197 that ordered 
the mayor of Bogotá to remove a number of obstacles preventing vehicles 
from parking on sidewalks. These obstacles had the unintended effect of 
restricting the mobility of blind people in public spaces. Interestingly, a 
disabled individual recently filed a case against the operators of the newly 
installed mass transportation system in Bogotá, Transmilenio. The plaintiff 
argued that part of the infrastructure and the vehicles used to provide 
access to the system were not adequately adapted to the needs of disabled 
individuals and, therefore, limited access to an essential public service. 
Taking into account that the right to liberty of circulation can be violated 
through both actions and omissions, the Court found that an operational 
 194. Decision T-823 of 1999, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Señor A contra la 
Secretaría de Tránsito y Transporte de Santa Fe de Bogotá, D.C. (Mr. A v. Secretary of Transportation 
of Santa Fe de Bogotá). 
 195. Decision T-429 of 1992, Ciro Angarita Barón, J. (José Gregorio Hernández, J. concurring), 
Julian Mauricio Moreno Alvarez contra Julio Maldonado Bulla (Alvarez v. Bulla). 
 196. Decision T-1134 of 2000, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Gloria Enid 
Sepúlveda Monsalve contra Directora de la “Escuela Arzobispo García” (Monsalve v. Director of the 
School of Arzobispo Garcia); Decision T-150 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), 
Arismel Camargo Baldiris contra el Servicio Nacional de Aprendizaje (SENA) Seccional Bolívar 
(Baldiris v. National Education Service). 
 197. Decision T-024 of 2000, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Gilberto Pastrana 
Fernández contra la Alcaldía Mayor de Santa Fe de Bogotá, la Secretaría de Tránsito y Transporte de 
Santa Fe de Bogotá y el Instituto de Desarrollo Urbano del Distrito Capital (Fernández v. Mayor of 
Santa Fe de Bogotá et al.). 
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public transportation system is essential to an individual’s full enjoyment 
of the liberty of movement and other associated rights, especially for 
disabled persons. The Court also found that public transportation must be 
accessible to all disable users. The Court affirmed the special protection 
due disabled persons by governing authorities and private parties—in 
particular, the obligation to adopt positive measures that ensure the 
disabled equal access to the goods and services freely enjoyed by the rest 
of the population. Based on these considerations, the Court concluded that 
the scope of constitutional protection for a disabled individual’s liberty of 
circulation, includes the right of equal access to the basic transportation 
facilities of a city. The scope of a disabled individual’s freedom of 
movement demands, at the very least, that operators of transportation 
systems across the country have a plan that allows for the enjoyment of 
this right and facilitates the participation of those affected in its design, 
evaluation, and implementation. The Court issued the corresponding order 
to the Transmilenio operator, and required compliance within two years.198
Discrimination against an individual because of his or her incapacity 
has been completely banned by the Court in a number of tutela decisions. 
The disabled, for example, cannot be forced to vote only when 
accompanied by a member of their family,199 and academic institutions 
cannot exclude them from teaching when there are no alternative non-
academic positions available in the school.200 This line of rulings was not 
an innovation under the 1991 constitutional order. Under the 1886 
Constitution, the Supreme Court of Justice had already struck down 
provisions that discriminated against disabled individuals. In a 1985 
judgment the Court prohibited denial of disabled individuals access to 
posts in the judiciary or public entities. In this case, three justices 
expressed their dissent arguing that when the law established requirements 
for access to given positions in public service, it did not violate equality 
because it was different treatment for persons in different situations. Thus, 
the change in the constitutional approach is remarkable. 
The duty to grant special treatment to disabled individuals has also 
been affirmed by the Court in other areas. In the field of labor rights, 
constitutional case law has upheld that it is not acceptable for the Public 
 198. Decision T-595 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Daniel Arturo 
Bermúdez Urrego contra Transmilenio S.A. (Urrego v. Transmilenio). 
 199. Decision C-359 of 1994, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), Tercera Enmienda del 
Convenio Constitutivo del Fondo Monetario Internacional” y de la Ley 92 de 1993 (Law 92 of 1993). 
 200. Decision T-100 of 1994, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), Jorge Alfonso González 
Martínez contra Secretaría de Educación y Otras (Martínez v. Secretary of Education et al.). 
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Administration to deprive a disabled individual of his or her opportunity to 
work.201 Another related decision stressed that a provision binding 
employers to pay an indemnity to disabled individuals, who have been 
removed from their posts may be constitutional, on the understanding that 
any termination of the employment contract as a result of an individual’s 
disability without official administrative authorization does not produce 
any legal effects.202 Finally, in the field of liberty of circulation, the Court 
declared unconstitutional a decision by the Mayor of Bogotá, denying a 
partially paralyzed person special permission to move in a special vehicle 
during hours ordinarily restricting traffic because the Court believed the 
Mayor failed to fulfill his duty to provide the handicapped special 
treatment.  
Despite a consistent pattern of case law upholding the special treatment 
to which disabled individuals are entitled, the Court has occassionally 
refrained from fully enforcing this constitutional duty when there is a lack 
of resources in a given institution or program. This occurs, primarily, in 
the cases of disabled children who require the provision of special 
education; a right to which they are entitled by virtue of Article 68 of the 
Constitution. The Court has refrained from ordering the adoption of 
special programs, plans, or curricula in order to effectively provide for this 
right stating that, special education is only mandatory when sufficient 
means are available and disabled children with no access to special 
education facilities should be incorporated into normal classrooms.203 This 
situation sharply contrasts with the treatment given by the Court to 
children with exceptional intelligence or abilities, and who are entitled to a 
similar right to special education under Article 68 of the Constitution. In 
these instances, a number of orders have been issued by the Court to 
competent state entities calling on them to adopt reasonable and effective 
programs to provide for the special educational opportunities that these 
children require.204
 201. Decision T-427 of 1992, Eduardo Ci fuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Luis Hernando Suarez 
contra el Director General de la Caja de Previsión Social de Comunicaciones (Suarez v. Director 
General). 
 202. Decision C-531 of 2000, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 26 de la Ley 
361 de 1997 (Article 26 of Law 361 of 1997). 
 203. Decision T-620 of 1999, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Nubia Stella 
Pomares de la Rosa contra Directivas de la Escuela Urbana “San Juan Bautista de Ovejas-
Sucre” (Rose v. Directors of the Urban School of San Juan Bautisa de Ovejas); Decision T-329 
of 1997, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Yolanda Barbosa de Morales contra Escuela Urbana Luis 
Maria Rojas (Barbosa de Morales v. Rojas Urban School). 
 204. Decision SU-1149 of 2000, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), Moisés David 
Acebedo Paredes y Otros contra Presidencia de la República y Otras entidades (Paredes et al. v. 
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iv. Extreme Poverty 
Applying the constitutional protection for equality of treatment and 
opportunity of the weak, the marginalized, and those in need,205 the Court 
has supported those suffering from extreme poverty and lack of access to 
social benefits and services. Three different types of judgments serve to 
illustrate this point: (i) decisions in which the Court has extended social 
security benefits to very poor individuals; (ii) decisions in which the Court 
has ordered or upheld measures designed to combat poverty and 
marginalization from a structural and macro perspective, and (iii) 
decisions dealing with the internally displaced population. 
A classic example of the first line of cases is a 1992 judgment206 in 
which the Court ordered the social security system to approve an eye 
operation for an elderly man living in absolute poverty. This order was 
subject, of course, to verification of his economic conditions. It was 
argued that the Constitution reflects an awareness of the need to secure the 
access of impoverished individuals to the most basic social security 
services. Whenever the Legislature has not fulfilled its constitutional duty 
to produce laws and address this problem, it has been deemed reasonable 
to extract rules from the Constitution to defend a person’s minimum rights 
to a dignified subsistence.  
Another judgment in which the Court has extended social security 
benefits to those in greatest need was issued in 1992.207 The Court 
examined the case of three individuals who, due to their mental 
disabilities, had been indefinitely deprived of their liberty and placed in 
criminal psychiatric wards for more than twenty years. The Court 
acknowledged this serious violation of their fundamental rights to liberty 
and freedom from cruel, inhuman, or degrading penalties or treatments. 
The Court also acknowledged the state’s duty to give them special 
treatment for their impairment. Affirming the mandatory character of these 
duties, the Court stated that persons with mental limitations who have 
been interned may not be subjected to an unjust and indefinite deprivation 
of liberty. In addition, the state is obligated to provide such persons with 
additional protections after the completion of their internment period when 
President of the Republic et al.). 
 205. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 13. 
 206. Decision T-533 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Ricardo Rivera contra el 
Estado Colombiano (Rivera v. Colombiano State). 
 207. Decision T-401 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Luis Francisco Barajas y 
Otras contra Juzgado Primero (10) Superior de Bucaramanga y Otros (Barajas et al. v. Superior Court 
of Bucaramanga). 
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they may find themselves in an even more vulnerable state. It was ordered 
that the Government, through the Ministers of Justice and Health, design 
and implement programs for the provision of adequate, all-inclusive 
attention to and protection of persons in the plaintiffs’ condition within a 
period of thirty days.  
Invoking a similar rationale in 1997,208 the Court ordered the public 
entity responsible for a mental hospital to take in a poor woman who 
suffered from a mental illness. As a result of her extremely poor condition 
and manifest weakness, the Court enforced the state’s duty to provide her 
with constitutionally mandated special protections. The Court ordered the 
hospital to treat her as soon as possible.  
The Court affirmed this trend of decisions in 2001209 when it examined 
the case of an elderly and handicapped man living in conditions of 
absolute poverty and abandonment in Bucaramanga. The Court found that 
social security entities wrongly classified this man under a health services 
program that did not correspond to his extreme economic conditions. In 
spite of his evident need for attention, he was denied free access to 
medical services. The social security entity argued that it had informed the 
man of its reclassification procedures, however, given his physical 
disability, he had not started the relevant procedures. The tutela claim was 
presented by a neighbor on the afflicted man’s behalf. The Court recalled 
the special duty that binds the state to protect persons in circumstances of 
manifest weakness and held that the state had an affirmative obligation to 
grant such persons immediate attention required if immediate family 
cannot. The Court ordered the social security system to reclassify the 
afflicted man in the appropriate category. The Court then established a rule 
that whenever there is doubt as to a person’s classification social security 
entities shall err in favor of the applicant. The Court in this case went 
further, underscoring the plaintiff’s old age and extreme conditions and 
ordering the municipal authorities to grant him the comprehensive and 
immediate attention required such as a dignified place to end his days, if 
he so desired.  
Following a similar course, the Court, in a 2002 decision,210 examined 
the situation of an impoverished 58 year old man, who could not work 
 208. Decision T-046 of 1997, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. (unanimous), Personero del 
Municipio de Espinal, Tolima contra Beneficencia de Cundinamarca (Muncipality of Tolima v. 
Charity of Cundinamarca). 
 209. Decision T-1330 of 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Pablo Antonio 
Prada Archila contra la Secretaría de Salud y Medio Ambiente de Bucaramanga (Archila v. Secretary 
of Health and Environment of Bucaramanga). 
 210. Decision T-149 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J., Alfredo Moreno Pérez contra el 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss4/2
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 613 
 
 
 
 
 
 
because of a serious heart condition. This man was denied access to a 
special state subsidy for persons in similar circumstances because of the 
relevant administrative entity’s failure to provide accurate information on 
the appropriate procedures required in order to obtain the subsidy. In this 
case, the Court ordered a study to determine whether the plaintiff was 
actually entitled to registration with the relevant program. It was clearly 
stated that any state subsidy program should be (i) conducted in such a 
manner as to avoid recurring problems;211 and (ii) publicized in a timely, 
pertinent, correct, and complete manner to all potential beneficiaries in 
order to avoid differences in treatment that hamper the fundamental rights 
of society’s weakest members. 
The Court applied an analogous reasoning in cases involving AIDS 
patients who cannot finance their medical treatment. In these instances,212 
the Court has usually ordered the social security system to provide 
services and medicines necessary for the afflicted to live under dignified 
conditions as long as scientifically possible. Protection of their social right 
to good health is a necessary means for preservation of their right to life. 
In addition, AIDS patients’ conditions of special weakness entitle them to 
receive special protections from the state.  
The Court has also ordered measures designed to eliminate social 
injustices on a larger scale. In one of its earliest decisions,213 the Court 
examined a tutela brought by the inhabitants of a marginalized sector of 
the city of Bucaramanga who had been deprived access to public 
transportation because of the local bus companies’ unilateral decision to 
modify the routes near their area. The Court ruled that urban public 
transportation is an essential means of mobilization for certain social strata 
dependant on it for transport to work, school, and personal business. This 
strata is, therefore, entitled to continuous and regular service. Second, the 
Court held that the actions of public transportation companies have a 
Departamento Administrativo de Bienestar Social, Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá (Pérez v. Administrative 
Dept. of Social Welfare). 
 211. This includes untimely responses to requests for affiliation, lack of predictability, scarce 
participation of beneficiaries in the decision-making process for assignment of public funds, fragile 
control over the relevant administrative decisions, and disregard for administrative due process. 
 212. Decision T-177 of 1999, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), 
Señor X contra Secretaría de Salud Pública Municipal de Cali (Mr. X v. Secretary of Public Health of 
Cali City); Decision T-484 of 1992, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Alonso Munoz Ceballos 
contra Instituto de los Seguros Sociales (Ceballos v. Inst. of Social Security); Decision T-505 of 1992, 
Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Diego Serna Gomez contra Hospital Universitario del 
Valle “Evaristo García” (Gomez v. Univ. Hosp. of Evaristo García). 
 213. Decision T-604 of 1995, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), José Manuel de Arco 
Garcés contra la Jueza Primera Penal Municipal de Cartagena (Garcés v. First Criminal Division of 
Cartagena City). 
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significant impact upon citizens’ everyday lives, placing them in a position 
of greater public responsibility and accountability and subject to a higher 
degree of control by the authorities. Third, because the Constitution 
assigns social significance to private property, the Court ordered the bus 
companies to reestablish their previous routes through the relevant part of 
town. 
In a similar 1995 ruling,214 the Court upheld the constitutionality of 
legal provisions establishing a scheme of subsidies for public utilities 
under which consumers from higher economic strata paid higher rates in 
order to finance consumption by poorer strata. The plaintiff argued that the 
regulations violated the Constitution insofar as they financed only a 
portion of the lower strata’s consumption. In the plaintiff’s view, the state 
had a special obligation to the poorer segments of the population, 
particularly to those groups or individuals in extreme poverty. The 
plaintiff argued that these groups should benefit from special societal 
protection through measures like complete subsidies covering their basic 
needs. The Court dismissed this argument as too extreme. In the Court’s 
view, the Constitution provides special protection to the weak and the poor 
and, therefore, allows measures such as the one adopted by Congress. 
However, the redistributive functions created by Congress to fulfil social 
and economic rights were limited by the system’s fiscal capacity and could 
not be interpreted in such a way as to disrupt the state’s macroeconomic 
conditions and fiscal balance. Therefore, the Court held that the provision 
at hand reached a valid equilibrium between democratic principles and the 
social commitments of the state.  
Finally, the Court has adopted a number of important holdings related 
to internal population displacement—a problem that has grown steadily as 
a consequence of the recent upsurge in violent conflict within Colombia, 
which now predominantly affects the civilian population. Hundreds of 
thousands of individuals, usually entire families, in both rural and urban 
areas across the nation have had to leave their homes due to threats, fears, 
or reasonable expectations of death, violent persecution, extortion, or other 
intolerable situations. Many of these situations have been prompted by the 
spreading confrontation between illegal armed groups and the state. As a 
consequence of their displacement, these persons are often forced to 
migrate to the main cities where they have enlarged growing, and visible, 
pockets of misery. Many of these migrants rely upon whatever charity is 
 214. Decision C-566 of 1995, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), In re Artículos 89, 99 
de la Ley 142 de 1994 (Law 142 of 1994). 
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available for survival. Although there is a special state program for the 
displaced population currently coordinated by the ministries of the Interior 
and Justice, financial constraints and organizational flaws render this 
program notoriously inefficient. Ultimately, the effects of this program are 
little more than symbolic for the persons in need of its aid. When these 
individuals have filed tutela claims, the Court has reacted in a very 
protective manner by declaring that forced displacement amounts to a 
massive, comprehensive, and continuous violation of the affected person’s 
fundamental rights. Dealing with these situations requires the utmost 
solidarity, and these individuals should receive a special level of state 
protection. The State is, therefore, bound to create and implement 
adequate programs to fulfil the basic unsatisfied needs of the affected 
population.215 The Court has also ordered the relevant administrative 
entities to refrain from applying excessively rigid criteria in granting 
displaced individuals and families the benefits provided by law. This 
measure was adopted in order to progressively extend the coverage of 
these programs and contribute to the alleviation of this crisis.216 The 
programs are also intended to assume the task of adequately coordinating 
the different state entities participating to relieve displaced individuals and 
families from the additional burden of administrative inefficiency.217
v. Race 
The Court’s silence on the issue of race can only be described as 
surprising. In a country with a population that is approximately thirty 
percent black, an emerging political and social Afro-Colombian 
movement, and a cultural heritage with substantial African and Afro-
Colombian roots, it is shocking that not one of the Court’s 
pronouncements has dealt with the issue of racial discrimination.218 This 
does not mean, of course, that Colombia is a racism-free democracy; 
sadly, the situation is very much to the contrary. Perhaps the Court’s 
silence can be explained by the fact that the issue of race has not yet 
become a matter of national attention. Very few cases of individual racial 
 215. Decision SU-1150 of 2000, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Defensora del Pueblo 
Regional de Antioquia y Otros contra Inspección 8B municipal de Policía de Antioquia (Public 
Defender of Antioquia et al. v. Police Inspection 8B of Antioquia et al.). 
 216. Decision T-215 of 2002, Jaime Córdoba Triviño, J., Narciso Doria Segura y Pedro Tuberquia 
contra el Colegio Sol del Oriente (Segura et al. v. Sol del Oriente School et al.).  
 217. Decision T-268 of 2003, Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, J., Defensora Regional del Pueblo, 
Antioquia contra Ciudad de Medellín (Public Defender of Antioquia et al. v. City of Medellín)  
 218. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 13. 
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discrimination have been litigated; fewer still have reached the Court. 
Afro-Colombian communities have entered the public sphere as multiple 
ethnic groups, and their lack of unity has affected their treatment by the 
Court. For example, the myriad groups’ special participation rights were 
upheld when a statute granting ethnic groups a special constituency in 
Congress was reviewed. In addition, the Court has defended the cultural 
specificity of some Afro-Colombian communities, such as the isleño 
communities of San Andres.219 In a recent tutela decision,220 the Court 
examined a case in which the management of a building in Cartagena 
forbade its employees to use the elevators. Although the plaintiff in this 
case was a black woman and racial discrimination was present,221 the 
Court granted the tutela on grounds that the right of equality is violated 
whenever access to services based on wholly subjective criteria. In other 
words, people cannot be denied equal access to everyday services on the 
grounds of personal conditions, such as socioeconomic status. Such 
restrictions are only acceptable when there is an objective, reasonable, and 
constitutionally acceptable justification. The issue of race was only 
mentioned as one among many unacceptable discrimination factors; it did 
not constitute a central part of the ratio decidendi. 
In spite of recent efforts aimed at empowering Afro-Colombian 
movements, the issue of racial discrimination and segregation is still so 
deeply entrenched within social practice and culture that, despite the 
abolition of slavery over 150 years ago, the black population remains one 
of the poorest, most underrepresented, and vulnerable groups in the 
country.  
c. Social and Economic Rights 
The purposes and goals of state action were significantly broadened in 
1991 to extend beyond the classic aims of protecting persons and property. 
As amended, the State’s agenda now includes social concerns and the 
protection of fundamental social, economic, and cultural rights. Indeed, 
 219. See, e.g., Decision C-086 of 1994, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. 
dissenting) In re Artículos 14, 23 , 24, 25, 33, 34, 36, 37, 42, 45, 57 de la Ley 47 de 1993 (Law 47 of 
1993); Decision T-574 of 1996, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Pescadores de 
Salahonda contra Empresa Ecopetrol (The Community Members of Salhonda v. Ecopetrol Company). 
 220. Decision T-1042 of 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Olinda María 
Calderón Calderón contra el Gerente del Edificio el Conquistador (Calderón v. Building Manager of 
Conquistador). 
 221. The plaintiff in this case argued that she was being discriminated against because she was 
black, poor, and female. Id. In addition, the plaintiff proved that the manager and residents of the 
building humiliated her expressly on the grounds of her physical and social traits. Id. 
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the essential nature of the Colombian State was modified, transforming its 
traditional political formulation as Estado de Derecho (A Rule of Law 
State) to an Estado Social de Derecho (A Social Rule of Law State).222 
The impact of this deceptively simple conversion runs deep into the most 
diverse spheres of public and private action. Precisely for these reasons, 
the notion of Estado Social de Derecho is one that the Court has 
emphasized, establishing it as the cornerstone of its legal reasoning. The 
notion has also inspired most of the case law related to the social and 
economic rights expressly included within the Constitution.223
The Court has dealt with the issue of social and economic rights both 
abstractly and concretely in its decisions. Tutela judgments are, however, 
the area in which the most significant advances have been made. In this 
field, the Court has highlighted some of the salient features of social and 
economic rights under the new constitutional order. It has said, for 
instance, that these rights have a two-fold content: an essential, non-
negotiable nucleus that may not be restricted; and a progressive 
development area, the extent and content of which is to be defined through 
democratic debate and is essentially tied to the law.224 The Court also 
stated, in one of its unification decisions,225 that the fulfilment of social 
and economic rights is dependant on the decisions incorporated into the 
law and that a constitutional judge is not entitled to intervene in the 
process of congressional assignation and distribution of social benefits. 
Such interference would seriously hamper the democratic process and 
standard application of the principle of equality. However, in that same 
opinion the Court clarified that in some exceptional cases, a constitutional 
judge may grant a tutela pertaining to a social or economic right if certain 
strict conditions are met. One such example is when the minimum 
subsistence rights of marginalized or weak groups and individuals are 
being threatened. This line of reasoning was further refined in a 1998 
decision226 involving children—a group whose social rights are expressly 
classified as fundamental by the Constitution.227 Based on these 
 222. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 1. 
 223. COLOMBIAN CONST. Title II, ch. 2, arts. 42–48. 
 224. Decision SU-225 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. 
Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. and José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J.) Sandra Clemencia Perez Calderon y 
Otros contra Ministerio de Salud y Otros (Calderon et al. v. Minister of Health et al.). 
 225. Decision SU-111 of 1997, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Celmira Waldo de 
Valoyes contra Caja Nacional de Previsión Social-Seccional Chocó (Valoyes v. National Bank of 
Chocó). 
 226. Decision SU-225 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., Calderon et al. v. Minister of Health 
et al. 
 227. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 44. 
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fundamental, prevalent, and mandatory rights of children, the Court 
ordered the municipal authorities of Bogotá to institute an infant 
vaccination program for the poor. There was, therefore, a sufficient reason 
to order public expenditure in order to satisfy these rights.  
There are three types of cases in which the Court has determined that 
rights of a social or economic nature may be protected by means of the 
tutela. The Court has held that socioeconomic rights are directly 
enforceable in specific situations where: (i) social or economic rights that 
become fundamental “by connection,” such as the rights to health and 
social security, which are often linked to the preservation of life; (ii) social 
or economic rights fundamental in and of themselves, such as the 
fundamental social rights of children, the right to adequate nutrition, or to 
basic elementary education; and (iii) the right to minimum conditions of 
dignified subsistence (mínimo vital). Nevertheless, the the issue of whether 
social and economic rights are enforceable in and of themselves remains 
undecided in contexts other than the three mentioned above.228
Since the advent of its fundamental rights case law, the Court has 
accepted that social or economic rights may be protected by means of the 
tutela whenever that protection is necessary to preserve another 
fundamental right directly linked to them. Correspondingly, the Court has 
consistently protected the right to health through tutela decisions 
whenever a safeguard is necessary to ensure the continuity and quality of 
life.229 This protections is also granted in cases in which the right to health 
is connected mainly to the right to life or the right to personal integrity. 
The Court has also protected the right to a healthy environment whenever 
it is necessary to safeguard the rights to life or integrity of persons.230
In addition, there are situations in which social or economic rights 
under the Constitution, directly or through judicial interpretation, are 
fundamental in and of themselves. Such is the case with children’s 
 228. On this debate, and on the defense of the direct and autonomous enforcement of such rights 
through tutela, see generally Rodolfo Arango, La Justiciabilidad de los Derechos Sociales 
Fundamentales, 12 REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO (2001); Rodolfo Arango, Basic Social Rights, 
Constitutional Justice, and Democracy, 16 RATIO JURIS 141 (2001). 
 229. Decision T-534 of 1992, Ciro Angarita Barón, J. (unanimous), Jorge Alexander Moreno 
contra Quinta Brigada del Ejército Nacional, con sede en Bucaramanga (Moreno v. National Army’s 
5th Brigade Seated in Bucaramanga). 
 230. Decision T-123 of 1999, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Fanny Del Socorro Ipujan 
contra Alcaldía Municipal de Túquerres (Nariño) (Ipujan v. City of Túquerres); Decision T-244 of 
1998, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Humberto Cardona Zamora contra Alcaldía Mayor de Santa 
Fe de Bogotá (Zamora v. Mayor Santa Fe de Bogotá). 
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fundamental social rights, the right to an adequate nutrition, and the right 
to elementary education.231
Finally, the Court has consistently asserted the existence of a right to 
minimum subsistence conditions (mínimo vital), derived from the 
constitutional rights to life,232 health,233 work,234 and social security235 in 
the framework of a Social State (Estado Social de Derecho), and from the 
perspective of human dignity. The practical effect of this right is to entitle 
persons in conditions of absolute poverty to special assistance from public 
authorities in order to fulfil their most basic needs. Without this aid, their 
lives would lack the essential dignity protected by the Constitution. In 
other words, this right compels the state to actively protect persons and 
groups who have been traditionally discriminated against, marginalized, or 
are in conditions of manifest weakness. The state must balance 
opportunities of these groups with those of the majority in a historically 
unfair and unequal society. Among the numerous cases decided on these 
grounds, it is useful to examine the landmark 1992 judgment that 
inaugurated the concept.236 In this matter, an elderly man required a 
retirement pension from social security entities, which were eventually 
ordered to promptly ensure his inscription. Of paramount importance is the 
concept that protection of the right to minimum subsistence conditions 
should be assessed in accordance with the specificities of each individual 
case. For example, the payment of retirement pensions is not, in itself, a 
fundamental right, but it may be protected through a tutela when payments 
are unduly suspended and the Court determines that this keeps the 
recipient from maintaining a minimum subsistence level of income.237 
Along these same lines, the Court has stated that tardiness in the payment 
of salaries affects minimum subsistence income and concluded that 
workers do have a fundamental right to the timely remittance of salaries.238
 231. Decision SU-225 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., Calderon et al. v. Minister of Health 
et al. 
 232. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 11. 
 233. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 49. 
 234. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 25. 
 235. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 48. 
 236. Decision T-426 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Hernando de Jesus 
Blanco Angarita contra Director de la Caja Nacional de Previsión Social (Angarita v. National Bank). 
 237. Decision T-606 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), 
Nieves Avilez Pérez y Otros contra Municipio de Montería (Pérez et al. v. City of Montería). 
 238. Decision SU-995 of 1999, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. concurring), 
Iván Enrique Brito Roncallo y Otros contra la Alcaldía Municipal de El Plato, Magdalena (Roncallo et 
al. v. Mayor’s Office of El Plato, Madalena). 
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It should be noted that a vast majority of tutela actions concern social 
rights. The workload of the Court consists primarily of cases regarding: (i) 
protection of their right to health, which is violated by the lack of 
provision for treatment, medicine, or surgery prescribed under their 
physician’s diagnosis;239 (ii) registration with social security entities by 
employers240 and corresponding payments to the system,241 or 
disbursement to workers;242 (iii) recognition of retirement pensions;243 or 
(iv) demands of payment of their public salaries or pensions,244 or private 
salaries, in extreme situations. In these cases, the Court typically grants the 
tutela.  
d. Collective Rights 
The 1991 Constitution is also innovative in its treatment of “society” 
insofar as it does not simply limit state powers, but actively seeks to 
empower social groups and individuals by emphasizing the protection of 
vulnerable individuals and the adjustment of social power structures and 
 239. Decision SU-043 of 1995, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), María Elena Alvarez Ramírez 
contra Instituto de Seguros Sociales (I.S.S.), Seccional Antioquia (Ramírez v. Inst. of Social Security 
in Antioquia); Decision SU-480 of 1997, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous) Enfermos del 
SIDA contra Entidad promotora “Salud Colmena,” Instituto de Seguros Sociales (AIDS Patients v. 
Inst. of Social Security et al.); Decision SU-819 of 1999, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (unanimous), 
Alejandro Moreno Alvarez contra el Estado, Ministerio de Salud (Alvarez v. Minister of Health). 
 240. Decision T-140 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (uanimous), Adalgiza Casallas Martínez 
contra Hospital Universitario de Cartagena (Martínez v. Univ. Hosp. of Cartagena); Decision T-072 of 
1997, Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. (unanimous) Julio César Rincón Rodríguez contra Jair Díaz Herrera 
(Rodríguez v. Herrera); Decision T-544 of 2000, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous) 
José Benedicto Ramírez Canchón contra el Restaurante “El Gran Sazón” (Canchón v. El Gran Sazón 
Restaurant). 
 241. Decision T-398 of 1996, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. (unanimous), José Luis Muñoz Barraza y 
Otros contra William Behaime, Alcalde de Ponedera (Barraza v. Mayor of Ponedera); Decision T-606 
of 1996, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Rosa Helena Niño de Quiroga contra Castañeda 
Salazar y Cía. Ltda. o Transportes Petroleros Ltda. (Quiroga v. Castañeda Salazar Transport and 
Petroleum Co.). 
 242. Decision T-146 of 1996, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), Pedro José Ariza Caicedo 
contra la Federación Nacional de Algodoneros (Caicedo v. National Association of Cotton Planters); 
Decision T-716 of 1999, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Alvaro Esteban Castro 
Aranda y Melva Plaza Prado contra el Hospital San Vicente de Paul (Aranda et al. v. Hosp. of St. 
Vincent); Decision T-320 of 2000, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Fernando 
Giraldo Echeverry contra Acerías Paz del Río S.A. (Echeverry v. Acerias Paz del Rio Co.). 
 243. Decision T-005 of 1995, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Gina Adarraga Gómez 
contra “Eficacia S.A.” y “Colgate-Palmolive Compañía” (Gómez v. Eficacia Co. et al.). 
 244. See, e.g., Decision T-606 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. 
dissenting), Nieves Avilez Pérez y Otros contra Municipio de Montería (Pérez et al. v. City of 
Montería). See also Decision T-726 of 1999, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes 
Muñoz, J. dissenting), María del Carmen Trejos de Navarro y Otros contra Gobernador del 
Departamento de Bolívar (Navarro et al. v. Governor of the Department of Bolívar).  
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trends to benefit the weak, the marginalized, and the poor. Motivated by 
participatory democracy, this Constitution grants society a central role in 
the establishment of peace and institutional stability not only during 
elections, but on a permanent basis. As a necessary precondition for this 
approach, the Constitution recognizes the existence of different groups and 
collectives into which individuals are born and live meaningful lives. The 
Court has, therefore, granted special protection to certain collective actors, 
interests, and organizations, and has given them a variety of collective 
rights245 actively recognized and enforced by the Constitutional Court.  
The Court was not specifically entrusted by the Constituent Assembly 
with the task of protecting collective rights in concrete review cases. 
However, since its first tutela decisions in 1992, the Court has understood 
that, given the diverse links that exist between the protection of collective 
rights and interests and fundamental constitutional rights and the mandates 
of respect for human dignity, solidarity, and the general interest, it could 
not fail to protect communities seeking the intervention. This is especially 
true when Congress had not yet regulated the scope and procedure of the 
special actions created by the Constitution for that specific purpose 
(acción popular). Until 1998, tutela was the only available mechanism to 
secure these constitutionally protected rights and interests. After that date, 
as a result of the precedential case law the accrued during the preceding 
years, the Court continued to grant protection to different types of 
collective interests in the gravest situations, despite the availability of 
acción popular. Typically, however, tutelas are now granted as transitory 
mechanisms to avoid irreparable harm, or in cases where fundamental 
rights are directly affected by the violation of or threat to collective rights. 
The protection of collective rights has given rise to a host of interesting 
phenomena, including new types of legal subjects (indigenous 
communities), links between the protection of fundamental rights and the 
protection of interests concerning society and individuals (the 
environment), and the protection of new forms of collective participation 
for the advancement of common interests (the case of organized 
consumers of public utilities). The following section describes the main 
decision trends followed by the Court in relation to the first two of these 
types of constitutionally protected collectives.  
 245.  COLOMBIAN CONST. Title II, Ch. 3. 
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i. Indigenous Peoples 
Today, approximately 500,000 individuals belonging to eighty-one 
different ethnic groups known as “indigenous peoples” in Colombia.246 
This status, which has gotten these groups increasing levels of national 
and international attention for decades, is one topic where Colombian legal 
issues are linked to the forefront of constitutional law worldwide. In fact, 
several scholars recognize that Colombia, unlike its neighboring Latin 
American nations, takes indigenous rights seriously.247 Yet the legacy of 
the treatment of native Americans and their successors, in Colombia and 
in Latin America, has been one of continuous tragedy, exclusion, and even 
genocide. The descendants of pre-Hispanic nations in Colombia began to 
organize themselves around the second half of the twentieth century in 
order to claim the legal benefits that were primarily given to them by the 
system. Currently over twenty-five percent of Colombian territory has 
been reserved as indigenous land, constitutionally and legally allocated to 
aboriginal communities across the nation. These communities also benefit 
from a strongly protective constitutional248 and legal regime that is often 
viewed as a model for other governments. Unfortunately, many of the 
aboriginal groups are still in poor condition. Some of these groups are 
even on the brink of cultural and physical extinction, due to poverty, ill 
health, armed conflict, and environmental damage. This environmental 
damage results from an invasion of commercial coca and poppy 
plantations, police efforts to destroy drug crops through fumigation, and 
many other causes. Moreover, guerrilla and paramilitary groups attack 
indigenous communities, compelling them to accept illegal violent 
activities within their territories and forcibly recruiting young people. 
Within this framework, indigenous communities have become legal 
subjects, entitled to a number of fundamental rights that they can protect 
through the tutela. For example, Article 7 of the Constitution expressly 
requires the recognition and protection of the nation’s ethnic and cultural 
diversity. This Article centers on the need to preserve a group’s cultural 
 246. The production of precise figures is difficult because of the semi-nomadic culture of 
aboriginal communities in Colombia.  
 247. See Christian Gros, Indigenismo y Etnicidad: el desafío neoliberal, in URIBE ANTROPOLOGÍA 
EN LA MODERNIDAD 15 (Ma. Victoria Uribe & Eduardo Restrepo eds., 1997); Camilo Borrero Garcia, 
Multiculturalismo y derechos indígenas, CINEP/GTZ, Bogotá (2003); Esther Sanchez, La aplicación 
práctica de la política de reconocimiento a la diversidad étnica y cultural, and “Política de 
reconocimiento a la diversidad étnica y cultural y de protección al menor,” Ministerio de Salud—
Instituto Colombiano de Bienestar Familiar, Bogotá (2002). 
 248. See, e.g., COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 7, 8, 10, 68, 70, 171, 176, 246, 329, 330 (recognizing 
indigenous people). 
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identity and guarantee its long-term survival. The rights of the community 
as a collective legal subject should not be confused with the individual 
fundamental rights of each one of its members, which coexist with the 
rights of the community. These individual and collective rights have been 
promoted and upheld by the court and include: (i) territorial rights actively 
enforced by a constitutional judge, (ii) the right to establish “traditional” 
indigenous legal systems, and (iii) the right to preserve the integrity of the 
indigenous culture from external influences. 
The Constitution granted indigenous peoples property rights over their 
ancestral territories and over the immeasurably rich natural resources they 
possess.249 As a result of this property right and the entitlement to 
physical, cultural and social survival, indigenous groups received the right 
to be consulted when a project for resource exploitation is launched in 
their territories. The Court regards this right, which is recognized in 
several international instruments, as a fundamental right of the 
community. In a 1993 decision, the Court dealt with the fact that the 
territory of the Embera-Katío people of the Chocó department was 
damaged by massive deforestation caused by the timber industry.250 
Similarly, a 1998 tutela judgment declared unconstitutional a licence 
granted to build civil infrastructure works in indigenous territory on the 
grounds that the relevant community had not been consulted.251 A well-
known 1997 judgment ordered the suspension of an oil exploitation 
project in the U’wa territory because the previous consultation 
requirements had not been met.252
Regarding the scope of indigenous peoples’ autonomy, the Constitution 
has included several provisions designed to preserve indigenous culture, 
such as the ancient right of indigenous individuals to be judged by 
traditional authorities. One such provision is the “rule of maximization,” 
which appeared in a 1997 decision.253 In that case, the Court decided 
 249. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 329–331. 
 250. Decision T-380 of 1993, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Organizacion Indigena 
de Antioquia contra Corporacion Nacional de Desarrollo del Choco (Indigenous Organization of 
Antipquia v. National Corporation for the Development of Small Cuttlefish). 
 251. Decision T-652 of 1998, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), Organización Nacional Indígena 
de Colombia y Otros contra Presidente de la República y Otros (Indigenous Organization of Colombia et 
al. v. President of the Republic et al). 
 252. Decision SU-039 of 1997, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., 
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., Fabio Morón Díaz, J., and Jaime Vidal Perdomo, J. dissenting), Jaime 
Córdoba Triviño, Defensor del Pueblo contra Ministerio del Medio Ambiente (Public Defender v. 
Minister of Media & Atmosphere). 
 253. Decision T-523 of 1997, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), Francisco Gembuel Pechene 
contra Gobernador del Cabildo Indígena de Jambaló y Otros (Pechene v. Governor of Cabildo Cabildo 
Indígena de Jambaló). 
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whether to overturn the conviction of a Páez individual, who was 
convicted by traditional authorities and sentenced to public corporal 
punishment with a whip-like instrument. The Court held that (i) whenever 
conflicts between indigenous jurisdictions and other national interests 
arise, the constitutional judge should apply the “rule of maximization” of 
indigenous autonomy; and (ii) the Rule requires acceptable limitations of 
autonomy, which are the least restrictive available alternatives. Indigenous 
peoples are thus limited in their use of their autonomous jurisdictional 
powers by a standard of “minimum inter-cultural consensus,” which 
includes the right to life, the prohibition of torture and slavery, and the 
application of cultural procedural requirements.  
Applying these rules to the case, the Court verified that the penalty was 
imposed in accordance with tradition and that the limits of indigenous 
jurisdiction were respected. Regarding the issue of corporal punishment, 
the Court found that the severity of the sentence did not cause such 
suffering to be considered “torture.” Further, the Court found the whip 
represented a means of purification within the Páez tradition, and 
therefore, it should be respected from a non-occidental perspective.254 In a 
similar case, the Court granted the tutela filed by two indigenous 
individuals who were being investigated by standard governemnt officials 
for crimes committed within the jurisdiction of their communities. The 
Court ordered their case to be tried by traditional indigenous authorities.255
The Court has also made significant advances regarding the 
preservation of cultural identity and integrity. In a delicate 1998 
decision,256 the Court upheld the right of the Arhuaco authorities to 
prevent a Protestant church from promoting its beliefs within tribal land 
and converting members of the community. The indigenous authorities 
were constitutionally permitted to impose much more extensive 
restrictions upon the religious freedom of community members and 
 254. Id. From a historical point of view it is interesting to note, that the whip (fuete) and other 
types of “traditional” punishment examined by the Court in tutela cases, correspond to disciplinary 
measures originally brought and implemented by the Spanish conquerors. Eventually, these 
punishments were incorporated and given new cultural meaning by the indigenous communities in 
post-colonial times. Within the Páez culture, the whip is interpreted as a symbol of the thunderbolt, 
and therefore, it is seen as a purification ritual. 
 255. Decision T-394 of 1999, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), María del Pilar Valencia 
contra Jueces Penal del Circuito y Promiscuo de Familia del Guamo, Tolima (Valencia v. Penal 
Circuit Judges). 
 256. Decision SU-510 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., 
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., and José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. dissenting), Alvaro de Jesús 
Torres Forero contra Autoridades Tradicionales de la Comunidad Indigena Arhuaca de la Zona 
Oriental de la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta (Forero v. Traditional Authorities of the Indigenous 
Community of the E. Zone of the Sierra Nevada of Santa Marta). 
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outsiders on ancestral land in order to preserve their culture and religion. 
This case is especially noteworthy because it involved the same 
indigenous authorities who deferred the conflict to the Constitutional 
Court through the initiation of a tutela. This decision illustrates the 
unsuspected positive effects that the tribunal’s decisions have had on 
indigenous peoples’ rights and on the means used to defend those rights: 
judicial channels.257
Important governmental interests, such as national security concerns 
related to drug trafficking, have often been insufficient to justify 
restrictions on indigenous peoples’ practices. For example, in one 
important case,258 Amazonian indigenous peoples filed a tutela claim, 
supported by an amicus curiae brief from the Public Ombudsman 
(Defensor del Pueblo). The people wanted to protect their right to self-
determination, their participation rights, and their right to survival in 
healthy conditions. They asked the Court to suspend aerial fumigation 
with the herbicide glifosato over coca or poppy crops in their territories 
and in nearby areas. The Court abstained from ordering a suspension of 
fumigation due to a lack of evidence. While the Court admitted that the 
decision to suspend fumigation may be unilaterally adopted by the 
competent administrative authorities, it did take several steps in matters of 
public order and national security to further indigenous rights. First, the 
Court stated that indigenous communities’ participation rights, interpreted 
in accordance with ILO Convention 169 and with the principle of 
participative democracy,259 extend not only to the exploitation of natural 
resources but also to all decisions that affect such communities directly 
within their territories. This includes decisions concerning the preservation 
of public order and the enforcement of the criminal policy reflected in the 
Criminal Code. Second, the Court expressed that indigenous communities 
should participate in decisions regarding crop eradication, such as the 
matter of illegal crop fumigation. Third, the Court ordered the Executive 
to respect the substantive rights to life, health and survival of the 
indigenous communities if an agreement with the indigenous peoples was 
not reached after a period of three months.  
 257. Decision T-405 of 1993, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., Comunidades Indígenas del Medio 
Amazonas contra el Ministerio de Defensa Nacional y la Misión Aérea de los Estados Unidos 
(Indigenous Communities v. Ministry of National Defense, U.S. Airforce). 
 258. Decision SU-383 of 2003, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., Jaime Araujo 
Rentería, J., and Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, J. dissenting), Organización de los Pueblos Indígenas 
de la Amazonía Colombiana OPIAC contra la Presidencia de la República y Otros (Organization of 
Indigenous Towns of Colombian Amazon v. President of the Republic et al.). 
 259. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 2. 
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Three Justices260 dissented on the grounds that the Court should have 
gone further and ordered the suspension of the fumigations. The dissenters 
felt that the Court should give a three-month period to the communities 
concerned to ensure that participation would be real and effective and that 
vital indigenous rights would be protected. The dissenters also argued that 
a precautionary principle should be applied and fumigations suspended 
until it was adequately proven that the herbicide used was harmless. 
The Court has, however, adopted a less activist stance in its abstract 
review of the Mining Code provisions vis-a-vis the exploitation of mineral 
resources in indigenous territories. For example, in 2002,261 the Court 
decided an actio popularis challenging a Mining Code provision granting 
the state the ability to determine the location and extent of special 
indigenous mining areas. This provision enabled national authorities to 
decide unilaterally issues that should ordinarily be debated by the relevant 
indigenous communities. Instead of striking down the provision, the Court 
stated that it should be interpreted in accordance with constitutional and 
international mandates on the matter; thus the provision should entail 
proper consultation with indigenous communities. In a later judgment,262 
the Court restated that legal provisions regulating mining activities in 
indigenous territories should be interpreted so as to ensure the right of 
participation of aboriginal communities, particularly by carrying out 
appropriate consultation procedures during the relevant decision-making 
process. Nevertheless, with regards to the bill which later became the 
Mining Code, the Court felt that the state’s obligation had been adequately 
fulfilled by efforts to submit the draft to indigenous people for approval, 
even though such consultations eventually failed and no agreement was 
reached. 
ii. Environmental Rights 
We have a “green” Constitution. Approximately fifty constitutional 
articles refer directly or indirectly to the preservation of nature, which is 
one of Colombia’s most valued and threatened assets. Not only does the 
 260. The dissenting justices were Jaime Araujo Rentería, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, and Clara Inés 
Vargas Hernández. 
 261. Decision C-418 of 2002, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 122 de la Ley 
685 de 2001 (Article 22 of Law 685 of 2001). 
 262. Decision C-891 of 2002, Jaime Araujo Rentería, J. (unanimous), In re Artículos 2, 3, 5, 6, 11, 
35, 37, 39, 48, 58, 59, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 261, 267, 271, 275 y 332 de la Ley 685 
de 2001 (Law 685 of 2001). 
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Constitution entitle persons to a healthy environment,263 but it also 
imposes upon the authorities and citizens alike the obligation to refrain 
from damaging the environment and preventing its degradation. The state 
has affirmative constitutional obligations to promote the conditions 
necessary for environmental conservation and development, including 
providing environmental sanitation services, promoting protected areas, 
enforcing community participation, and engaging in other environmental 
protection activities.264  
The protection of the right to a healthy environment is not new to 
Colombian constitutional law. The Supreme Court of Justice, in a salient 
1987 decision, upheld criminal provisions penalizing environmental law 
violators. This decision showed how public law was evolving 
progressively to defend the quality of human life. The Court also stated 
that “the State has the unquestionable duty to incorporate into its activities 
the protection of the environment, a duty which may be included even 
within its classical mission to protect Colombian residents’ life.”265 
However, no specific constitutional provisions were enacted to protect 
natural resources as a fundamental right. 
The right to enjoy a healthy environment, which was classified by the 
Constitution as a “collective” right,266 has been defined by the Court as the 
basic conditions surrounding individuals, which allow their biological 
survival and guaranteeing their normal performance and balanced 
development within society.267 In that sense, the Court has classified the 
right to a healthy environment as essential for the survival of our species. 
The Court highlighted the fact that, although the Constitution has 
classified this right as a collective right, under certain conditions its 
violation may entail a threat to fundamental human rights. This threat 
makes tutela claims admissible to protect it.268 Consequently, the Court 
has issued tutela decisions protecting the right to a healthy environment 
when there are specific actions of environmental disruption or degradation 
and when the integrity of this right is threatened by situations of a general 
 263. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 79. 
 264. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 79, 80. 
 265. Decision of Mar. 12, 1987, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (text on file with author). 
 266. The right was protected through a specific legal channel: the acción popular. 
 267. Decision SU-442 of 1997, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. 
dissenting), Francisco Antonio Escobar Silebi y Otros contra Alcalde del Distrito Turístico (Silebi v. 
Mayor of Turístico Dist.). 
 268. Decision T-284 of 1995, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), Defensoría del Pueblo y 
Otros contra Señor Gobernador y la Junta de Planeación del Departamento del Archipiélago de San 
Andrés, Providencia y Santa Catalina (Public Defender et al. v. Governor, Head of Dept. of 
Agriculture of San Andrés). 
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nature. There are three recent cases in this area. First, the Court has 
consistently protected the rights of ordinary citizens to live in a healthy 
environment, when malfunctioning public utilities or private works disrupt 
normal living conditions. For example, in a 1997 tutela decision,269 the 
Court protected the rights of private citizens affected by a smell caused by 
their neighbor’s septic tank, which had not received the appropriate 
attention of relevant authorities. Stating that the neighbor’s undue 
disruption of the plaintiff’s domestic environment constituted a threat to 
their rights to health and life, the Court ordered the removal of the tank 
and the installation of adequate drainage facilities. 
Another set of decisions concerns individuals or communities affected 
by inappropriate waste disposal sites. In a 1999 decision, the Court 
reviewed the tutela presented by a woman on behalf of herself, her family 
and her neighbors. These citizens lived in poor households alongside a 
seriously faulty municipal landfill, which had noxious effects on their 
daily environments and their health. The Court granted the tutela, because 
it considered the disruption of the right to a healthy environment to be a 
severe threat to the fundamental rights to health and life. Consequently, 
the Court ordered municipal authorities to buy the plaintiff’s land next to 
the landfill, so she could purchase adequate living elsewhere. In the 
alternative, the Court ordered the authorities to suspend use of the landfill. 
For the same reasons, in a 1996 decision270 the Court prevented the 
establishment of a waste disposal site in Villavicencio because 
environmental requirements were not met. 
Second, the Court has upheld the rights of individuals and communities 
affected by specific events of environmental damage. However, the actual 
protection of such rights in cases in which environmental harm has already 
resulted has been limited by the nature of the tutela procedure. This kind 
of a limitation occurred in a 1996 tutela case271 in which the Court 
assessed the impact of a serious oil pollution incident in the Pacific Ocean 
upon the members of an Afro-Colombian coastal community who 
depended on fishing for their livelihood. Taking into account that the 
affected community was entitled to special constitutional protection as an 
ethnic group, the Court restated the State’s special obligations for 
 269. Decision T-071 of 1997, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Jesús Antonio González 
contra Municipio de Alvarado (González v. City of Alvarado).  
 270. Decision T-257 of 1996, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), Hans Ricardo Tiuso 
Malagón contra Alcalde de Villavicencio y el señor Edgar Ardila Barbosa (Malagón v. Mayor of 
Villavicencio et al.).  
 271. Decision T-574 of 1996, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Pescadores de 
Salahonda contra Empresa Ecopetrol (Community of Salahonda v. Ecopetrol Co.).  
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environmental preservation. The Court affirmed that sustainable 
development should be sought through decisions that minimize 
environmental harm, while promoting economic growth from a 
precautionary perspective. Because the damage had already occurred, and 
the tutela cannot be used in principle to seek economic indemnity, the 
Court limited its holding to ordering the Ministry of the Environment to 
monitor the long-term effects of pollution incidents. The Court also called 
upon other relevant authorities to fulfil their functions in promoting the 
community’s welfare. This judgment is important because it stressed the 
importance of the precautionary principle for Colombian authorities. 
Further, according to the Court, the state’s constitutional obligation to 
provide environmental sanitation services includes adopting emergency 
measures to address oil spill incidents and compensating for individual 
loss and patrimonial damage sustained by affected persons. But in this 
particular pollution incident, enforcing such an obligation to compensate 
through the tutela was expressly rejected by the Court.  
Finally, the general situation of environmental degradation in the 
coastal city of Santa Marta was examined by the Court in a 1997 tutela 
decision.272 In this decision the Court examined a complaint filed by 
several inhabitants against local authorities, which argued that the 
generalized pollution of the sea and beaches, and the inadequacy of urban 
drainage systems, were due to the city’s lack of planning and control over 
sewage disposal, urban construction, and coal shipping. The Court granted 
the tutela to protect the plaintiffs’ rights to a healthy environment, life and 
health. The Court felt these rights were violated by the local authorities’ 
failure to regulate land use and urban growth and excessive issuing of 
construction licences. As a consequence, the Court ordered the pertinent 
public entities to issue a plan for the regulation of land use in the District 
of Santa Marta, which was to include sewage disposal systems in 
accordance with legal requirements. The Court also ordered that 
construction licences should be granted by the relevant environmental 
authorities and prohibited license conferral in certain particularly degraded 
areas of the city. As to the noxious effects of air pollution caused by coal 
shipping activities, the Court ordered the Ministry of the Environment to 
adopt a comprehensive plan for the management of coal, through its 
extraction and commercialization processes, in order to avoid negative 
impacts on human health. 
 272. Decision SU-442 of 1997, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., Silebi v. Mayor of Turístico Dist.  
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The Court also upheld the right to a healthy environment in a series of 
abstract review cases. For example, in a 1998 judgment,273 the Court 
reviewed the use of the Presidential veto against a bill that established 
criminal penalties for persons convicted of causing serious environmental 
damage by illegal mining or oil extracting. The President argued that the 
requirements of “serious damage” and “illegality of the activity” were 
unconstitutional, because as they restricted the scope of the general 
obligation to preserve the environment to extreme cases. The Court 
accepted these objections and explained that environmental damage, even 
if it is caused by legal activities, should always be seen as constitutionally 
illegitimate conduct. The Court stated that the issuance of environmental 
licences should never be seen as authorization to harm nature. Moreover, it 
expressed that the Constitution not only requires the state to punish 
infractors of environmental regulations, but also to actively prevent and 
control degradation factors and seek compensation for the damages 
caused. 
In a similar judgment,274 the Court analyzed a legal provision requiring 
contractors of public infrastructure to present environmental impact 
assessments to the relevant authorities. Prior to this case, standard protocol 
was that, if the relevant authorities failed to issue a decision within two 
months after the presentation of the study, acceptance would be presumed. 
The Court struck down this rule, holding that there should be no barrier 
prohibiting the authorities from promoting environmental health.  
Other important abstract review judgments concern the environmental 
treaties approved by Congress. Most have been upheld by the Court, 
including the Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation 
Program,275 the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change,276 the Kyoto Protocol of the United Nations Convention on 
Climate Change,277 the United Nations Convention to Fight 
 273. Decision C-320 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (Alejandro Martinez Caballero, J., 
Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., and José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. dissenting), In re Ley 235/96 
Senado-154/96 Cámara (Law 235/92 of the Senate Law 154/96 of the House of Represenatives). 
 274. Decision C-328 of 1995, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 4º de la 
Ley 105 de 1993 (Article 4º of Law 105 of 1993). 
 275. Decision C-1314 of 2000, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (unanimous), In re Revisión Constitucional 
de la Ley 557 de 2000 (Const. Revision of Law 557 of 2000). 
 276. Decision C-073 of 1995, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), In re Revisión 
Constitucional de la Ley 164 de 1994 (Const. Revision of Law 164 of 1994). 
 277. Decision C-860 of 2001, Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, J. (unanimous), In re Ley No. 629 de 
2000 (Law 629 of 2000). 
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Desertification,278 the Ramsar Convention for the protection of 
Wetlands,279 and the Convention on Biodiversity.280
2. Decisions Concerning the State 
As previously mentioned, one of the central purposes of the 
Constituent Assembly was to develop a constitutional framework that 
would strengthen state institutions. State institutions were plagued by a 
lack of legitimacy, transparency, and efficiency, which in turn resulted in 
mistrust and contempt among citizens. While the 1886 Constitution, 
commissioned by President Rafael Núñez, sought to reinforce state 
presence from a vertical, authoritarian perspective, the 1991 Constitution, 
commissioned by President César Gaviria, focused on promoting 
efficiency, accountability, and responsiveness within a system of 
separation of powers. 
Part of the proposed reorganization of the state focused on the 
redistribution of functions among the three branches of public power. 
Reformers sought to restore the equilibrium, which had been altered by the 
historical prevalence of the Presidential office, and to promote higher 
levels of responsibility, accountability, and efficiency in the different 
spheres of public life. The Court has actively defended this equilibrium in 
decisions concerning such topics as the regime applicable to constitutional 
states of emergency, and the presidential powers for maintaining public 
order.  
a. States of Exception  
“States of exception” are defined by the Constitution as instances in 
which the President may require more stringent restrictions upon rights, 
assuming greater regulatory and police powers in order to cope with 
circumstances that give rise to the disruption of normality. Three possible 
“states of exception” are identified by the Constitution: (i) a “state of 
internal commotion,” to be declared for up to ninety days in cases of 
severe disruption of internal public order,281 (ii) a “state of foreign war,”282 
 278. Decision C-229 of 1999, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), In re Ley 461 de 1998 
(Law 461 of 1998). 
 279. Decision C-582 of 1997, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), In re Revisión 
de constitucionalidad de la Ley 357 de 1997 (Const. Revision of Law 357 of 1997). 
 280. Decision C-519 of 1994, Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. (unanimous), In re Revisión 
Constitucional de la Leyes 162 y 165 de 1994 (Const. Revision of Laws 162, 165 of 1994). 
 281. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 213 (stating that internal commotion may be renewed for ninety 
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and (iii) a “state of economic, social or ecological emergency.”283 Precise 
constitutional requirements must be met for the President to declare a 
“state of exeption,” and excessive restrictions on fundamental rights 
during such a “state of exception” are prohibited. Because of the principle 
of proportionality, suspension of rights is forbidden, and both international 
humanitarian law and human rights treaties should be applied.284 The 
Constitution also grants special political and judicial controlling powers to 
Congress and the Constitutional Court over the measures adopted by the 
President.285
States of exception in Colombia are regulated by a statutory law 
adopted in 1994,286 after ex-officio review by the Constitutional Court.287 
The Law establishes clear limits on presidential powers and defines 
specific controls, both judicial and political when rights are restricted by a 
presidential decree. Most of the law was upheld by the Court, but some 
powers were declared unconstitutional, including a provision enabling the 
government to grant general amnesties or individual criminal pardons 
during states of exception and a provision that allowed the Court to order 
the temporary suspension of a state of exception decree restricting certain 
rights during the Court’s review. 
The Court has consistently affirmed that the President of the Republic, 
when deciding to declare a state of exception, has much discretion in 
matters such as timing, the seriousness of the disturbance, its duration, and 
the measures that are to be adopted during its existence. This discretion is 
significantly reduced when it comes to verifying the objective and precise 
circumstances that, according to the Constitution, can give rise to the 
declaration of a state of exception. More specifically, the President has the 
ability to declare a state of exception, but only when the precise factual 
requirements outlined by the Charter have been objectively met. Although 
the President has a large amount of discretion to declare a state of 
exception, it is not boundless, because the Court can review the 
President’s decision in order to avoid errors. 
An analysis of the declarations of states of internal commotion is 
illustrative of this point. Six such states have been declared since 1991, 
days. After which time it can be renewed for another ninety days with the consent of the Senate). 
 282. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 212. 
 283. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 215. 
 284. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 214. 
 285. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 212–215, 241.  
 286. Ley 137 de 1994 (Law 137 of 1994). 
 287. Decision C-179 of 1994, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., In re Ley Estatutaria No. 91/92 Senado y 
166/92 Cámara (Law 91/92 of the Senate, 166/92 of the House). 
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and most have been upheld. The Court, however, has made it clear that 
under the new Constitution, this is exceptional because the Constituent 
Assembly abolished the provision regarding states of siege based on its 
abuse in the past. In two cases288 the Court completely struck down the 
corresponding presidential decree—something unprecedented in 
Colombian history.289 More recently,290 the Court upheld the Presidential 
declaration of a “state of internal commotion,” finding that a quantitative 
and qualitative increase in violence justified the exercise of extraordinary 
powers.  
However, the Court recently struck down a decree on procedural 
grounds that would have renewed, for a second time, this particular state 
of internal commotion.291 The divided Court held that because the validity 
of a second ninety-day renewal depended upon the consent of the Senate, 
which must be issued in writing, and the Senate could not be summoned 
by the President to discuss the matter almost one and a half months before 
the first ninety-day renewal terminated. Four justices dissented,292 arguing 
that, even though they agreed with the majority that the autonomy of the 
Senate should be preserved within a system of checks and balances, the 
conditions fixed by the majority were too formalistic. The Senate had 
debated and voted in accordance with parliamentary rules and approved 
the second renewal. Favorable consent had clearly been given, and 
therefore, no separate document was needed to repeat what appeared in the 
official Congressional Records Publication (Gaceta del Congreso). In 
addition, the dissenters noted that the Senate had the Constitutional power 
to summon itself at a later date if it considered such action appropriate, 
and therefore, was not forced to make a decision during the extraordinary 
sessions called by the President. 
 288. Decision C-300 of 1994, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. concurring, 
Hernando Herrera Vergara, J., Fabio Morón Díaz, J., and Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. dissenting), In re 
Decreto N° 874 de 1994 (Decree 874 of 1994) (striking the decree down); Decision C-466 of 1995, 
Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Jorge Arango Mejía, J. and Fabio Morón Díaz, J. concuring, Hernando 
Herrera Vergara, J. and Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. dissenting), In re Decreto 1370 de 1995 (decree 
1370 of 1995) (striking the decree down). 
 289. In 1994, the Court struck down President Gaviria’s decree declaring a state of internal 
commotion. It was the first time the judiciary refused to allow a President to invoke emergency powers 
to address a crisis. 
 290. Decision C-802 of 2002, Jaime Córdoba Triviño, J. (Jaime Araujo Rentería, J. dissenting), In 
re Decreto Legislativo 1837 de 2002 (Legislative Decree 1837 of 2002). 
 291. Decision C-327 of 2003, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., In re Decreto Legislativo No. 245 de 
2003 (Legislative Decree 245 of 2003). 
 292. Id. 
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The Court adopted a similar position with regards to other types of 
constitutional states of exception. A 1997 judgment293 declared a decree of 
a state of economic and social emergency unconstitutional because the 
material requirements had not been met. The Government argued that the 
measure was adopted in response to growing economic devaluation, 
excessive external debt, slow economic growth, a fiscal deficit, and a low 
tax income. The Court considered these to be normal economic cycles and 
not examples of exceptional circumstance. In this particular case the Court 
applied the rule of subsidiarity, which states that states of exception can 
only be declared when normal state resources are insufficient to deal with 
an extraordinary situation.  
In its first constitutionality decision under the new Constitution, the 
Court upheld a decree declaring a state of social emergency. The state of 
social emergency was enacted to address the turbulent labor climate 
among the police, which resulted from the Senate’s failure to adjust police 
salaries in a timely manner.  
One very important aspect of the Court’s work in relation to states of 
exception has been the constant affirmation of the limits placed by 
international humanitarian law and international human rights law over the 
Executive’s powers during states of exception. In its constitutional review 
of the 1977 Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions on the 
protection of victims of internal conflicts, the Court upheld the customary 
value of international humanitarian law provisions. Similarly, in its 1994 
review of the Statutory Law on the matter,294 the Court emphasized that 
the President is still subject to control of his actions during the state of 
emergency, and that any restriction on fundamental rights not justified by 
the state of emergency or necessary to preserve the interests at stake.  
The Court frequently refers to international humanitarian legal norms 
when reviewing “state of internal commotion” decrees. For example, in a 
recent decision, the Court struck down several articles of such a decree 
because they violated international humanitarian law norms. One article 
ordered that every military combat unit should be assigned a public 
prosecutor to assist in actions by the armed forces that could potentially 
restrict individual rights. However, the Court struck down the article 
because a public prosecutor cannot become a permanent member of the 
 293. Decision C-122 of 1997, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. 
(Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. concurring in part, Fabio Morón Díaz, J., Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., and 
Jorge Arango Mejía, J. dissenting in part), In re Decreto 80 de 1997 (Decree 80 of 1997). 
 294. Ley 137 de 1994 (Law 137 of 1994) was reviewed by Decision C-179 of 1994, Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, J., In re Law 91/92 of the Senate, 166/92 of the House. 
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military unit without violating the principle of separation between civilians 
and military personnel. Another article prohibited entry into previously 
delineated conflict zones; the Court held that this restriction did not apply 
to humanitarian NGO’s because there is an internationally recognized 
norm to allow humanitarian access.295
b. Congressional Autonomy  
The Constitution carefully protects legislative autonomy, which has 
also been consistently defended by the Court. While conflicts between 
Congress and the Court occasionally arise, the Court’s constitutional case 
law has banned most attempts to restrict or disregard legislative autonomy. 
This primarily arises decisions relying on the constitutional protection of 
legislative autonomy to adopt specific legal regulations and those relating 
to the President’s exercise of delegated legislation powers. 
The Court has defended Congressional autonomy through numerous 
judgments invoking the principle of legislative autonomy to adopt specific 
policies, and has therefore applied a lenient constitutional review standard. 
This has primarily occurred in cases dealing with economic matters, 
particularly in areas that are not specifically regulated by constitutional 
provisions. In these cases, the Court has clearly stated that the Constituent 
Assembly gave Congress the ability to develop public policies based on 
legislative decisions it considered suitable. However, the Court limits 
Congressional autonomy when constitutional mandates regulate the 
subject matter of the legal provisions presented for review, and when such 
provisions affect fundamental human rights. In these cases, the Court has 
applied a strict standard of constitutional scrutiny in order to determine the 
compatibility of a given legislative measure with the Charter.  
The Court’s decisions in these areas are subject to much debate. One 
controversial case was a 2000 decision in which the tribunal declared a 
law unconstitutional that established the National Development Plan for 
the 1999–2002 period. The Court found unresolvable procedural defects 
during the law’s approval process, primarily due to pressure exerted by the 
Executive. Due to the extra cost associated with the Nation resubmitting 
this vital plan to Congress for approval, the Court acknowledged that the 
Constitution provides an alternative whereby the National Development 
Plan could be promulgated as a Governmental Decree. However, it also 
indicated that this alternative only empowers the President to promulgate 
 295. Decision C-1024 of 2002, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (unanimous on these points), In re 
Decreto 2002 de 2002 (Decree 2002 of 2002). 
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and grant legal force to the original development plan, without necessarily 
defining its content, which should proceed by democratic process.296
Another topic that is central to the relationship between the Legislative 
and Executive branches is the Constitution’s allowance for a transfer of 
legislative functions from Congress to the Government through “delegated 
legislation powers” (Government could issue legislation with legal status 
and force in limited conditions).297 Given the history of Presidential abuse 
of Congress, the 1991 Constitution was very wary of allowing Congress to 
transfer any of its legislative functions, and thus laid out a strict set of 
conditions. Constitutional case law has been equally strict in applying the 
requirements of “precision” and “temporary nature”298 to these delegations 
of legislative powers, and has often banned decrees issued by the 
Government due to their non-compliance.299  
Historically, the Court has interpreted the requirement of a temporary 
nature such that the legislative powers delegated can only be implemented 
once by the President.300 Thus, the President cannot try to use those same 
powers again to amend the rules already promulgated, even if the 
delegation period had not expired. The Court has also strictly enforced the 
requirement that the legislative powers not be used in an ultra vires 
manner, striking down statutes that confer overly broad powers to the 
Executive.301 In these cases, the Court has expressed that these laws based 
on an extension of legislative powers need to clearly define the subject 
matter and scope within which the Executive can legislate, and establish 
the criteria encompasing public policy choices.302  
 296. Decision C-557 of 2000, Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. 
dissenting), In re Ley 508 de 1999 (Law 509 of 1999). 
 297. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 150-10. 
 298. These special powers can not be transferred for more than six months. COLOMBIAN CONST. 
art. 150-10. 
 299. Decision C-368 of 1996, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimously), In re Decreto 
2150 de 1995 (Decree 2150 of 1995); Decision C-285 of 1996, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), In 
re Decreto 624 de 1989 (Decree 624 of 1989); Decision C-702 of 1999, Fabio Morón Díaz, J., In re 
Artículos 7º, 38, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59, 68, 111 y 120 de la Ley 489 de 1998 (Law 489 of 1998); 
Decision C-1437 of 2000, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. and Cristina 
Pardo Schlesinger, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 42 de la Ley 489 de 1998 (Article 42 of Law 489 of 
1998). 
 300. Decision C-510 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (Fabio Morón Díaz, J. concurring), In 
re Decreto Ley 2183 of 1991 (Decree Law 2183 of 1991); Decision C-511 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes 
Muñoz, J. (Fabio Morón Díaz, J. concurring), Decreto 2250 de 1991 (Decree 2250 of 1991). 
 301. Decision C-1374 of 2000, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 
39 del Decreto 261 de 2000 (Article 39 of Decree 261 of 2000). 
 302. Decision C-097 of 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (Jaime Araujo Rentería, J. and 
Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. concurring), In re Artículos 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 y 10 de la Ley 588 del 2000 (Law 
588 of 2000). 
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c. Presidential Authority in Matters of Public Order During 
Ordinary Times 
There are a series of important Court decisions concerning the 
President’s authority to deal with public order issues during “ordinary 
times,” namely when no “states of exception” are in place. Given the 
current armed conflict and the widespread disruption of public order in the 
country, the controversial nature of these decisions can easily be 
understood. Some Government and military officials have criticized the 
Court because its intervention can potentially adversely affect the State’s 
ability to respond to situations threatening public order. In reality 
however, the Court has consistently permitted broad Presidential 
autonomy and has struck down unconstitutional provisions. 
For instance, in a 2001 decision303 the Court upheld the 
constitutionality of a law304 enabling the President to temporarily withdraw 
national armed forces and military personnel from certain areas in order to 
facilitate peace negotiations with rebel groups. The Court justified this 
decision on the grounds that the President is the Supreme Commander of 
the armed forces305 and has the authority to select appropriate means to 
foster peace. This decision helped establish a de-militarized area in the 
south of the Country to host peace talks with the FARC guerrilla 
movement, which were unfortunately unsucessful.  
The Court upheld Presidential autonomy and discretion in a case 
dealing with the preservation of public order in a 1999 tutela decision.306 
In this case the Court reviewed a claim brought by a relative of one of the 
victims of a notorious mass kidnapping in Cali. The distraught relative 
wanted the judge to order either a comprehensive rescue mission or 
negotiate with the kidnappers. The Court denied the plaintiff’s requests, 
holding that neither the Court nor any other judicial body could 
constitutionally invade the protected sphere of the President’s autonomy in 
matters related to the public order and role of the armed forces. 
In an important 1995 decision concerning the validity of a law granting 
state entities certain powers in relation to the preservation of public order 
and the promotion of peace,307 the Court made a key distinction between 
 303. Decision C-048 of 2001, Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, J. (José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, 
J. concurring), In re Artículo 8 de la Ley 418 de 1997 (Article 8 of Law 418 of 1997). 
 304. Ley 418 de 1997 (Law 418 of 1997). 
 305. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 189-5. 
 306. Decision T-683 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (unanimous), In re Felipe Ayerbe Muñoz 
contra Presidente de la República (Muñoz v. President of the Republic). 
 307. Decision C-283 of 1995, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), In re Ley 104 de 
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Presidential powers in matters of public order and the coextensive duty of 
all public officials to promote peace. The Court upheld the Congressional 
power to issue laws with the specific goal of promoting public order and 
the rule of law, as long as the laws did not infringe on the President’s 
constitutional powers in this area. The Court also highlighted the 
difference between specific presidential powers to direct public order and 
permanent legislative powers in the area. The latter powers enable 
Congress to create the general legal framework within which the President 
may operate. The Court enumerated, as part of this function, some matters 
for which it is legitimate for Congress to legislate, including: (i) the 
establishment of criminal penalties; (ii) the definitions of political 
offenses; (iii) the establishment of mechanisms to promote the effective 
administration of justice; (iv) the protection of individuals who intervene 
in criminal procedures; (v) the creation of instruments that promote a 
peaceful social coexistence; (vi) the extension of benefits for demobilized 
insurgents; (vii) the generation of attention for victims of terrorism; (viii) 
the exercise of control over the financing of subversive activities; and (ix) 
the seizure and confiscation of assets related to the commission of criminal 
offenses. 
Despite its consistent defense of Presidential powers in this area, the 
Court’s case law has also established that the preservation of security is a 
service that can eventually be provided by private organizations. Indeed, in 
a controversial 1997 decision,308 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a 
policy that allowed organized communities (named: CONVIVIR) to 
provide their members with private security services. The policy was 
believed to foster paramilitary organizations, but the Court disagreed, 
holding that organizations created under the law would not be acting 
extrajudicially and that civil society is legitimately entitled to protect 
itself. The Court, however, forbade these organizations from using 
weapons legally restricted to use by the Armed Forces. Four justices 
dissented, warning that the existence of these groups were incompatible 
with the rule of law and constituted a threat to institutional stability and 
peace. In addition, they stated that the public service function filled by the 
1993 (Law 104 of 1993). 
 308. Decision C-572 of 1997, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. and Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. 
(Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. concurring; Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., José Gregorio Hernández 
Galindo, J., Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J., and Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), In re Artículos 4º, 
23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45 y 46 del Decreto 356 de 1994 (Decree 356 of 
1994). 
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police and the military could not be delegated by the state to private 
parties as a means to resolve their own disputes. 
Another important decision309 in this area, in 1993, involved the 
constitutionality of a law that sought to diminish the kidnapping industry 
by prohibiting the payment of ransoms. This objective was pursued by the 
law through measures such as freezing the assets of kidnapped persons and 
their families, and imposing administrative penalties upon entities that 
executed insurance contracts to pay for ransoms. The Court held that such 
measures were contrary to the Constitution because they deprived 
kidnapped victims from their only available means of defense. The Court 
further stated that preventing kidnapped individuals or their families from 
using any means to save their lives would be tantamount to compelling the 
victims to a kind of “social martyrdom,” as it would inhumanely turn them 
into a tool of the state to accomplish a social objective.  
The Court has affirmed that there are clear constitutional limitations on 
legislative autonomy in the sphere of public order, including the 
prohibition against the involvement of civil society in the armed conflict. 
In a 2002 decision,310 the Court struck down the so-called “National 
Defense and Security Law,” because one of its main pillars was the notion 
of “national power,” which included the direct involvment civil socity in 
national security strategies. The Court considered this type of mandatory 
civilian involvement in the violent conflict to be unconstitutional, because 
it endangered private citizens. This contravened elementary principles of 
international humanitarian law and constitutional mandates stipulating that 
citizens’ military duties cannot be established by administrative 
resolutions. The Court stated that the Executive’s fusion of the public and 
private spheres, forcing citizens to cooperate, is akin to fascism and alien 
to democracy. The concept of “national power” also violated the principle 
of separation of powers because it was directed by a council agreed upon 
by all three branches of Government but under the direction of the 
President. Moreover, several provisions of the law subverted civilian 
control to the military by giving the latter exclusive powers to design 
defense and security policies, which were only to be presented for their 
final approval to the President. The Court said that the country could have 
 309. Decision C-542 of 1993, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. (Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. dissenting; 
Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. concurring), In re Artículos 12, 16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 24, 25 y 26 de la ley 
40 de 1993 (Law 40 of 1993). 
 310. Decision C-251 of 2002, Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, J. and Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, 
J. (Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. and Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, J. dissenting), In re Artículos 3, 6, 13, 
20, 25, 38, 42, 50, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 62 y 72 de la Ley 684 de 2001 (Law 684 2001). 
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a national security law as long as it respected basic constitutional 
principles.311
The Court has also stated that the government’s power of maintaining 
public order must be carried out in accordance with constitutional 
mandates and international treaties. The Court’s recent decision on the 
constitutionality of the Rome Statute,312 which created the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), is especially relevant because its ratification by 
Colombia will have important effects. These effects will be felt not only in 
the subsequent peace process aimed at solving the internal armed conflict, 
but also by those who continuously disregard international rules that aim 
to humanize internal armed confrontations. In its decision, the Court 
emphasized first that allowing the ICC to exercise complementary 
jurisdiction does not absolve the sovereignty of the Colombian State 
because the ratification of the Rome Statute is in fact a manifestation of 
sovereignty. Second, the Court noted that the ICC would have jurisdiction 
over crimes that are not always defined in a way that respects the 
Colombian Constitution. In 2001, the Constitution was amended to 
prevent this conflict by authorizing different treatment for these particular 
criminals. This amendment thus must be interpreted in a manner 
compatible with the rest of the Constitution’s provisions. The Court 
believed it had jurisdiction to suggest a number of areas in which the 
President could formulate interpretative declarations. First, no provision 
governing the ICC in the Treaty of Rome inhibits the President from 
granting amnesties or pardons as long as such measures comply with the 
Constitution and accepted international law. Second, Colombian nationals 
must be guaranteed their constitutional right to defense, particularly their 
right to receive legal counsel during an investigation and trial. Finally, 
under Colombian law, the treaty does not alter the jurisdiction of the 
national judicial authorities. On these grounds, the treaty was upheld by 
the Court.313
 311. The Court also analyzed in detail specific provisions that were clearly problematic. The Law 
authorized military officials to impose duties upon citizens. The Law subordinated civilian authorities 
to a military commander in pre-defined public order zones and transferred judicial functions to the 
military that pertained to civilians. 
 312. Decision C-578 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. 
concurring), In re Ley 742 de 2002 (Law 742 of 2002). 
 313. President Andreés Pastrana made use of the exception in article 124 of the Rome Statute, 
which allowed a state to elect not to accept the ICC’s jurisdiction over war crimes for seven years 
upon becoming a Party to the treaty. President Alvaro Uribe Vélez did not withdraw the declaration. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss4/2
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 641 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Decisions Concerning the Economy  
Some of the Court’s most widely publicized and debated verdicts, 
especially in 2000, have been those pertaining to economic matters. On the 
one hand, many of the tutela decisions, dealing with social and economic 
rights, ordered public expenditures that initially were not allocated for in 
public budgets. On the other hand, as part of its function as guardian and 
interpreter of the Constitution, the Court makes difficult decisions in 
abstract review cases dealing with legislative provisions that are highly 
significant for the preservation of macroeconomic stability in Colombia. 
The Court took its basic position on which economic statutes can be 
judicially reviewed in a 1994 decision314 analyzing the unconstitutional 
actio popularis in a statute that set the requirements for the creation of 
certain types of private entities. The Court explained that the Constitution 
has given Congress a large degree of control in matters exclusively 
economic in nature, allowing for a lax standard of review. Stricter 
standards of review should be applied to laws that regulate matters 
concerning fundamental rights or matters relating to specific mandates in 
the Constitution. The Court also stated that the Colombian charter is not 
economically neutral because economic policies are evaluated in light of 
objectives proclaimed in the Preamble and fundamental economic rights. 
However, it clarified that the Constitution does not actually impose one 
economic model over the other; what is important, then, is that the 
Executive and the Legislature may select any economic policy that fully 
respects constitutional provisions. This imposes a great deal of 
responsibility upon a constitutional judge.  
Some of the Court’s strongest critics argue that its decisions on 
economic legislation create a high degree of legal instability.315 They have 
stated that as a consequence of its judicial activism, the Court has 
consistently increased public expenditures, disregarding the negative long-
term macroeconomic effects of its decisions.316 Since 1990 the Court has 
been more sensitive to the economic impact of its decisions, without 
disregarding the protection of rights or the defense of constitutional 
principles. Three of the most controversial areas with economic 
 314. Decision C-265 of 1994, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 12 y 
38 de la Ley 44 de 1993 (Articles 12, 38 of Law 44 of 1993). 
 315. See Sergio Clavijo, Fallos y Fallas Económicas de las Altas Cortes: el Caso de Colombia 
1991–2000, REVISTA DE DERECHO PÚBLICO No. 12 (June 2001); Salomón Kalmanovitz, Los Efectos 
Económicos de la Corte Constitucional, RERISTA DE DERECHO PUBLICO (Oct. 1999). More recently, 
both of these economists have adopted a more cautious approach. 
 316. The costs of this have often been quantified by some critics in terms of GNP percentages. 
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implications include the adoption of tutela decisions that generate 
economic costs for the state, banning regulations that establish the system 
for financing the acquisition of housing, and deciding on the laws that 
regulate annual increases in public employees’ salaries. 
a. Tutela Decisions with Public Costs 
Early on, the Court had to address the possibility of ordering, by means 
of tutela decisions, the mandatory development of State activities that 
increase public expenditures. Although the Court held in a unanimous 
decision317 that tutela judges should respect expenditure priorities adopted 
through the national budget planning process, the Court may order 
expenditures in exceptional circumstances. However, this position has not 
been consistently applied in the Court’s case law.  
Several tutela decisions have ordered public authorities to provide 
services that over extend their budget. For example, in 1999,318 a social 
security entity was ordered to carry out an expensive medical procedure, 
contrary to regulations, in order not to violate an individual’s right to 
minimum subsistence conditions. The Court has also ordered the social 
security system to provide special health care services and medications to 
AIDS patients.319 It is clear that in circumstances where the protection of 
social rights is at issue, the Court has consistently ordered authorities to 
act in a way that increases public expenditures. For example, in 1998,320 
the Court ordered the local authorities of Bogotá to carry out a mandatory 
vaccination plan to preserve the health of children in one of the City’s 
poor districts. In 2000,321 a social security regulation was construed to 
require special headphones for an individual with hearing impairment.322  
 317. Decision SU-111 of 1997, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Celmira Waldo de 
Valoyes contra Caja Nacional de Previsión Social-Seccional Chocó (Valoyes v. National Bank); 
Decision SU-1052 of 2000, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. concurring), 
Emilio Sánchez Alsina y Otras contra Presidencia de la República y el Ministerio de Hacienda y 
Crédito Público (Alsina v. President of the Republic et al.). 
 318. Decision T-590 of 1999, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), 
Alfredo Pineda Torres contra la Caja Nacional de Previsión (Torres v. National Bank). 
 319. Decision T-484 of 1992, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Alonso Munoz Ceballos contra 
Instituto de los Seguros Sociales (Ceballos v. Inst. of Social Security); Decision T-177 of 1999, Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), Señor X contra Secretaría de Salud Pública 
Municipal de Cali (Mr. X v. Secretary of Health of the City of Cali). 
 320. Decision SU-225 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz , J., Sandra Clemencia Perez Calderon 
y Otros contra Secretaria Distrital de Salud (Perez et al. v. District Secretary of Health).  
 321. Decision T-516 of 2000, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (unanimous), Miguel Camacho contra la 
empresa Solsalud, E.P.S. Seccional Bucaramanga (Camacho v. Solsalud Co.).  
 322. Compare Decision T-042 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (unanimous), Luis Carlos 
Sánchez Alvarez contra Cafesalud E.P.S (Alvarez v. Cafesalud). 
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In spite of the debate around the costs of upholding rights,323 the new 
Court elected in 2000, has confirmed the basic thesis that social rights can 
be enforced through tutela decisions. The sheer cost of protecting a right is 
not a sufficient argument for disregarding clear constitutional mandates 
upholding the effective enjoyment of rights and the state’s duty to 
safeguard life, personal integrity and human dignity. The Court has also 
stated that the protection of all constitutional rights entail costs which are 
unavoidable.  
b. The “UPAC” System for Financing Housing Alternatives 
The most salient economic decisions of the Court in recent times have 
undoubtedly been those related to the system for financing social housing 
based on a scheme of “constant purchasing value units” or UPAC (Unidad 
de Poder Adquisitivo Constante). For complicated historical economic 
reasons, the system had reached a point where it was not only inefficient, 
but also counterproductive because value units were calculated through 
annual variations in the interest rates, which were constantly reaching new 
historical peaks. This contravened the government’s original objective and 
made social housing debts too high to pay. The Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of these regulations with three decisions that caused an 
unprecedented level of debate among the private and public sector and in 
academia. 
The first decision, issued in May 1999,324 reviewed the constitutionality 
of the legal provisions that the Central Bank relied on to determine the 
monetary value of UPAC units. The plaintiff claimed that this system 
made the constitutional right to dignified housing325 unattainable. The 
Court held that part of the Central Bank’s constitutional autonomy in its 
role as the supreme monetary authority is the determination of the relevant 
factors used to preserve the value of money. The Court determined that 
imposing mandatory criteria was comparable to restricting the Bank’s 
autonomy. The Court also analyzed the effects of the current system on the 
goal of promoting dignified housing alternatives for the poor, and 
concluded that the system’s structure was unconstitutional. The Court 
 323. This debate occurs in other parts of the world as well. See, e.g., STEPHEN HOLMES & CASS R. 
SUNSTEIN, THE COST OF RIGHTS: WHY LIBERTY DEPENDS ON TAXES (1999); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, 
MORTAL PERIL (1997). 
 324. Decision C-383 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. and 
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 16 de la Ley 31 de 1992 (Article of Law 31 of 
1992). 
 325. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 51. 
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therefore banned the provision requiring variations in UPAC units to 
reflect movements of interest rates in the financial sector. Two justices326 
dissented, accusing the Court of intruding upon the powers of the 
Legislature. 
In 1999, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of provisions in the 
Organic Statute of the Financial System that structured the UPAC 
system.327 The Court adopted a purely formal stance and struck down the 
provisions as unconstitutional because they were not issued by Congress. 
The Court deferred the implementation of its decision until the end of the 
1999 legislative period, giving Congress time to order a new, 
constitutional regulation on the matter. The Court has also ordered the 
system to revise individual debt liquidations in accordance with its 
previous decision regarding the procedure used to calculate UPAC units. 
A few weeks later the Court decided whether an actio popularis filed 
against articles in the Organic Statute of the Financial System were 
unconstitutional.328 These articles allowed credit entities to capitalize 
interest in long-term credit plans, and they applied this system to loans 
used for financing social housing alternatives. The Court restated the 
argument it relied on in its previous judgment, namely, that the President 
cannot regulate state intervention in financial matters by using delegated 
legislative powers to show the fundamental unconstitutionality of the 
provisions. However, the Court affirmed that capitalization of interest in 
long-term credit operations is not contrary to the Constitution itself, rather 
it is unconstitutional when the capitalization is applied to credits granted 
for the acquisition of housing alternatives. Access to dignified housing is a 
fundamental right that must be progressively developed by the law 
through an “adequate financing system.” Therefore, the Court asserted that 
the state cannot ignore the need for adequate housing and must issue 
adequate plans. Given the evident inequities of the system, the Court 
declared the provision unconstitutional and banned the application of the 
regulations to loans for the financing of housing alternatives. As in its 
 326. Justices Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz and Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa. 
 327. Decision C-700 of 1999, José Gregorio Hernández, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. and José 
Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. concurring; Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., and 
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. dissenting), In re Artículos 18, 21, 23, 134,137, 138, del Decreto 
Extraordinario 663 de 1993 (Extraordinary Decree 663 of 1993). 
 328. Decision C-747 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. and José 
Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. concurring; Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, 
J., and Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. dissenting), In re Artículos 121 y 134 del decreto ley 663 de 1993 
(Articles 121, 134 of Decree Law 663 of 1993). 
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previous decision, the Court granted Congress a reasonable time frame in 
which to regulate the matter. 
These three judgments completely invalidated a costly system but also 
generated a remarkable degree of criticism from financial entities and 
economists. The decisions gave rise to the creation of a new system, based 
on “UVR” or Real Value Units. The Court reviewed the new system in 
2000, and declared it constitutional on the understanding that the interest 
charged would not be determined by the market. Instead the Court 
believed that the interest should be governed by precise regulations issued 
by the Central Bank. The Central Bank was thus entrusted with the task of 
setting interest rates for loans that would finance social housing 
alternatives.329 Since this judgment, several courts have upheld other 
aspects of the new UVR system.330
c. Annual Salary Increases 
The Court has also adopted controversial abstract review decisions 
regarding the regulation of annual increases in public and private salaries. 
In a 1999 decision,331 the Court examined a provision allowing the 
Government to establish a national minimum wage, and ordered the 
Goverment to take into account the inflation rate goals established for the 
following year. For the Court, this criterion taken by itself, would have 
been clearly unconstitutional because it would reduce the value of wages. 
The Court ordered the Government to consider all the criteria specified by 
the provision, and noted that annual salary readjustments should never be 
lower than the inflation rates of the previous year in order to maintain 
minimum wage increases.  
In a similar and equally controversial judgment in 2000,332 the Court 
declared part of the national budget unconstitutional because Congress 
 329. Decision C-955 of 2000, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (José Gregorio Hernández, J., 
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., and Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. dissenting), In 
re Ley 546 de 1999 y Ley 550 de 1999 (Laws 546, 550 of 1999).  
 330. Decision C-1192 of 2001, Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, J. (unanimous), In re Artículos 2 a 
9, 12 a 15, 17 a 19, 21, 22, 24, 25, 28, 29, 31, 33, 36, 39 a 42, 46, 47, 49, 50 y 51 de la Ley 643 de 
2001 (Law 643 of 2001); Decision C-1140 of 2000, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (Alvaro 
Tafur Galvis, J., Alfredo Beltran Sierra, J., Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, 
J., José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J., and Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. concurring), In re Ley 546 
de 1999 (Law 546 of 1999). 
 331. Decision C-815 of 1999, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J., 
Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., and Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 8 de la Ley 278 
de 1996 (Article 8 of Law 278 of 1996). 
 332. Decision C-1433 of 2000, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. and Cristina 
Pardo Schlesinger, J. dissenting), In re Ley 547 de 1999 (Law 547 of 1999). 
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failed to fulfill its duty of appropriating sufficient funds to secure the 
necessary increase in public officials’ wages in accordance with the 
previous year’s inflation rate. This position was, however, expressly 
modified by the Court in a 2001 judgment333 in which it accepted the 
argument that annual increases in salary involved the effective enjoyment 
of constitutional rights. However, the Court extracted wholly different 
consequences from it, taking into account: (i) the social context and 
impact of abstract review decisions in reducing inequalities within a State 
founded on the rule of law (Estado Social de Derecho); (ii) the inadequacy 
of judicial orders establishing a fixed, immovable standard for determining 
the value of wages; and (iii) the absence of absolute rights because even 
fundamental rights are subject to reasonable limitations. On these grounds, 
the Court found that annual increases in salary are not limited to minimum 
wages; and public salary policies should strive to maintain the purchasing 
power of public officials’ wages.334 The Court then stated that the 
provisions were constitutional so long as the criteria were applied in full. 
4. Decisions Concerning Private Powers  
The 1991 Constitution introduced a number of innovative mechanisms 
designed to control the arbitrary exercise of power by private parties over 
individuals and groups. Not every clause, however, has been interpreted 
and developed by Court decisions. First, some of the relevant 
constitutional provisions are those intended to redistribute social power, 
most notably the right of access to property,335 the possibility of using the 
tutela to counter fundamental rights violations by private parties in 
 333. Decision C-1064 of 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. and Jaime Córdoba Triviño, J. 
(Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. concurring; Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, J., Jaime Araujo Rentería, J., 
Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., and Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 2° de la Ley 628 de 
2000 (Article 2° of Law 628 of 2000).  
 334. In order to formulate a salary policy the Court applied specific criteria for determing an 
increase of wages, including: 
(1) the right of all public workers to maintain the purchasing power of their salaries; (2) the 
obligation to increase these workers’ annual salary in nominal terms; (3) the salaries of public 
workers’ that are below the average of central administration wages; (4) all public workers’ 
salaries according to the previous year’s inflation rate, readjusted in such a manner that the 
principles of salary scales and proportionality are respected; (5) the limitations on the right to 
maintain the purchasing power if the provisions are directed to prioritize public spending for 
the benefit of those who are in a situation worse than that of the public employees 
(unemployed, poor, indigent, diplaced, etc.); and (6) any fiscal savings resulting from the 
limitation of annual salaries. 
Id. 
 335. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 60. 
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exceptional conditions,336 and the constitutional right to present petitions 
before private organizations in order to obtain an adequate and prompt 
response.337 Second, some constitutional provisions contain mandates 
designed to require more respect for democracy and fundamental rights by 
private organizations (such as professional associations, schools, and trade 
unions). Third, some constitutional provisions support the organization of 
civil society through non-governmental and grassroots groups, and some 
assign special participation rights to the different social groups expressly 
recognized in the Charter.  
Perhaps the most feared development in this field is the ability to file a 
tutela against private parties responsible for violating or restricting 
constitutionally protected rights.338 According to the procedural 
regulations and the doctrine of the Court, the tutela may be used against 
private parties when the plaintiff is in a position of subordination or 
otherwise defenseless in relation to the private party against whom the 
claim is directed, a private party seriously harms collective interests, or the 
private party is charged with providing public services or utilities.  
The characteristics of “subordination” and “defenseless” have been 
given specific meaning through the Court’s decisions. Subordination has 
been strictly defined as the subjection to orders or decisions of third 
parties who are legally enabled to impose their will.339 Defenselessness has 
been given a very broad interpretation by the Court, which has stated that 
defenselessness must be evaluated in accordance with the particular 
circumstances of each individual case. For example, defenselessness has 
been interpreted as: (i) the plaintiff’s lack of effective defense channels 
(whether legal, material or physical) that enable the plaintiff to counter the 
attacks or burdens placed upon his or her fundamental rights;340 (ii) the 
plaintiff’s inability to fulfill a basic or vital need due to the unreasonable 
or disproportionate manner in which a private party exercises a given 
 336. Id. art. 86. 
 337. Id. art. 23. 
 338. This ability allows private parties to directly apply fundamental constitutional rights, and it 
ends the debate in Colombia concerning the application of the state action doctrine. 
 339. Decision T-333 of 1995, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (Jorge Arango Mejía, J. dissenting) 
Martha Beatriz Johnson Ceballos y Otros contra la Asociación de Copropietarios del Conjunto 
Residencial Montana (Ceballos v. Owners Assoc. of Montana); Decision T-172 of 1997, Vladimiro 
Naranjo Mesa, J. (unanimous), Dora Helena Aguilera y Otros contra Señora Beatriz Acevedo de 
Ordóñez (Aguilera v. Ordóñez). 
 340. Decision T-573 of 1992, Ciro Angarita Barón, J. (unanimous), Juan Guacaneme García 
contra Carlos Ulises Cárdenas (Garcia v. Cárdenas); Decision T-190 of 1994, Alejandro Martínez 
Caballero, J. (unanimous), María Margarita Marín Zuleta contra Aicardo Marín Saldarriaga (Zuleta v. 
Saldarriaga); Decision T-498 of 1994, Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. (unanimous), Carlos Alberto 
Blandon contra Club Deportivo Armero (Blandon v. Sports Club of Armero). 
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position or right;341 (iii) the existence of a moral, social or contractual 
bond, which may cause actions or omissions that violate the rights of one 
of the parties (parent-child relationships or corporate bonds);342 (iv) or the 
use of social pressure to force specific conduct (e.g., publishing of a 
person’s outstanding debt in a newspaper).343 The Court has also stated 
that the condition of defenselessness is presumed in cases where minors 
invoke the tutela to protect their rights.344
The possible scope in applying this instrument to private relationships 
is far-reaching. The broad array of cases in which the Court has allowed 
the limitation of private powers through tutela include the following: (i) 
retired workers against their former employers,345 (ii) employees who are 
denied social security services because their employer failed to make 
necessary fund transfers,346 (iii) residents of buildings and compounds 
against co-owners’ assemblies and administration bodies,347 (iv) medical 
practitioners against the administration of the private hospitals where they 
work,348 (v) users or clients of financial entities who unduly disseminate 
their personal data,349 (vi) citizens affected by noises coming from a near-
 341. Decision T-605 of 1992, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Lucio Quintero Rincon 
contra Eduardo Mendoza (Rincon v. Mendoza); Decision T-379 of 1995, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, 
J. (unanimous), Pedro Daniel Rojas y Otros contra Francisco Próspero de Vengoechea Fleury (Rojas 
v. Fleury); Decision T-375 of 1996, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Ignacio Barbosa 
Sánchez y Otros contra Isabel Molina y Otros (Sánchez et al. v. Molina et al.); Decision T-081 of 
1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Yorly Fander Messa Osorio contra Ejercito Nacional 
(Osorio v. National Ejercito).  
 342. Decision T-529 of 1992, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Blanca Cecila Castro Lopez 
contra Gustavo Cardenas (Lopez v. Cardenas); Decision T-233 of 1994, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. 
(unanimous), Maria Aurora Contreras contra Junta Administradora del Conjunto Residencial Montana 
(Contreras v. Administrator of Montana Residential Complex); Decision T-351 of 1997, Fabio Morón 
Díaz, J. (unanimous), Santos María Escalante Ramírez contra Diocesis De Cúcuta Y El Sacerdote Luis 
Fernando Hoyos Ossa (Ramírez v. Father Ossa). 
 343. Decision T-411 of 1999, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Danilo Trujillo 
Betancurt y Otros contra Constructora Colmena S.A. (Bentancurt et al. v. Colmena Construction). 
 344. Decision T-172 of 1997, Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. (unanimous), Dora Helena Aguilera y 
Otras contra Beatriz Acevedo de Ordóñez (Aguilera et al. v. Ordóñez). 
 345. Decision T-524 of 2000, Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. (unanimous), José Pedro Pablo Rodríguez 
Ramírez contra Siderúrgica Corradine S.A. (Ramírez v. Siderúrgica Co.). 
 346. Decision T-202 of 1997, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Guillermo Rueda y Otros contra 
Forjas Técnicas Ltda (Rueda et al. v. Forjas, Ltd.). 
 347. Decision T-418 of 1999, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Elizabeth Calderon Montaño 
contra Luz Marina Barbosa (Montaño v. Barbosa); Decision T-333 of 1995, Antonio Barrera 
Carbonell, J. (Jorge Arango Mejía, J. dissenting), Martha Beatriz Johnson Ceballos et al. contra 
Asociación de Copropietarios del Conjunto Residencial Montana (Cebellos et al. v. Residential Assoc. 
of Montana); Decision T-233 of 1994, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), Contreras v. Administrator 
of Montana Residential Complex . 
 348. Decision T-433 of 1998, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (unanimous), Hermman Cuervo Pinto 
contra la Fundación Santa Fe de Bogotá (Pinto v. Foundation of Santa Fe de Bogotá). 
 349. Decision T-261 of 1995, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), German 
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by privately-owned motor sports track,350 (vii) the inhabitants of a social 
housing compound that suffered from serious structural defects against the 
builder who failed to prevent such failures,351 (viii) inhabitants of 
residential areas affected by the smells and noises emanating from their 
neighbors’ animal-raising activities or other poorly operated industries,352 
(ix) a priest who was banned from carrying out religious services inside 
privately operated cemeteries against the cemetery’s administration,353 (x) 
homemakers who were constant victims of domestic violence against their 
aggressors,354 (xi) the victims of fraudulent accusations printed in a widely 
read book against the author,355 and (xii) sports fans against the entities in 
charge of managing stadiums.356
III. THE IMPACT OF THE COURT  
The Constitutional Court’s contribution to the materialization and 
development of the 1991 Constitution has deeply impacted most aspects of 
Colombian life. Its judgments, which have touched upon all areas of the 
law and all facets of Colombia’s complicated national reality, have led the 
Court to become a necessary reference point for anyone who wishes to 
know in detail what has transpired in Colombia in the past decade.  
For purposes of clarity, the author has grouped the different effects 
generated by the Court’s decisions into two broad categories. First, the 
Court exerted substantial influence in strengthening the rule of law and in 
transforming the entire Colombian legal system. This transformation 
Humberto Rincon Perfetti contra Sistema Pronta S.A. de Tarjetas de Credito y Otros (Perfetti v. 
Sistema Pronta Credit Card Co., et al.). 
 350. Decision T-226 of 1995, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Ricardo Prieto Rozo contra 
Fernando Escobar (Rozo v. Escobar). 
 351. Decision T-411 of 1999, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Bentancurt et al. v. Colmena 
Construction. 
 352. Decision T-115 of 1997, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. (unanimous) Alberto Rafael Alemán 
Orozco contra Fernando Colón Ramos (Orozco v. Ramos); Decision T-099 of 1998, José Gregorio 
Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), José Joaquín Manchola Muñoz contra Alcalde Local de San 
Cristóbal (Muñoz v. Mayor of San Cristóbal). 
 353. Decision T-602 of 1996, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Berardo Arango 
Marín contra Cooperativa de Trabajo Asociado de Servicios Funerarios (Marín v. Workers 
Cooperative). 
 354. Decision T-436 of 1995, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Luz Marina Montoya contra 
Marco A. Castiblanco (Montoya v. Castiblanco); Decision T-458 of 1995, Alejandro Martínez 
Caballero, J. (unanimous), Lucelys Ballesteros González contra Amaury Vega Ruiz (González v. 
Ruiz). 
 355. Decision T-244 of 2000, Fabio Morón Díaz, J. (unanimous), Flor Elvira Russi Rodríguez 
contra Hernán Joaquin Fonseca Jiménez (Rodríguez v. Jiménez). 
 356. Decision T-288 of 1995, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Rosemberg Zamora y 
Otras contra Clubes Deportivo Cali y América y Otros ( Zamora et al. v Sports Club of Cali et al.). 
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became evident in the fundamental change in the general interpretative 
approach towards the law and legal issues. The transformation also 
became evident with the deep infusion of constitutional law into the 
criminal, civil, administrative, and labor decisions, as well as in other 
areas of the legal system. Further, the introduction of current issues into 
Colombian constitutionalism, the rise of new “equity jurisdiction” in 
Colombia, and the application of substantial pressure for further change in 
the legal system also evinced the transfer nation.  
Secondly, the Court has visibly impacted Colombian politics. In short, 
the Court interpreted some social conflicts as constitutional problems. 
Therefore, it contributed to the peaceful resolution of conflicts within 
society. This means that the Constitution ceased to be an abstract code and 
became imbedded in social reality. In fact, the Court has become a 
controversial but legitimate institutional arbiter, called upon to make 
difficult decisions. It has become a forum in which most controversies are 
submitted to a second round of decision-making. 
Overall, the Court’s largely unprecedented impact upon Colombian life 
may be summed up as follows:  
(a)  The Court has contributed to building the rule of law, 
expanding it within the context where the rule of force often 
prevails. In doing so, the Court strengthened public institutions 
that were threatened by many types of menaces and 
circumstances. This prompted strong debates regarding the 
Court’s extensive power, and whether this power encroaches 
excessively into the political sphere.  
(b)  The Court has modified the balance of social and political 
power by, inter alia granting more power to weak, vulnerable, 
marginal, and disorganized persons with constitutional rights.  
(c)  The Court has made these advancements without depriving the 
state of its legitimate enforcement actions, which enable the 
State to address social and political problems. 
A. The Court’s Impact in the Legal Field 
1. Change in the Prevailing Interpretative Approach  
The interpretative approach that prevailed in Colombian legal circles 
before 1991 was mainly formalist. Once the Constitutional Court decided 
the first abstract review and tutela cases, however, the dominant 
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interpretative approach perspective began to undergo a major 
transformation among judges, public officials, and legal practitioners.357 
This modification process, which has profoundly impacted Colombia’s 
strong pre-existing legal culture, was largely brought about by the 
essential focus shift adopted by the new constitutional judge. At the level 
of judicial review, the change of legal perspective was sudden. The 
Constitutional Court radically focused on abandoning the formalist 
approach and adopting an approach centered on the protection of rights 
and the balance of principles and values. Given the hierarchy of the Court 
within the Constitutional system, this slow but steady change of approach 
is being gradually adopted in most tutela decisions. For a Hispanic 
country, with a four-century old legal culture of ritual forms, inaccessible 
judicial hierarchies, endless procedures, and an amazing overpopulation of 
lawyers, this general and quick change in prevailing interpretative 
approaches was an unexpected advantage. Moreover, it evolved into a very 
interesting socio-legal process that has profound implications for the 
progressive construction of the rule of law. 
I have previously referred to a number of differences between the types 
of decisions adopted by the Supreme Court under the former Constitution 
and those adopted by the Constitutional Court after 1991 for more than 
historical reasons. They serve as eloquent reminders of the great distance 
that lies between a formalist approach and a “substantialist” approach, 
which favors the defense of rights and principles. One great difference 
between these two types of legal focus is that before 1991, the Concordat, 
decrees declaring a state of exception, regulations covertly discriminating 
against women, would not have been declared unconstitutional. The same 
may be said of many other laws, measures, and situations that are now 
subjected to an entirely different sort of constitutional evaluation. 
However, this does not mean that the new approach is necessarily more 
rigorous than the former;358 it just means that wholly new outlooks, 
 357.  See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBIT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1991); SUSAN J. BRISON & 
WALTER SINNOTT-ARMSTRONG, CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON CONSTITUTIONAL 
INTERPRETATION (1993). See generally ROBERT ALEXY, TEVÍA DE LA ARGUMENTACIÓN JURÍDICA 
(Manuel Atienza & Isrbel Expejo trans., 1989); CHAIM PERELMAN, MÉTHODES DU DROIT, LOGIQUE 
JURIDIQUE ET NOUVELLE RHÉTORIQUE (1976). 
 358. A formalist approach, focused on the adequate distribution of functions among public 
authorities and concentrated on the types of acts by which the functions are carried out and the 
regularity of the corresponding procedures,can also be very strict and consequentially generate a 
declaration of unconstitutionality of norms that would otherwise pass a substantial constitutionality 
review. The most salient examples are the decisions of the Supreme Court by which several 
Constitutional amendments were banned for procedural reasons. This same point is illustrated by 
another case, which also proves that the formalistic approach also occasionally appears in the context 
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dilemmas, and responsibilities have been created for the constitutional 
judge. Similarly, this does not mean that the new approach has been 
universally adopted; the formalist approach still remains appealing, 
particularly in those areas of the country where access to information and 
legal education is difficult. Further, in politically challenging cases that 
raise procedural issues, the formalist approach is often still utilized. 
Five elements may help examine the fundamental difference that exists 
between these two types of interpretative approaches. First, the problems 
posed by each approach are different, because the substantialist approach 
emphasizes conflicts of values and interests but not formal powers or 
procedures. Second, the methods used to solve such problems are also 
different, since the formalist approach typically privileged “black or 
white” solutions, while the new perspective seeks to harmonize conflicting 
values and interests. Third, as a consequence, an entirely new type of legal 
reasoning is applied to solve difficult cases, because the formalist ideal of 
universally applicable abstract legal categories is no longer viable. 
Constitutional problems are now seen as matters of degree and balance, 
which require bringing together diverse values, principles, interests, and 
rights. Fouth, this system entails a new link between the constitutional 
system of review and social reality, which must be considered in order to 
find concrete solutions in particular cases. Finally, the judge is left to 
consider the impact of her decisions in the context in which they will 
operate.  
of the new Constitution. In one decision the Constitutional Court declared the legally-established 
system for the financing of housing alternatives unconstitutional. The main reason was not a 
substantial one focused on the effective enjoyment of the right to adequate housing, but a formal one, 
i.e. that the legal instrument used to regulate this system was not of the type required by the 
Constitution to intervene in financial matters. For the Court, a system such as this could not be 
regulated by means of an ordinary law that in turn empowered the President of the Republic to issue 
legislative decrees on the matter. 
 That is why it is mistaken to present the debate between old and new constitutionalism as a 
replication of the North American controversy between “judicial passivity”—understood as a cautious 
and restrained application of the constitutional system of judicial review and associated with 
traditional constitutionalism—and “judicial activism”—defined as the intervention of judges in the 
definition of preferable constitutional alternatives in hard casesand associated with new 
constitutionalism. Through cases such as the ones just mentioned, Colombia has shown that it is 
possible to develop a high level of judicial activism on the grounds of formalistic, traditional 
arguments. For commentary on the American debate, see RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY 
JUDICIARY, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); ROBERT H. BORK, 
THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990); JESSE H. CHOPER, 
JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL PROCESS (1980); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND 
DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); ROBERT JUSTIN LIPKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
REVOLUTIONS (2000); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
(1982). 
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The first difference refers to the type of problems that the constitutional 
judges must solve. Under a formalist approach, typical conflicts are 
generated between organs of public power and between formally defined 
spheres of jurisdiction. Recurring issues are whether the authority 
involved could do what it did, whether it follows the correct procedure, 
whether the form of the act was adequate, or whether its actions invaded 
the sphere of jurisdiction of another authority. By contrast, under a 
“substantialist” approach, typical conflicts are generated between 
constitutional values, principles, interests, and rights that clash in certain 
contexts.359  
The resolution of these substantial conflicts demands different methods 
than those used under a formalist approach. When one public authority 
invades another authority’s sphere of jurisdiction, the solution is simply to 
protect the organ affected by the intrusion and to punish the infractor. In 
other words, the judges employ black-and-white solutions. But this 
method is distinctly inappropriate when dealing with a conflict between 
values, rights, interests, and principles.360 The method required by the 
constitutional judge allows the harmonization of rights and principles in 
concrete circumstances. Each judge is granted a specific value based on 
objective criteria, and the adequate solution is one that achieves the 
maximum protection and minimum restriction of all of the values. This 
method requires the application of new analytical tools and concepts such 
as “rationality,” “reasonability,” “proportionality,” or “essential nucleus of 
rights.” 
 359. These values, principles, interests, and rights have been granted different forms of 
constitutional protection, depending on the context in which they operate. Certainly, the constitutional 
judge cannot disregard them, and must make a careful assessment of the specific circumstances of 
each case. A constitutional conflict thus emerges when two rights are confronted in a particular 
situation. Examples of this occur when: the freedom to impart information to which a magazine is 
entitled is confronted with the privacy of a public figure whose personal life was the object of a news 
article (conflict between rights); the professional duty of a physician to preserve life clashes with the 
liberty of a terminally ill patient to decide whether she will carry on living in extreme conditions 
(conflict between a duty and a right); the legal stability that emerges as a consequence of respect for 
res iudicata is confronted with the need to prevent the application of a decision which violates 
fundamental rights (conflict between two principles); and the state goal of expanding public 
transportation infrastructure is confronted with the right of an indigenous community to preserve the 
integrity of ancestral lands (conflict between a public interest and a right). 
 360. For example, to hold that a magazine can never publish something that a public figure 
considers private would amount to suppressing the right to information; to ascertain that roads or 
infrastructure may never be constructed in areas classified as indigenous territory would ultimately 
leave aboriginal groups and their neighbours in the darkest isolation from development and its benefits 
and to affirm the abstract prohibition of ordering public expenditures outside of institutional budgets, 
would be tantamount to forgetting the very existence of basic social and economic needs of the 
individual. Black-or-white solutions lead to decisions that ultimately disregard rights and principles 
protected by the Constitution. 
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A third difference poses a much more extensive challenge. In order to 
accept that a given solution is not of the black-or-white type, it is 
necessary to overcome a certain method of legal reasoning characteristic 
of the formalist approach that is identified by a craving for classification. 
This method prefers that each phenomenon be placed in a separate, 
distinct, and irreconcilable category through abstract procedures that do 
not consider the unique context. The constitutional judge must now assess 
the comparative importance of the values, principles, interests, and rights 
that collide in concrete situations. They make this assessment by 
visualizing the problems as issues of degree and balance. Most of 
Colombia’s current constitutional issues are located in “gray” areas, which 
is reflected in the types of questions posed during judicial review.361  
A fourth difference emerges from the third one. It is related to the link 
between the law and reality. In matters of degree, decisions may not be 
adopted in abstract terms that disregard the factual or normative context 
that gave rise to the conflict. This poses an enormous conceptual 
challenge, because the law and the judge must be sufficiently open to the 
context of each case. Additionally, legal reasoning must be able to 
incorporate the relevant elements provided by that context. This is an 
interesting challenge, because it requires Colombian lawyers to modify 
their schemes of thought. It is no longer possible to select general rules 
and apply them to concrete cases, as most Colombian lawyers were taught 
to do through a simple syllogism. Thus, Colombian lawyers must ponder 
factors and criteria that emerge from the specific facts of each case and 
from their links to conflicting values, interests, rights, and principles, not 
the other way around.362  
 361. To return to our simple example: To what extent can a magazine publish information on a 
public figure’s private life? When is it reasonable to reveal certain information in accordance with the 
right to privacy? When does control over published information become a disproportionate limitation 
of freedom of the press, similar to forbidden censorship? The difficulty in most constitutional cases is 
centered on where to draw the line, not in the abstract, but in each particular situation, on the grounds 
of the elements that define the traits and dimensions of each individual conflict. 
 362. Returning again to our example on the conflict between freedom of the press and the right to 
privacy: is it relevant to ask whether the information that is being published is a picture of the mayor 
with his or her lover, or whether it is a picture of the mayor receiving money from a municipal 
contractor on the gates of her/his house? If the news is related to a public corruption scandal, the 
difference is relevant. But if the news is related to the ethical profile of the mayor, maybe it is not so 
significant. That is why some Colombian scholars have begun to talk about the “death of syllogism”, 
of the inadequacy of simple deductive logical reasoning, of the impossibility of maintaining a scheme 
of thought that proceeds downwards from the top. That is also why some have begun to speak of the 
need to articulate the rules and sub-rules applied by the Court, to make the reasonability tests more 
transparent in each decision, to satisfy with enough pertinent reasons the duty of applying strong 
arguments, of expressly defining the different degrees at which constitutional judicial review should be 
applied to different issues. This is all perhaps to indicate that it is important not to allow subjectivity to 
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This leads to a fifth trait of the shift in the interpretative approach. 
From a substantialist perspective, the effects and impact of constitutional 
decisions are necessarily born in mind by the judge, not for reasons of 
convenience, but to avoid the disproportionate restriction of constitutional 
rights and principles as a consequence of the decision. The clearest 
examples are tutela decisions. These decisions are not adopted in the 
abstract, but rely on the concrete, specific circumstances of each individual 
case. They order whatever is necessary to effectively protect the 
fundamental rights at stake. The tutela judge must not give a pre-defined 
order when faced with a fundamental rights violation, but employs 
different orders for each case, even if the same rights are being protected. 
Another way of taking into account the effects and the impact of decision, 
is through the Court’s “modulative” decisions, which would have been 
unconceivable under the abstract black-and-white approach. 
2. Applying the Constitution to All Branches of the Law  
In addition to spurring the “de-formalization” of legal arguments, the 
Constitutional Court’s case law has rapidly applied the Constitution to all 
branches of the law. The Court’s decisions contributed to the infusion of 
constitutional principles into all legal sub-disciplines. The principle of 
legal interpretation according to the Constitution, presented by the Court 
as a necessary precondition for the preservation of the Charter has led 
ordinary judges to directly apply constitutional norms and to incorporate 
constitutional arguments into their legal reasoning. Moreover, the primary 
commitment of protecting fundamental rights has begun to surface in all 
types of judicial decisions. This is not, however, an exclusively Colombian 
phenomenon. This has occurred wherever powerful Constitutional Courts 
have started to shape the legal systems within which they operate.363
prevail in the many gray zones of constitutional interpretation, and to set clear rules for the game from 
the outset. 
 363. Referring to the European case, one scholar has depicted a situation very similar to ours:  
European judiciaries now must take into account the dictates of constitutional 
“jurisprudence”. . . which is formally binding upon them as higher law. As this case law has 
expanded in scope and content, once relatively autonomous legal domains (such as penal, 
administrative, and contract law) have been gradually but meaningfully placed under the 
tutelage and supervision of constitutional judges. Consequently, judicial processes and 
litigation strategies, but also the teaching of law and legal scholarship, are being transformed. 
In short, the process of constitutionalizing European law has not only begun, it is irreversible. 
ALEC STONE SWEET, GOVERNING WITH JUDGES CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS IN EUROPE (2000). See 
also SALLY J. KENNEY, WILLIAM M. REISINGER & JOHN C. REITZ, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES IN 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1999).  
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The assimilation of constitutional law by other legal sub-disciplines is 
evident in a variety of protective tutela decisions. In labor law cases, the 
Court has addressed matters like the timely payment of salaries,364 the 
adequate recognition and payment of retirement pensions,365 the protection 
of pregnant workers,366 even those hired through “temporary worker” 
companies,367 the prohibition of changing the legal personality of a 
company to elude labor obligations,368 respect for the right to strike,369 and 
the prohibition of discrimination against trade unions members.370 In 
criminal law cases, the Court addressed issues such as the constitutional 
limitations upon the types of admissible evidence,371 the scope of the 
exclusionary rule,372 the protection of defendants’ procedural rights 
 364. Decision SU-995 of 1999, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. concurring), 
Iván Enrique Brito Roncallo y Otros contra la Alcaldía Municipal de El Plato, Magdalena (Roncallo et 
al. v. Mayor of El Plato). 
 365. Decision T-606 of 1999, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting) 
Nieves Avilez Pérez y Otros contra el municipio de Montería (Perez et al. v. City of Montería). 
 366. Decision T-969 of 2000, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous) María Palacios 
contra Servicios y Asesorías S.A. (Palacios v. Services and Accessories Co.); Decision C-470 of 1997, 
Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous) In re Artículo 239 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo 
(Labor Code); Decision T-380 of 1999, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Carmen Villalba 
Gil y Otros contra Seguro Social E.P.S. y Otros (Gil et al. v. Social Security Services et al.) .  
 367. Decision T-1101 of 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Carmen Villalba 
Gil y Otras contra el Seguro Social E.P.S. y Unimec E.P.S. (Carmen Villalba Gil et al. v. Social 
Security E.P.S., Unimec E.P.S.).  
 368. Decision T-286 of 2003, Jaime Araújo Rentería, J. (unanimous), Claudia Lorena Silva Soto 
contra la Cooperativa de Trabajadores de Colombia (Claudia Lorena Silva Soto v. Workers’ 
Cooperative of Colombia).  
 369. Decision T-568 of 1999, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. concurring; 
Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. and Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), Sindicato de las Empresas 
Varias de Medellin E.S.P. contra Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social y Otros (Various 
Companies of Medellin) Minister of Labor and Social Security et al.); Decision C-432 of 1996, Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 451 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo (Labor Code); 
Decision C-271 of 1999, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), In re Artículos 374 (P) y 376 (P) 
del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo (Labor Code). 
 370. Decision SU-342 of 1995, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (Jorge Arango Mejía, J., Vladimiro 
Naranjo Mesa, J., Fabio Morón Díaz, J., and Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. dissenting), Sindicato de 
Trabajadores de Confecciones Leonisa S.A. contra la Empresa Confecciones Leonisa S.A (Leonisa 
Textile Labor Union v. Leonisa Textile Corporation, Ltd.); Decision of T-230 of 1994, Eduardo 
Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Juan de Jesús Jiménez contra Febor Entidad Coopertiva (Juan de 
Jesús Jiménez v. Febor Entidad Association). 
 371. Decision T-008 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), William Alberto Tulena 
Tulena contra Sala Penal del Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Santa Fe de Bogotá (William 
Alberto Tulena Tulena v. Penal Office of the Superior Tribunal of the Judicial District of Sante Fe de 
Bogotá). 
 372. Decision SU-159 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., 
Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J., and Jaime Araujo Rentería, J. dissenting), Saulo Arboleda Gómez contra la 
Fiscalía General de la Nación y la Sala de Casación Penal de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (Gómez v. 
National Fiscal General). 
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(including the right to an adequate technical defense),373 the rights of 
prison inmates,374 and the obligation to respect procedural delays.375 In 
administrative law cases, the Court has considered topics such as the right 
to obtain adequate and timely answers to petitions,376 the conditions upon 
which informal traders can be banned from invading public space,377 and 
the application of constitutional principles governing public service to 
every public official’s activities.378 In civil law cases, the Court decided 
subjects like the rights and duties of family members vis-à-vis each 
other379 and the application of constitutional social functions to private 
property.380
 373. Decision T-573 of 1997, Jorge Arango Mejía, J. (unanimous), Nicolás Antonio Gil Marín 
contra Penal Municipal de Medellín (Antonio Gil Marín v. Criminal Order 26 of the City of Medellín); 
Decision T-567 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Avelino Pasachoa Cely contra la 
Sala Civil-Familia-Laboral del Tribunal Superior del Distrito Judicial de Santa Rosa de Viterbo 
(Avelino Pasachoa Cely v. Civil-Family-Labor Office of the Superior Tribunal of the Judicial District 
of Santa Rosa de Viterbo). 
 374. Decision T-966 of 2000, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Luis León España, 
Giovanni Girón Collazos y Arnulfo Moncayo Mera contra la Directora y el Comandante de Vigilancia 
de la Cárcel del Distrito Judicial de Cali Villahermosa (España et al. v. Director and the Commandant 
of the Prison Guards of the Judicial District of Cali Villahermosa); Decision T-153 of 1998, Eduardo 
Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Manuel José Duque Arcila, Jhon Jairo Hernández y Otros contra el 
Ministerio de Justicia y el INPEC (Manuel José Duque et al. v. Minister of Justice and the INPEC). 
 375. Decision T-361 of 1997, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), Hector Alonso Zapata Congote 
y Otros contra la Fiscalía Regional de Antioquia (Hector Alonso Zapata et al. v. the Fiscal Region of 
Antioquia). 
 376. See, e.g., Decision T-867 of 2000, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), Henry 
Bolaños Daza y Otros contra Caja de Crédito Agrario y/o Banco Agrario de Colombia (Daza et al. v. 
Colombia Bank of Agriculture); Decision T-997 of 1999, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. 
(unanimous), Edilma Del Socorro Rendón Castaño contra CAJANAL (Castaño v. CAJANAL); 
Decision C-339 of 1996, Julio César Ortiz, J. Gutiérrez (unanimous), In re Artículos 49, 60, 72 y 136 
del Decreto 01 de 1984 (Decree 1 of 1984). 
 377. See, e.g., Decision T-883 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), Francy 
Hernández González contra la Alcaldía Mayor de Bogotá, a la Secretaria de Gobierno y a la Alcaldía 
Local de Teusaquillo (González v. Mayor of Bogotá et al.). 
 378. Decision C-328 of 1995, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 4º de la 
Ley 105 de 1993 (Law 105 of 1993); Decision T-609 of 1999, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), 
Manuel de Jesús Valdés García y Otros contra Gobernación del Chocó y el Hospital San Francisco de 
Asís de la ciudad de Quibdó (García et al. v. Governor of Chocó et al.); Decision T-533 of 1999, 
Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. dissenting), Esperanza Pinzón Ortíz contra 
Ministerio de Hacienda y Crédito Público (Ortiz v. Minister of Land and Public Resources); Decision 
T-396 of 1997, Antonio Barrera Carbonell, J. (unanimous), Diego Jesús Téllez y Otros contra la 
Empresa de Desarrollo Urbano de Villavicencio (Téllez et al. v. Desarrollo Urbano Co.). 
 379. Decision T-278 of 1994, Hernando Herrera Vergara, J. (unanimous), Diana Patricia Gutiérrez 
Utima contra Blanca Lilia Utima Rivera y Oscar Gutierrez Lizarazo (Gutiérrez v. Rivera); Decision T-
182 of 1999, Martha Victoria Sáchica de Moncaleano, J. (unanimous), Andrea del Pilar y Otros contra 
Silvio Nel Huertas Ramírez (Pilar et al. v. Ramírez); Decision T-098 of 1995, José Gregorio 
Hernández Galindo, J. (unanimous), Carolina y Lina Tatiana Torres Rey contra Orlando Torres Sierra 
(Rey v. Sierra). 
 380. Decision T-427 of 1998, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), María Esperanza 
Prieto González contra el Curador No 3 de la Zona de Usaquén (González v. No. 3 Zone of Usaquén); 
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Applying constitutional principles to all areas of the law was also 
prompted by abstract review decisions in which the Court interpreted 
statutes so as to make them compatible with the Constitution. These 
interpretations guide judges and administrative authorities in concrete 
cases. For example, regarding labor law, the Court held that the law cannot 
exclude strikes prompted mainly for solidarity reasons from legal 
protection.381 In criminal law, the Court held that crime victims have three 
constitutional rights: truth, justice, and compensation. Consequently, the 
Court declared some provisions in the Criminal Code unconstitutional. 
These provisions regulated victims’ rights as if the victim’s only interest 
was to claim damages.382 The Court also issued judgments on the types of 
admissible evidence and the admissible restrictions on their publicity.383 In 
administrative law, the Court held that a plaintiff could challenge an 
administrative act without asking for damages. As a result, citizens can 
seek the simple invalidation of the act.384 The Court ordered that public 
utility consumers have the right to participate in the competent regulatory 
agency’s tariff creation,385 and it also limited the President’s power to 
modify the Executive branch’s structure.386 In civil law, the Court held that 
a person’s obligation to give alimony to divorced and gravely ill spouses 
could only be terminated when the dignity and autonomy of the ill spouse 
would not be affected.387
Decision C-595 of 1995, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (unanimous), In re Artículos 3 de la Ley 48 de 1882, 
Artículo 61 de la Ley 110 de 1912 (Law 48 of 1882, Law 110 of 1912). 
 381. Decision C-201 of 2002, Jaime Araujo Rentería, J. (Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. and 
Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. concurring in part; Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, J., Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., 
Jaime Córdoba Triviño, J., and Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. dissenting in part), In re Artículos 
359, 379-e, 401, 405, 406, 408 y 467 del Código Sustantivo del Trabajo, Artículo 25 del Decreto 2351 
de 1965 (Labor Code, Decree 2351 of 1965). 
 382. Decision C-916 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 97 de 
la Ley 599 de 2000 (Law 599 of 2000); Decision C-032 of 2003, Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, J. 
(unanimous), In re Artículo 56 de la Ley 600 de 2000 (Law 600 of 2000). 
 383. Decision C-394 of 1994, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J., Carlos 
Gaviria Díaz, J., and Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 37A, 37A, 293, 306, 
329, 369C, 415 del Código de Procedimiento Penal (Code of Criminal Procedure). 
 384. Decision C-426 of 2002, Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 84 del Código 
Contencioso Administrativo (Administrative Code). The Council of State disagreed in a divided 
decision (text on file with author). 
 385. Decision C-150 of 2003, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (Jaime Araujo Rentería, J., Clara 
Inés Vargas Hernández, J., and Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. dissenting), In re Ley 142 de 1994, Artículo 1° 
de la Ley 286 de 1996, Artículo 2°, 3° de la Ley 632 de 2000, Artículos 18, 19, 23 de la Ley 689 de 
2001 (Law 142 of 1994, Law 286 of 1996, Law 632 of 2000, Law 689 of 2001). 
 386. Decision C-702 of 1999, Fabio Morón Díaz, J., In re Artículos 7º, 38, 47, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 
59, 68, 111, 120 de la Ley 489 de 1998 (Law 489 of 1998). Several justices dissented in this opinion. 
Id. Decision C-1437 of 2000, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J. and 
Cristina Pardo Schlesinger, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 42 de la Ley 489 de 1998 (Law 489 of 1998). 
 387. Decision C-246 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J., In re Artículo 6 de la Ley 25 de 
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3. The Importance of New Concepts and the Incorporation of Current 
Constitutional Issues into National Case Law  
In the course of its first decade, the Court has not only rendered 
decisions on the most pressing national problems, but it has also issued 
pronouncements on broad issues of current constitutional law. These may 
be classified in three groups: (i) traditional controversies associated with 
the constitutional judicial review of laws, (ii) post-war debates of western 
constitutionalism, and (iii) emerging issues in the transition from the 
twentieth to the twenty-first centuries.  
First, the Court has dealt with traditional controversies relating to the 
role of a constitutional tribunal by establishing transparent criteria to guide 
its own activity. Several concepts must be understood in this light: 
“legislative margin of configuration,” the government’s “margin of 
appreciation” when declaring a state of exception, and “levels of intensity 
of the equality test.” These three concepts demonstrate the Court’s prudent 
attitude. Different reasonability tests and guidelines created to solve 
difficult cases (such as the pro-libertatis principle) exemplify this court’s 
efforts to make its constitutional interpretation more rigorous. Depsite 
these advancements, more must be done in this endeavour.  
Second, post-war debates, which have been ignored by Colombian case 
law, have also been addressed by the Court in what may be called a fast 
aggiornamento. Over a ten year period, the tribunal has had to decide 
matters which had been addressed in the four prior decades in Europe and 
the United States. Regarding the debate on the constitutional provisions’ 
normative character, the Court began by affirming that every word in the 
Constitution is a true legal imperative that binds every national authority. 
On the question of whether there are essential political issues that the 
constitutional judge should not be permitted to decide, the Court has 
consistently rejected the possibility of spheres of power that would be 
immune to the general duty of respecting the Constitution. However, 
perhaps in the field of fundamental rights and basic liberties our 
constitutional law has been most rapidly and remarkably updated. Through 
its decisions, the Court has assimilated Western jurisprudential advances, 
and has gone further in issues such as personal autonomy, sexual 
discrimination, and social exclusion. Nevertheless, regarding other issues, 
such as racial equality, homosexual rights, and reproductive rights, there is 
still a long road ahead.  
1992 (Law 25 of 1992). 
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Third, the Court has coped with some of the current global 
constitutional debates. In particular, four areas of debate should be 
underscored. First, in the areas of multiculturalism and the right to be 
collectively different, the Court has completely abandoned the 
assimilationist perspective instead of imposing individualist, occidental 
conceptions upon indigenous peoples. In doing so the Court spoke of 
intercultural dialogue among equally dignified cultures, as well as free 
determination of ethnic groups as a pre-requisite for the preservation of 
diversity. Second, in terms of the enforceability of social rights, the Court 
recognized the right to minimum subsistence. In doing so, it created the 
doctrine of unconstitutional state of affairs, and it has protected the right to 
health and other social rights through acción de tutela. Third, in the area of 
the application of fundamental rights provisions to relations between 
private parties, the Court agreed that a private person is in a situation of 
power and advantage over another, the Constitution should be applied 
through tutela directly to protect the weakest person. Finally, regarding the 
problem of the active status of fundamental rights, the Court has 
consistently affirmed that fundamental rights empower individuals to 
defend themselves from arbitrary actions. The Court also demanded 
positive actions from authorities in order to fulfil their needs. 
Conformity with the tendencies of modern constitutionalism is also 
evident in the central role assigned to the solidarity principle and the 
progressive definition of equality, which is understood in substantive 
terms and not merely as formal equality before the law. Conformity is also 
evident in the authorization of affirmative action mechanisms to benefit 
both individuals and groups such as women, adolescents, the elderly, 
children, the marginalized and the disabled. It is also evident the 
visualization of society not merely as an aggregate of individuals, but as a 
complex structure where very diverse groups and affiliations interact on 
the grounds of their different needs and interests. Such groups include 
ethnic groups, peasants, consumers, public utility users, entrepreneurs, 
marginalized and formerly discriminated sectors, persons in conditions of 
special physical, mental, or economic weakness, and even guerrilla 
groups. These persons have therefore acquired new standing before the 
law, public institutions, and society which can reinforce their active 
participation in all relevant societal areas. 
Moreover, the Court has introduced a number of analytical instruments 
into its decision making process and legal reasoning. These tools are in 
tune with the challenges posed by the new issues the Court faced, and are 
also quite innovative at the global level. Concepts like “proportionality,” 
the “reasonability test,” “special protection,” “levels of constitutional 
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scrutiny,” “essential nucleus of rights and competences,” “legitimate 
trust,” and several others, which would have sounded alien and certainly 
beyond the law two decades ago, now form part of the Court’s everyday 
work. 
4. The Rise of an Equity Jurisdiction  
As a natural consequence of the Court’s shift toward an interpretative 
approach, judges implemented a new type of legal reasoning in their tutela 
decisions. Rather than applying rigid, abstract, impersonal rules of conduct 
to individual cases, judges applying the new reasoning began a quest for a 
just and fair solution in every case within the constitutional framework. 
The judges did this by carefully valuating and balancing the claims that 
they confronted in any constitutional conflict. In that sense, tutela judges 
may be seen as part of an overall equity jurisdiction that has emerged as a 
result of constitutional interpretation and application in individual cases, 
and which now occupies a central place in Colombian affairs.  
The importance of equity as a principle under the Constitution has been 
expressly recognized and applied by the Court in relation to several 
specific topics. Such topics include the special degree of protection, and 
corresponding special treatment, that should be given to weak and 
defenseless individuals and groups,388 the obligation to use private 
property in a manner that does not harm community interests or 
environmental integrity,389 and the interpretation of municipal public 
officials’ duties favoring the community.390 More recently, the Court 
underlined the special constitutional status of the equity principle and held 
that when delivering ex aequo et bono awards in the context of labor 
conflicts (a possibility which is expressly allowed by the Constitution), 
arbitrators must adopt reasonable decisions.391 This year, the Court held 
that in takings cases, the law cannot establish unified or mandatory 
amounts for compensation, because in certain cases, the protection of the 
 388. Decision T-456 of 1994, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), In re T-38844, T- 
42884, T-43400 Civil del Circuito de Santa fé de Bogotá (Civil Circuit of Santa fé de Bogotá). 
 389. Decision T-523 of 1994, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), María de Jesús 
Medina Pérez y Otros contra Alvaro Vásquez (Pérez v. Vásquez). 
 390. Decision T-518 of 1998, Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. (unanimous), Ana Rosa Serna vda. de 
Cadavid contra Municipio de Angelópolis (Serna v. City of Angelópolis). 
 391. Decision SU-837 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J., Fundación Abood Shaio y Otros 
contra Sentencia de Homologación de la Corte Suprema de Justicia (Foundation Abood Shaio et al. v. 
Sentence of the Supreme Court of Justice). 
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vulnerable may require that the judge decide on a case by case basis what 
constitutes adequate compensation.392
But apart from developing the principle of equity as recognized by the 
Constitution and making it operational in concrete situations, the Court’s 
case law has contributed to the creation of a new type of “jurisdiction” that 
coexists with the ordinary jurisdiction and comprises every single tutela 
decision. One clarification is necessary in this regard: in contrast to the 
U.S. judicial system, where each judge is empowered to apply the law and 
to seek an equitable solution to the cases brought before her, in the 
Colombian civil law system, judges were originally instituted to apply the 
mandates contained in clear legal provisions and no more. However, as a 
result of the interpretation rules derived from the Constitution, judges have 
begun to seek equitable solutions to difficult cases rather than to 
syllogistically apply abstract norms to concrete problems. In that sense, a 
parallelism may exist between a formal system of judicial decision making 
(the traditional jurisdiction) and a new method of approaching legal issues. 
This new method preserves sufficient flexibility, but also objectively tends 
to instill justice into concrete situations (the tutela constitutional 
jurisdiction). In that sense, the Court has made a remarkable contribution 
to a more fair and just resolution of conflicts, where the general mandate 
of equity stands a higher chance to eventually replace the old latin maxim: 
dura lex, sed lex. 
5. The Pressure for Further Change in the Legal System 
The Court’s work has also generated new questions concerning the 
constitutional judge’s role within our democratic society. In particular, it 
has generated a strong debate on the precise status of the Court’s decisions 
within the legal system. The traditional practice in our civil law system has 
been to grant special preeminence to legal mandates adopted by statute or 
decree over judicial decisions.393 However, both the erga omnes effects of 
the Court’s abstract review judgments and the constitutional doctrine’s 
mandatory character have led scholars and observers, in addition to the 
 392. Decision C-1074 of 2002, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. 
dissenting), In re Artículos 61, 62, 67, 70, 128 de la Ley 388 de 1997, Artículos 29 y 30 (parcial) de la 
Ley 9 de 1989 (Law 388 of 1997, Law 9 of 1989). Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa and Montealegre 
Lynett dissented in part, arguing that the court should have gone even further. Id. Even though this is 
an abstract review case, the decision actually binds judges in concrete review cases to balance the 
interests of the community and those of the owner, within the spirit of an equity jurisdiction. 
 393.  See NEIL MACCORMICK & ROBERT SUMMERS, INTERPRETING PRECEDENTS: A 
COMPARATIVE STUDY (1997). 
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Court, to inquire upon the emerging force of precedent within our 
constitutional order. Several of judgments have emphasized the mandatory 
effect of concrete review verdicts for parties who are not directly involved 
in the corresponding proceedings. These judgments state that the 
constitutional doctrine must be followed. Because judicial decisions have 
acquired new importance as a source of law in Colombia, a natural 
question becomes: how has the force of constitutional precedents 
transformed the structure, and the very nature, of our legal system?  
The Constitutional Court has made great advancements on the issue of 
precedents. In constitutional law it has increased its workload to assure 
that lower judges’ tutela decisions will be reversed if they are contrary to 
the Court’s doctrine. It has also incorporated precedent explicitly into its 
reasoning, and as a sufficient base for deciding a case, even in abstract 
judicial review. Further, the Court extended tutela against civil, labor, 
criminal, and administrative judgments whenever the judge has not 
followed a relevant constitutional precedent to decide the case. It also 
accepted that a tutela decision by one of its three-member review 
chambers (Salas de Revisión) can be voided by the full chamber (Sala 
Plena) if it is found to be contrary to the Court’s doctrine. Finally, the 
Court developed rules to change or overrule precedents, even in abstract 
judicial review. In other branches of law, the Court has ordered other 
jurisdictions to take precedents seriously, by reinterpreting a nineteenth 
century statute that diminished the force of judicial opinions as a source of 
law,394 and by reinterpreting another nineteenth century statute which said 
that three judgments in the same direction amounted only to a “probable 
doctrine.”395  
B. The Impact in the Political Domain 
Apart from its immense influence in the legal domain, the Court has 
also generated visible effects in our country’s daily political and social 
activities.396 Informally phrased, it is not that the Court is peeking into 
 394. Decision C-083 of 1995, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. concurring), 
In re Artículo 8° de la ley 153 de 1887 (Law 153 of 1887). 
 395. Decision C-836 of 2001, Rodrigo Escobar Gil, J. (Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J., Alfredo Beltrán 
Sierra, J., Jaime Araujo Rentería, J., and Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, J. dissenting), In re Artículo 4º 
de la ley 169 de 1896 (Law 69 of 1896). Justices Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa and Marco Gerardo 
Monroy Cabra, concurred on the grounds that the Court should have gone even further. Id. 
 396. On the role of the United States Supreme Court, see generally ALEXANDER M. BICKELL, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978); ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE 
CONSTITUTION (1978); ARCHIBALD COX, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT (1976); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT (1960); DAVID M. 
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everything, but rather that it is pulled into everything. A combination of 
political, social, cultural, and institutional factors cause this phenomenon. 
Only those causes of a national scope will be highlighted in this 
discussion. First, the so-called “political crisis” has led to problems that 
are not solved by political decisions brought before the Court by citizens 
interested in finding a solution to matters that affect them. Institutionally, 
Colombia may be said to have the most open and accessible system of 
constitutional judicial review in the world. Any citizen can appear before 
the Court to file a claim through the public unconstitutionality action. Any 
citizen may also request a tutela judgment be reviewed by the Court, in the 
exercise of broadly recognized constitutional rights. A third element is that 
some social groups and activist citizens quickly understood the 
implications of such an open system and made rapid use of the 
constitutional channels to file their petitions before the Court. This is not a 
massive mobilization, because constitutional procedural rules do not 
require a significant number of citizens to come together on an issue. 
Because these rights protect each individual, it is enough for an active 
citizen to file a short lawsuit before the Court. Individuals may also file a 
brief request for tutela review to bind the Court to adopt a decision on the 
matter, even if it does not delve into the merits of every claim. 
This transformation of political and social matters into constitutional 
controversies may be explained culturally: Colombia has traditionally 
been a country of laws. Many of the laws are not applied, but they are 
there. Laws are constantly issued with the illusion that new norms will 
solve pressing problems. Because almost every problem has a 
corresponding law, it is easy to formulate each social or political problem 
as a matter of regulation and to question the rules before the Court. In 
addition, constitutional fundamental rights are applicable in every aspect 
of life, which allows every concrete situation to be formulated as a 
constitutional case. Alexis de Tocqueville’s famous affirmation about the 
United States—that in America, every social or political issue sooner or 
later becomes a legal one—can easily be transplanted to Colombia. 
O’BRIEN, STORM CENTER, THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1986); WILLIAM H. 
REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT (1987); GLENDON A. SCHUBERT, CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS 
(1960); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE PARTIAL CONSTITUTION (1994); and LAURENCE TRIBE, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES (1986). 
 As to the debate in other systems, see Aharon Barak, A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme 
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002); Vijayashri Sripati, Towards Fifty Years of 
Constitutional and Fundamental Rights in India: Looking Back to See Ahead, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 
413 (1998). 
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1. No Longer a Paper Constitution 
The criticisms that the 1991 constitutional scheme was far too idealistic 
and that it would become the “sterile symbol of millions of Colombians’ 
frustrations,” have now been replaced by accusations that the 
constitutional provisions are being taken too seriously. Additional 
criticisms are that social rights are being applied in concrete cases in an 
excessively costly manner, or that constitutional procedures have 
displaced judges’ attention from ordinary matters to an ever-increasing 
number of tutela claims. This only proves that the first distinct output of 
the 1991 constitutional system of judicial review has been the ascription of 
a higher status to the Constitution and its progressive assimilation into all 
areas of social and individual life in Colombia. Public officials and private 
citizens have begun to adjust their behavior to the Constitution. 
Constitutional education has been included as a compulsory subject in all 
educational curricula. Social discourse incorporates constitutional terms, 
values, and principles. In short, the Constitution has been instilled with a 
new life of its own, which has enabled it to abandon the realm of paper 
and to permeate human relations at all levels. The Constitution was 
introduced visible and invisible changes into our immediate reality.  
2. An Instrument to Seek the Redistribution of Political and Social 
Power 
Throughout its case law, the Court emphatically stated constitutional 
limitations that may be placed on numberous political and social powers. 
As discussed above, the Court’s decisions have restricted the diverse types 
of excesses incurred by public officials vis-á-vis private citizens. They 
have also restricted the different types of private powers that may amount 
to undue violations, restrictions, or threats to fundamental rights. The 
Constitution has thus become a guide for social transformation, and for the 
re-distribution of power within our very unbalanced Colombian society; 
the ultimate beneficiaries of this process are, in turn, the people and their 
Constitution.  
3. A Legitimate Arbiter Facing Enduring Criticism  
The Court has become a kind of arbitrator with sufficient and 
legitimate authority to adopt all sorts of final decisions. It is the Court who 
is generally expected to provide an answer from a constitutional 
perspective. Difficult decisions, such as those related to the “8000 
Process” (a campaign finance political scandal), to the extent of 
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extradition, or to the admissibility of demilitarized stretches of national 
territory, have been deferred to the Court by the very same authorities in 
charge of applying them.397 This would not be the case if those responsible 
for solving such problems actually exercised their authority to adopt a 
decision. When that does not happen, the Court is asked to decide the 
matter. Nevertheless, harsh criticism of specific topics is an enduring and 
visible consequence of the system. Issues such as the admissibility of 
tutela against final judgments, or the review of decrees declaring states of 
exception, or the Court’s intervention in economic matters, have all raised 
substantial and repeated opposition by all branches of the governemtn. 
However, the trend is toward a higher degree of legitimacy, promoting 
fundamental rights at each advance.  
4. A Forum to Make Difficult Decisions  
As a consequence of the prevailing patterns of social exclusion and 
recurring human rights violations, the failure of the political system to 
respond to the needs of the citizens, and easy access to courts, the Court 
has now become a forum in which difficult decisions have to be made. 
These decisions usually concern topics that have been neglected, evaded, 
or rejected by other branches of public power. The controversy generated 
by many of the Court’s verdicts is a direct consequence of this new role. It 
was the Court who defined the official position on difficult issues that the 
Constituent Assembly had avoided for their thorny character.398  
5. A Second Round for Everything 
As a consequence of the foregoing traits, the Court has become a 
decision-making body to provide a constitutional solution for virtually 
every type of conflict. Moreover, in a large number of cases, the Court’s 
activity is initiated by those who have been adversely affected by 
decisions in previous fora. That is, those who lose a “round” before any 
public authority or private person, have increasingly brought their cases 
before the Court to seek a constitutional ruling. Those who do not actually 
get to the Court, have usually consulted specialized attorneys or informed 
citizens about the chances of obtaining a favorable tutela decision for their 
case.  
 397. It is not infrequent even for the Government to come before the Court requesting its decision. 
 398. Abortion, euthanasia, drug consumption, and the Concordat are but a few of the issues that 
the tribunal has ruled on. 
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6. A Controversial Institutional Actor 
These dynamics, and the system as a whole, generate constant 
questions. Does the Court have enough institutional capacity to address so 
many different issues? How can it solve them without invading the 
jurisdiction of other branches? Is it legitimate for the Court to intervene in 
matters where there are multiple solutions and divergent opinions? Must it 
bear in mind extra-legal elements while making its decisions, such as the 
parties’ constitutional interpretation of the issue, or the economic or 
political cost of its verdicts?  
Such questions, which have been studied by scholars and the Court for 
decades, have become commonplace in public commentary of the Court’s 
decisions. Public opinion has visibly reacted to sensitive judgments, which 
has prompted proposals to restructure the Court, either by creating a 
specialized economic chamber, or by merging it with the Supreme Court 
of Justice to create a new Constitutional Chamber. These proposals have 
been unsuccessful thus far. In sum, the Court has been placed in a position 
where it must bear the burden of being at the “storm center.”  
Nonetheless, these issues should not be understood or addressed in the 
same way as their “cousins” in the United States context. This point will 
be further developed in Part IV of this paper. 
7.  The Wider Context: Constitutionalism Against Violence  
Another aspect of the Court’s political impact concerns the wider 
context of our internal armed conflict. Against the background of 
participatory democracy, the Court has strived to reinterpret the nature, 
scope of application, and functioning of judicial channels for the 
resolution of conflicts, especially of the writ of protection of fundamental 
rights known as acción de tutela. This instrument has been conceived as a 
means for fighting arbitrary limitations of human dignity, and has become 
a generally available tool of individual and collective empowerment. This 
is especially true for those traditionally under-represented inthe political 
spheres. From this standpoint, the tutela has enabled these groups to 
promote their interests through institutional channels, as opposed to 
violent means. The Court has also drawn constitutional interpretation rules 
that have significant effects. Some of these rules expand the number and 
nature of the rights enforceable through the tutela mechanism, avoid 
formalism in the interpretation of its procedural requirements and broaden 
access to the tutela by the powerless. The importance and impact of the 
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acción de tutela within the Colombian socio-political structure, may be 
partially appreciated by reference to the figures referred in Part II above.  
Experts who have studied Colombia and the Colombian situation, 
especially the terrible degrees of violence that have constantly affected it 
throughout past centuries, have recently begun to highlight the 
fundamental role played by the administration of justice in the prevention 
of violence. Legitimate and effective channels for conflict resolution are 
generally available and can provide a sound alternative to collective or 
individual “self-defense” from pervasive and brutal conflict. Perhaps the 
Court has posed a significant contribution to the consolidation of peace, by 
resolving through institutional channels a number of difficult issues. 
Perhaps the Court has become, as a consequence of its position within the 
system, a fundamental actor in the peaceful resolution of conflicts. 
IV. GUARDING THE GUARDIANS: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM AND THE SPECIFICS 
OF THE COLOMBIAN CONTEXT 
The foregoing overview of the Court’s broad powers, and of its role 
within the Colombian State, could lead an external observer, especially 
one who is aware of the North American debate on judicial power,399 to 
pose a number of objections to the system of judicial review introduced by 
the 1991 Constituent Assembly. There are three principal objections to the 
current system of judicial review.  
Some argue that the Court is an anti-majoritarian body with excessive 
powers. This is so because it is composed of a small number of individuals 
with a very high degree of decision-making power. Furthermore, these 
individuals have no link to the people because they have not been 
popularly elected. Therefore, they are neither representative nor 
responsible. Others argue that the Court has invaded the policy-making 
field exclusively reserved to Congress and the Executive, and has in 
 399. The debate in the United States on the compatibility of a strong and active judicial power 
with the democratic principle and separation of powers has been marked with different highlights and 
points of emphasis. The Colombian Constitutional Court was created not only with an awareness of 
such debate, but as a consequence of certain criticisms directed against the Colombian supreme Court 
of Justice, which were inspired by what has been called the “government of the judges.” For a 
synthesis of this debate and its implications in the Colombian context, see MANUEL JOSÉ CEPEDA, 
DERECHO POLÍTICA Y CONTROL CONSTITUCIONAL (1987). During the 1990s, after the creation of the 
Colombian Constitutional Court, the debate did not surface again in Colombia, although in the Untied 
States, it is still alive. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, 
FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); DUNCAN 
KENNEDY: A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION (FIN DE SIÈCLE) (1998); MARK KOZLOWSKI, THE MYTH OF 
THE IMPERIAL JUDICIARY (2003); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993). 
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several cases acted as a true legislator. From that perspective, the Court 
has restricted the scope of democratic politics by diminishing the influence 
of Congress in essentially political matters. As a result, these political 
matters are now resolved at the constitutional level by the Court. Finally, 
others argue that the Court has ventured into a broad array of subjects that, 
due to their very complex technical nature, require a solid expertise that 
the Justices lack. It is not possible for the members of the Constitutional 
Court to be experts on every single subject of ordinary life that they deal 
with in their decisions. As a result, the decisions are technically deficient. 
These criticisms are inspired by the United States debate over judicial 
review. As phrased by Hart,400 the “noble dream” of a Constitution 
effectively defended before any public power that exceeds its limits or 
disregards basic liberties, may turn into the unexpected “nightmare” of 
judges who are insensitive to democratic procedures and decide to 
formulate policies on every conceivable topic. 
But the debate that has developed in the United States cannot be 
automatically transferred to a wholly different social and political context. 
In addition, because this debate was well known when the Court was 
created, both the Constitution and the regulations that govern the Court 
introduced certain innovations aimed at overcoming such objections. 
Therefore, to assess carefully the relevance of these criticisms to 
Colombia, one must examine the types of checks to which the Court is 
subject and the political and institutional specificities of the current 
Colombian context. 
A. Checks over the Court’s Powers 
The Court’s work is subject to two primary kinds of checks. External 
checks and balances, devised by the Constituent Assembly, prevent the 
Court from exceeding its jurisdiction. Internal checks, are self-restraint 
mechanisms, introduced by the Court within the Constitution’s spirit of 
limiting public power. 
1. External Checks and Balances 
The Constituent Assembly prevented the Court from having the last 
word on the matters presented to it, even though it is the highest 
interpreter of the Constitution. Because of the democratic nature of the 
 400. HLA Hart, American Jurisprudence Through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble 
Dream, 11 GA. L. REV. 969 (1977). 
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Colombian State, the last word has always been given to the sovereign 
people. If the people do not use it, political forces have it, and they can 
make themselves heard through various means. Congress can carry out 
four types of control over the Court. First, Congress may impeach 
individual justices. Second, Congress has the power to approve statutory 
or organic laws. In this way, it can set criteria that the Court must follow 
on key issues. Third, Congress may make new laws on issues that the 
Court has already decided upon. But, it can decide them differently while 
still respecting the Constitution. Fourth, Congress may exercise its 
constituent control by amending the Constitution. In this way, it can 
overrule a specific decision of the Court. On the other hand, the sovereign 
people can control the Court’s activities directly through public 
participation mechanisms such as referenda to amend the Constitution, and 
public opinion debates. 
The enumeration of these external checks and balances401 proves that 
the Colombian situation is substantially different from the one in the 
United States, where the aforementioned objections have been widely 
discussed. Indeed, the Colombian Constitution is relatively easy to reform, 
unlike the case in the United States. Congress may rapidly respond to any 
judgment of the Court that it does not agree with by modifying the 
relevant constitutional provisions in a short period of time. A 
constitutional amendment in the United States takes significantly longer. 
Moreover, in the United States legal system, there are no statutory or 
organic laws that bind the judge once they have passed constitutional 
review. Also the United States system does allow the presentation of 
popular legislative initiatives or national referenda. The Colombian 
Constitution not only introduced these latter mechanisms, but broadened 
their scope to include laws and constitutional reforms. In that sense, the 
Colombian people can express their will in a specific, formal, and legally 
binding manner, against a given decision of the Court. These mechanisms 
do not function solely in theory, but rather are applied in practice.  
 401. There are other types of checks on Justices, which bear a different effect than the ones 
enumerated. Two examples illustrate the point: (i) the annual output control of Justices’ work carried 
out by the Superior Council of the Judiciary (Consejo Superior de la Judicatura), which is an entity 
that belongs to the Judicial Branch and is independent from the Executive and the Legislative powers; 
and (ii) the disciplinary control for official misbehavior due to non-compliance with mandatory delays 
or similar objective causes. 
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a. Checks by Congress 
The Court is subject to the classic control carried out by Congress in 
the form of impeachment of high public officials. This possibility, which 
is clearly foreseen in the Constitution,402 has remained a hypothetical one. 
Since 1991, no Constitutional Court Justices have been impeached. 
Second, Congress may limit the Court’s margin of constitutional 
interpretation, and control its potential excesses, through the enactment of 
statutory or organic laws.403 These two types of legislation were created by 
the Constitution with a special status because they regulate matters that the 
Constituent Assembly considered of the utmost importance. They are 
therefore subject to special procedural requirements. Statutory laws, on 
one hand, regulate topics such as fundamental rights, democratic 
participation mechanisms, states of exception, and the Administration of 
Justice. They are considered to be direct developments of the Constitution 
in those spheres, and limit the Court’s margin of discretion (even though 
the Court also reviews the constitutionality of these laws ex officio, before 
their promulgation and entry into force).404 Organic laws regulate matters 
such as the legislative procedure that must be followed by Congress, or the 
special requirements that must be met by the laws that approve the 
national budget or the national development plan. Therefore, through 
organic legislation, Congress can establish the catalogue of procedural 
requirements that these bills must meet. This establishes clear rules that 
must be followed by the Court whenever it is examining a given law’s 
formal validity.405  
 402. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 174, 178. 
 403. Id. arts. 151–152. 
 404. Congress has only adopted one statutory law concerning constitutional rights—Law 133 of 
1994, on freedom of religion. It has also adopted the following statutory laws, some of which have 
been declared in whole or in part unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. Law 130 of 1994 
(Statute of Political Parties and Movements); Law 131 of 1994 (on “Programmatic Voting”—a 1991 
Constitutional innovation by which citizens can elect some public officials on the grounds of their 
programmes, and recall their mandates through new elections if they fail to meet their promises, 
amended by Law 741 of 2002); Law 134 of 1994 (Citizen Participation Mechanisms, such as referenda 
and popular initiatives, also amended by Law 741 of 2002); Law 137 of 1994 (States of Exception 
Statute); Law 270 of 1996 (Statute of the Administration of Justice). One statutory law on habeas data 
was struck down on procedural grounds. The statutory law on habeas corpus is pending review by the 
Court.  
 405. Congress has adopted all the organic laws authorized by the Constitution, except for one. 
Congress promulgated the Rules of Legislative Procedure (Law 5 of 1992), the Organic Law of the 
Budget (Law 38 of 1989), the Organic Law of the National Development Plan (Law 152 of 1994), and 
the Organic Law Concerning the Distribution of Functions and Resources to Territorial Entities (Law 
715 of 2001). However, Congress has not yet adopted the organic law that regulates the structure and 
relations among territorial entities (Ley Orgánica de Ordenamiento Territorial). 
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Third, Congress can issue new legislation on matters that the Court has 
already decided upon and decide those matters differently. Most of the 
Court’s decisions permit the Congress to adopt new laws on the same 
subject that was formerely governed by an unconstitutional law so long as 
the content of that law is not reproduced, and the new law respects the 
Constitution. This occurs quite frequently, and it is not necessary to 
highlight specific examples.406
Finally, Congress can limit the scope of the Court’s margin of 
interpretation, by directly amending the Constitution.407 In contrast to the 
United States Constitution, which is very difficult to modify, or European 
ones, which are substantially more rigid than ours, the Colombian 
Constitution may be amended quite easily by Congress. The Colombian 
amendment procedure requires twice the number of debates than ordinary 
legislation, as well as a qualified majority approval during the second 
round, and is usually completed in less than one year.408 This is not merely 
a theoretical tool. Several decisions adopted by the Court have given rise 
to constitutional reform processes in Congress. Some of these processes 
have indeed resulted in specific amendments to the Constitution.409 
Although the Court has the power to review constitutional amendments 
approved through Legislative Acts, it can only review the procedural 
requirements of the amendment. It is therefore not empowered to review 
the substance of the amendment. This is also true of the laws that summon 
constitutional referenda and elections for a Constituent Assembly. The 
Court is thus prevented from having the last word on these matters. The 
Court has recently stated that the amendment power does not allow for the 
 406. Nevertheless, Congress cannot use its ordinary legislative powers to detract from the 
jurisdiction of the Court or to prevent the Court from reviewing the compatibility of specific 
legislation with fundamental rights. This practice is permitted in Canada. See KENT ROACH, THE 
SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001). 
 407. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 375.  
 408. This is one among three possible constitutional amendment procedures. The other two are 
much more rigid: (i) calling for a constitutional referenda, designed for submitting approval of a given 
constitutional amendment project to the people, presented to citizens through a law approved by 
Congress at the initiative of the Government or citizens; and (ii) summoning of a Constituent 
Assembly, which requires Congress to approve a law to present such a project to the people and to 
allow citizens to decide through direct vote whether such Assembly should be summonned, and 
whether they accept the Assembly’s competence, period, and composition. COLOMBIAN CONST. arts. 
378, 376. Both the law that summons a referendum and the one that summons the election of a 
Constituent Assembly are subject to preliminary review by the Constitutional Court. Id. arts. 241–242. 
 409. Specific instances include when the funds were transferred from the national treasure to the 
municipalities (Legislative Act 1 of 1995), the modifications to the composition of martial courts 
(Legislative Act 2 of 1995), and expropriation without compensation for reasons of equity (Legislative 
Act 1 of 1999). 
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substitution, derogation or destruction of the Constitution.410 Thus, the 
Court does not control the compatibility of the substance of an amendment 
with any specific constitutional clause that the Court had previously 
interpreted contrary to the amendment. 
There are instances when attempts to respond to a decision of the Court 
through popular referenda or Congressional amendment have failed. These 
failures prove that after political and social forces have debated the content 
of the judgment, they have accepted that the Court’s interpretation is an 
acceptable one. More importantly, they prove that those who could have 
rejected a given judgment decided not to do so. From that perspective, the 
judgment of the Court may not be dismissed as being contrary to majority 
beliefs or as anti-democratic. Rather, the Court’s judgments are approved 
as being compatible with the most stable and broad objects of social 
consensus. 
b. Control by the People 
Citizens were also empowered by the Constituent Assembly to place 
direct limits upon the autonomy of the Court. The most effective tool for 
this purpose is the constitutional reform process. First, a popular initative 
supported by five percent of the electurate is presented to one of the two 
houses. Then, Congress summons a referendum.411 These controls have 
not been successful. Two notable examples are the referendum that 
attempted to reverse the decision that declared the unconstitutionality of 
the Concordat Treaty between Colombia and the Vatican, and the 
referendum that sought to reverse the unconstitutionality of a provision in 
the Criminal Code that criminalized the consumption of personal doses of 
drugs (See Table 6).412
A second means of control frequently exercised by the people is public 
opinion. The Colombian Court has tolerated degrees of criticism that 
exceed the limits that other legal systems (such as the North American or 
several European systems) permit as minimum requirements of respect for 
 410. Decision C-551 of 2003, Eduardo Montealegre Lynett, J., In re Ley 796 de 2003 (Law 796 of 
2003). Justices Alfredo Beltrán Sierra and Clara Inés Vargas Hernández, dissented on the grounds that 
they favored striking down the entire referendum law. Id. 
 411. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 378. 
 412. As stated by article 378 of the Constitution, referenda may also be carried out at the initiative 
of the Goverment, which does not need to be backed by citizen support in order to present such a 
proposal to Congress. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 378. President Alvaro Uribe Vélez recently submitted a 
bill summoning a referendum to amend several aspects of the Constitution. Some of the matters 
included in that bill were recently struck down by the Court. See Table 6, supra. 
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the “administration of justice.” In several cases, the accusations launched 
against the Court by its critics would amount to contempt for the judges.  
For these reasons, that when the Court rules, it does not imply that the 
opposite decision may not be taken in the political field. The only 
requirement is that the opposite political decision be adopted through a 
much more open and rigorous procedure. A constitutional amendment that 
is more demanding in its approval requirements, ultimately protects 
minority rights, while also creating more opportunities for democratic 
debate and ensuring that the final decisions are solid and stable reflections 
of the popular will.  
It should be emphasized that these different types of checks have a 
crucial justification. They reinforce the legitimacy of a powerful, 
independent, and activist Constitutional Court. Indeed, whenever the 
Court’s difficult, activist, or controversial decisions are upheld over time, 
it is either because political actors have ultimately accepted their 
legitimacy, or because their critics were not able to gather sufficient 
support to counter the decision through constitutional amendments. Often 
times, whenever attempts to amend the Constitution fail, controversial 
judgments are eventually legitimized, and surrounded by a certain degree 
of consensus. In these cases, democratic debate proves that the Court’s 
decision was a reasonable and solid option within the Constitutional 
possibilities.  
Perhaps that is why the public scholars alike have been mostly 
respectful of the Court. The Court enjoys a remarkable degree of 
legitimacy, in spite of its position at the center of divisive public 
controversies and enduring opposition in some areas. Nevertheless, in 
spite of times of low acceptance (as low as 40% positive image), it now 
maintains a 58% positive acceptance rate. The acceptance of tutela is 78%, 
the highest of any legal instrument.413
2. Self-Restraint Mechanisms 
The Court has played an activist role throughout its ten years of 
existence. At the same time, though, it has designed important self-
restraint mechanisms, and applied them in a consistent manner within its 
decision-making process. There are two principal self-restraint 
mechanisms. First, the Court places limitations upon its institutional 
 413. Opinion poll published by the newspaper El Tiempo on the tenth anniversary of the 
Constitution. A recent survey shows that the Court has a fifty-five percent positive image. El Tiempo, 
July 23, 2003, at 1–2.  
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status, which restrict either the scope of its decisions or the reach of its 
own powers. Second, the Court also exercises judicial caution and 
prudence with regard to its review powers, the manner in which it applies 
such review powers, its decisions and the scope of their effects. I will 
briefly describe each one of these mechanisms. 
a. The First Limitation of Power 
In the first place, the Court has placed limitations upon the powers that 
arise from its own institutional status, particularly in regards to the other 
organs of the judiciary. There are two types of self-restraint mechanisms in 
this category.  
First, the Court established limitations on the mandatory effect of its 
opinions for other judges. The Constitutional Court has distinguished 
between the decision and the arguments that support it. The former is 
binding, while the latter is not. The Court has also affirmed that its 
interpretations of the Constitution are not binding for other judges, except 
when the Court explicitly provides so by ascribing inter pares, inter 
communis, or erga omnes effects to its judgments.414 This situation 
resulted from two decisions of the Court. The first one struck down a 
law,415 which stated that the doctrine of the Court was “a mandatory 
auxiliary criterion” for all judges and officials. This 1993 decision416 held 
that arguments of the Court lacked legal force beyond the justification of 
the relevant case. The second decision,417 concerned the legal rule418 by 
which, in the absence of a directly applicable law, judges must apply 
constitutional doctrine to solve the cases before them. In this decision, the 
Court held that constitutional doctrine may be applied as an auxiliary or 
subsidiary source of law, but never as a mandatory criterion for 
adjudication. This is expressly stated in Article 230 of the Constitution, 
according to which judges are only subject to the “empire of the law.” In 
that sense, the Court has prompted judges at all levels to explore their own 
interpretation of the Constitution, allowing them to reach different results 
if there are powerful reasons for this departure. The Court has not 
established in detail which reasons are actually powerful enough to justify 
 414. See supra Part II.A.2.a.i. 
 415. Decree 2067 of 1991, art. 23 
 416. Decision C-131 of 1993, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 2º , 23 
del Decreto 2067 de 1991 (Decree 2067 of 1991). 
 417. Decision C-083 of 1995, Carlos Gaviria Díaz, J. (Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, J. concurring), 
In re Artículo 8° de la ley 153 de 1887 (Law 153 of 1887). 
 418. Ley 153 de 1887 (Law 153 of 1887), art. 8. 
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such a course of action. The task of identifying such reasons and applying 
them to individual decisions is left to the individual judge. However, 
because the Court has the final word in this respect, it may accept or reject 
the departure of lower judges from its interpretative decisions. This state 
of affairs has prompted a debate surrounding the existence and the force of 
judicial precedents.419
Second, the Court itself struck down the provision by which an acción 
de tutela could be filed against judicial decisions420 and has only upheld 
these claims when those decisions are in gross opposition to the law. In 
these cases, the decisions are said to be based on factual arbitrariness and 
are not legal pronouncements. This is the doctrine of “vías de hecho”, 
which can only be applied in such extreme cases. This has severely limited 
the Court’s power to review other judges’ work in ordinary criminal, 
labor, civil, or administrative matters.  
b. Second Limitation of Power 
A second type of self-restraint mechanisms has been applied by the 
Court as a manifestation of judicial prudence and caution. There are three 
broad categories their fall under this self-restraint mechanism, including 
the object of the Court’s control, the manner in which the Court carries out 
its functions, and the Court´s decisions and their effects. 
The first category is self-restraint mechanisms that are grounded on 
judicial caution relating to the object of the Court’s control. This includes 
the legal provisions, and the acts or actions subject to the Court’s scrutiny. 
There are six self-restraint mechanisms relating to the object of the Court’s 
control. 
First, the Court may proceed on a case by case basis. Instead of 
adopting general solutions, the Court proceeds one case at a time. The 
figure of “reiteration of constitutional doctrine,” applied by the Court to 
decide cases which are essentially similar to those that were dealt with in 
previous judgments, is justified on these grounds. Whenever the Court 
determing that an individual case may be decided by applying the same 
constitutional doctrine that led to previous decisions, it follows the earlier 
decisions. However, this is done only after carefully examining the facts of 
the case and concluding that they have sufficient similarity with those of 
the previous decision. The high frequency of reiteration of doctrine 
 419. See supra Part III.A.1. 
 420. Decision C-543 of 1992, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J., In re Artículos 11, 12 y 25 del 
Decreto 2591 de 1991 (Decree 2591 of 1991). 
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decisions, especially in the past few years, explains the large number of 
tutela decisions I have quoted above. This trend has continued in spite of 
the Court’s discretionary power to select the decisions it will review. 
Second, when the Court performs an abstract review of the 
constitutionality of certain legal provisions, it generally restricts the scope 
of its analysis to the specific laws or articles which are claimed to be 
unconstitutional. It does not examine other parts of the same provision, or 
other articles within the same statute. Nevertheless, the Court may review 
provisions or statutes which are not the object of an unconstitutionality 
action through the procedure of normative integration (“integración 
normativa”).421 However, this instrument has only been given limited 
application, and the Court has established a number of requirements for its 
use. Moreover, these requirements have become more stringent over 
time.422 Today, the application of this procedure is quite restrictive, and 
abstract constitutional judicial review may have become less expansive, 
due to an element of prudence which has infused the Court’s decisions. 
Third, the concept of “relative res iudicata effect” for the Court’s 
decisions implies that laws subject to the Court’s review are only reviewed 
in light of specific unconstitutionality charges. If the Court decides to do 
so, it may allow future claims against the same legal provisions, but only 
on different grounds. This does not mean that the Court always leaves 
open the possibility of further controversy. On the contrary, whenever the 
Court does not specifically express that a decision will have relative res 
iudicata effects, a full or “absolute res iudicata effect” for such decision is 
 421. “Normative integration” is practiced by the Court whenever a citizen has filed an actio 
popularis of unconstitutionality against a given legal provision, the content of which cannot be fully 
and adequately examined without taking into account other legal provisioins, which have not been the 
object of the same lawsuit. This practice occurs when the content of the law, which has been brought 
to the Court’s attention, is so closely related to another legal provision that it would not be possible for 
the Court to issue an effective judgment without reviewing the legal provision not at issue and 
integrating such other legal provision into its decision. Decision C-320 of 1997, Alejandro Martínez 
Caballero, J., In re Artículos 34, 61 de la Ley 181 de 1995 (Law 181 of 1995); Decision C-1106 of 
2000, Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J., In re Artículos 546, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 556, 557, 558, 559, 562, 
565, 566 y 567 del Código de Procedimiento Penal (Code of Criminal Procedure). 
 422. For an example of the initial, more permissive, line regarding normative integration, see 
Decision C-113 of 1993, Jorge Arango Mejia, J., In re Artículo 21 del Decreto 2067 de 1991 (Article 
21 of Decree 2067 of 1991). The provision at issue that had been the object of an actio popularis 
(Decree 2067 of 1991, Article 21, paragraph 2) referred to the pro futuro effects of the Constitutional 
Court’s decisions, and the Court finally issued a judgment in which it not only declared the 
unconstitutionality of said provision, but also that of other articles within the same regulation (Article 
21, paragraph 4, and Article 24). Id. Decision C-320 of 1997, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J., In re 
Artículos 34, 61 de la Ley 181 de 1995 (Law 181 of 1995); Decision C-1106 of 2000, Alfredo Beltrán 
Sierra, J., In re Artículos 546, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 556, 557, 558, 559, 562, 565, 566 y 567 del 
Código de Procedimiento Penal (Code of Criminal Procedure). 
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presumed. This forecloses future unconstitutionality actio popularis 
against the legal provisions examined by the Court. Furthermore, the 
application of the “relative res iudicata effect” implies that the Court is 
not willing to consider, further unconstitutionality accusations against a 
given law.  
Fourth, “inhibitory decisions” result from defective unconstitutionality 
suits. Using this tool, the Court refuses to amend an ill-formulated 
unconstitutionality charge, and materially refrains from exercising control 
over the legal provision in question. In these cases, no decision is adopted 
on the merits. 
Fifth, the Court frequently refuses to consider unconstitutionality 
lawsuits that do not comply with the legal requirements until the citizen 
who filed the actio popularis corrects whichever deficiency is identified in 
the claim by the Court.423 According to the statistics provided by the 
Secretary of the Court, forty-two percent of all unconstitutionality actio 
popularis presented before the Court have been rejected. 
Sixth, in cases in which unconstitutionality actio popularis are filed 
against a law on the grounds that it breaches the principle of equality, the 
Court may require a higher degree of argumentation by the plaintiff. In 
these cases, the applicant must demonstrate which groups are being 
compared, the reason why they are comparable, and why they must 
receive equal treatment.  
The second category of self-restraint mechanism based on judicial 
caution, refers to the manner in which judicial control is carried out by the 
Court. While the Court’s activism has been reflected in the introduction of 
the requirements of “proportionality” or “reasonability” into its case law, it 
has also imposed clear limits to the scope of applicability of these 
conceptual instruments. 
First, there are different degrees of intensity of proportionality or 
reasonability tests, according to the subject-matter of the case. As 
explained in decision C-673 of 2001, the establishment of such varying 
degrees of intensity comes as a result of the Court’s goal to strike a 
balance between the powers of the constitutional judge, the ordinary 
 423. Decision C-1052 of 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J., In re Artículo 51 de la Ley 617 
de 2000 (Law 617 of 2000). The Court explained that the requirements for unconstitutionality lawsuits 
have been established in order to provide a minimally sufficient basis to the Court to consider the case. 
Id. The implication is that the plaintiffs in unconstitutionality processes, as parties within an active 
dialogue with the authorities, must comply with a minimum duty of communication, argumentation, 
and clarity with regards to: (i) the legal provision being accused; (ii) the constitutional mandates that 
such provision is accused of violating; (iii) the specific reasons why the law does not comply with the 
Constitution; and (iv) the reasons why the Court has jurisdiction to study the case. Id. 
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functions of the other branches of government, and the protection of 
fundamental constitutional rights. In equality cases, for instance, the Court 
has established three types of reasonability tests—strict, intermediate and 
soft—that differ in their structure, constitutive elements, and consequences 
in regard to evidence and argumentation.424
Second, the Court respects a “margin of configuration” left to the 
legislative or executive branches of power, in order for them to freely 
design public policies within their constitutional functions. 
Third, in matters that concern a given state of affairs and require value 
judgments by the authorities, such as the decision to declare a state of 
exception, the Court has introduced the doctrine of “manifest error of 
appreciation” to allow the executive power a wide margin of review to 
assess the necessity of a given decision on the basis of the facts before the 
executive branch. Only if the executive power has committed a manifest, 
or extreme, error of appreciation, will the Court strike down the 
Presidential decree declaring or extending a state of exception.425
Judicial caution has also led the Court to introduce self-restraint 
mechanisms over its own decisions, especially in cases involving abstract 
constitutionality review. This is evident in cases where the Court applied 
the principle of conservation of the law, which justifies the production of 
“modulative” decisions. Applying the conservation of the law principle, 
the Court only strikes down legal provisions when such a decision is 
unavoidable because the law at hand cannot be reconciled with the 
Constitution by pointing out the legal provision’s constitutional 
interpretation or meaning. Although, in practice, “modulative judgments” 
may give rise to the opposite effect (i.e. what some have seen as invasions 
by the Court into the legislative sphere), the principle which inspires and 
justifies these judgments is essentially based on judicial caution, and 
respect for the decisions of Congress or the executive power. These 
decisions will be struck down only if there is no alternative interpretation 
of the law to safeguard the supremacy of the Constitution. 
The practice of deferring unconstitutionality judgments is the final self-
restraint mechanism introduced by the Court as a consequence of judicial 
caution. As described in Part II.A.2.a, this mechanism addresses the 
effects of decisions and is a manifestation of the above-referred principle 
of conservation of the law, implying that the Court has allowed the 
application of an unconstitutional provision, while the competent entities 
 424. Decision C-673 of 2001, Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa, J. (Jaime Araújo Rentería, J. 
concurring), In re Artículos 4º y 33 del Decreto Ley 2277 de 1979 (Decree 2277 of 1979). 
 425. See supra Part II.B.2. 
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issue new, constitutional regulations on the same matter. The time periods 
granted by the Court are usually reasonable, and cannot be extended. For 
example, in a 1997 judgment, the Court struck down a provision that 
imposed a tax upon certain non-renewable natural resources. The 
application of the decision was deferred for five years so that Congress 
could regulate the matter at hand and, therefore avoid the automatic 
application of the general royalties regime.426 In the decision that declared 
the UPAC system unconstitutional,427 the Court deferred the effects of its 
judgment until the end of the legislative period (approximately nine 
months later) so that Congress could issue the corresponding regulations. 
B. The Political and Institutional Specificities of the Colombian Context  
In addition to the foregoing description of the different types of control 
over the Court, three specificities of the country’s political context and 
three characteristics of its institutional arrangements should be kept in 
mind while addressing the above-mentioned objections to constitutional 
judicial review. In light of these specificities, the objections lose weight 
within the Colombian context.  
1. Political Specificities: Presidentialism, Low Credibility of Congress 
and Political Parties, and Violence 
A number of political traits of the Colombian system are relevant when 
addressing the above objections: (1) the country’s notorious 
presidentialism; (2) the lack of credibility among the people of the main 
political parties, the political class, and Congress; and (3) the everyday 
reality of violence as a means to solve conflicts. 
On the one hand, the strong emphasis traditionally ascribed in 
Colombia to the figure of the President of the Republic has granted the 
executive branch an enormous influence over Congress, which in turn 
diminishes and in many cases distorts the functioning of the system of 
checks and balances between the political branches of power.428 First, it 
 426. Decision C-221 of 1997, Alejandro Martínez Caballero, J. (unanimous), In re Artículo 233 
del Decreto 1333 de 1986, Artículo 1º de la Ley 97 de 1913 (Decree 1333 of 1986, Law 97 of 1913). 
 427. Decision C-700 of 1999, José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. (Alfredo Beltrán Sierra, J. and 
José Gregorio Hernández Galindo, J. concurring; Alvaro Tafur Galvis, J., Eduardo Cifuentes Muñoz, 
J., and Vladimiro Naranjo Mesa, J. dissenting), In re Artículos 18, 21, 23, 134, 137, 138, del Decreto 
Extraordinario 663 de 1993, Decreto Extraordinario 1730 de 1991 (Extraordinary Decree 663 of 1993, 
Extraordinary Decree 1730 of 1991). 
 428. The Constitution foresees, in addition to the classical figure of impeachment, several specific 
forms of political control over Executive Officials. For example, under the “censorship motion” 
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must be noted that the Colombian Congress, although formally strong, in 
reality has a rather precarious institutional capacity to exercise its 
powers—for both technical reasons (e.g., poorly qualified and insufficient 
staff, and inconsistent access to autonomous information.) and political 
reasons (e.g., poor party discipline, clientelistic local electoral bases.). 
Second, in general terms, after presidential elections, members of 
Congress align themselves as either supporters or opponents of the 
President, who usually manages to build a comfortable majority in 
Congress with which to support his or her policies. Therefore, in many 
cases, Congress adopts its decisions with an agenda of backing the 
President. Because the main controlling body within the Colombian 
democracy, in theory, is Congress, and this legislative body often fails to 
fulfill its function because of political compromise, the “losers” of the 
process take their issues to the Court. Citizens and social organizations 
usually look to the Court to request that limits be placed on the 
government’s policies and that the Court enforce these limites, as 
instrumentalized through Congressional statutes), and that the Court 
enforce these limits. These parties do noy rely on political arugments, but 
on constitutional grounds and arguments. 
On the other hand, in spite of important reforms imposed upon the 
political system in 1991, public perception still includes feelings of 
misunderstanding and disappointment regarding political practices, which 
are seen as pure clientelism and patronage for the benefit of “politicians” 
not the people. This has resulted in situation in which laws are seldom 
seen by citizens to represent the consent of society or a solid political 
majority. Thus the Court’s decisions to strike them down are usually met 
with either indifference or popular approval. 
Bearing in mind the above-described flaws in the political system, to 
which the traditional ineffectiveness of the public administration is added 
(an ineffectiveness which is both real and perceived by ordinary citizens), 
it is not surprising that people look to the Court in search of a State answer 
to their problems. The Court then is not meddling in every issue 
imaginable; ordinary citizens or political players are bringing their 
everyday problems to the Court, and the Court is then forced to adjudicate 
on a notoriously diverse range of subjects. 
(moción de censura), Congress may decide whether a Minister of teh Presidential Cabinet should be 
removed from his or her post. No specific forms of direct congressional control over the President 
have been provided in the Constitution, other than the possibility of carrying out impeachment 
procedures. 
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Finally, as opposed to most other countries, violence in Colombia is a 
real, everyday, and, of course, illegal mechanism for the resolution of 
conflicts. Violence in Colombia is a widespread, generalized, and tangible 
phenomenon, operating on a national scale for many decades. Because 
politics are affected by the aforementioned problems, the legislative and 
executive branches are unfit to function efficiently as a channel for the 
peaceful expression and resolution of social conflicts. Therefore, the 
highest degree of institutional legitimacy and credibility is imposed on the 
judiciary, which is then entrusted with the challenge of addressing issues 
that are not met by eiher the political process or aggravated “violent 
solutions.” Because the intervention of a judge has helped solve conflicts 
that could have been addressed by arbitrary means, such as personal 
intimidation or murder,429 the acción de tutela has been praised in the 
Colombian context as an instrument of peace.  
2. Institutional Specificities: Constitutional Amendment, Election of 
Justices, Fixed Term for Justices, and Access to Judicial 
Procedures 
In addition to these political specificities within the Colombian context, 
a number of institutional traits should also be considered while assessing 
the pertinence of the above-stated objections to our constitutional system 
of judicial review. The four critical institutional traits include: (i) a flexible 
amendment mechanism within the Colombian Constitution that can easily 
be put into practice by Congress; (ii) a system of indirect popular election 
of the Court’s Justices; (iii) the Justices’ non-renewable eight-year term; 
and (iv) the participatory nature of the Court’s decision-making process, 
including citizen access to judicial review and the Court’s discretion to 
involve experts or interested parties. 
First, the Colombian Congress may amend the constitutional text 
through a relatively flexible mechanism described above called the 
“Legislative Act.” It is up to Congress to promote any legislative act, 
without the support of the Executive Branch, the Judiciary, or the people. 
In order to overrule the Court, Congress has successfully amended specific 
parts of the Constitution on a number of occasions, as detailed in Table 6. 
The Court can review the constitutional amendment only on procedural 
grounds. The fact that the Court has never declared an amendment 
unconstitutional proves that the requirements imposed by the Constitution 
 429. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
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for Congress’ own reform are easily attainable. Furthermore, the process 
of amending the Constitution through the legislative body is a relatively 
short one and can be successfully accomplished in less than one year. In 
that sense, it must be reiterated that the Court does not have the final word 
on every issue posed before it. Instead, Congress may amend the 
constitutional text in order to overrule the Court’s decisions.430 And if 
neither Congress nor the people carry out such amendments in response to 
the high tribunal’s judgments, one can conclude that the political forces 
inside Congress have accepted such judicial decisions, which are thus 
granted a significant degree of legitimacy within the system as a whole.  
Second, Justices are indirectly chosen by the people, through the 
Senate of the Republic, as described above. The Senate, composed of 102 
members,431 is elected directly by the people every four years through a 
national constituency. The role of the Colombian Senate is different from 
the United States Senate because (i) the Colombian Seante is not restricted 
to granting its advice and consent to the candidate nominated by the 
President of the Republic; and (ii) it is the Colombian Senate itself that 
elects Justices, reflecting grosso modo the distribution of the political 
forces within Congress. Thus, the 1992 Court was composed of five liberal 
Justices, two independents,432 and two conservatives, while the 2000 Court 
was composed of six liberal Justices and three conservative Justices. It is 
noteworthy that the candidate most favored by each that proposes its own 
list of three potential candidates (the President of the Republic, the 
Supreme Court of Justice, and the Council of State), is usually not the 
candidate finally chosen by the Senate. Moreover, there are no public 
audiences, as in the United States, but closed-door sessions among the 
different political coalitions. All candidates make only one presentation to 
the plenary session of the Senate, where they address members of 
Congress who may formulate questions, but usually abstain from doing 
 430. In theory, the last word belongs to the people, through two mechanisms: (i) derogatory 
constitutional referenda in Article 377 of the Constitution by which the people may prevent 
constitutional amendments approved through legislative acts in regards to certain topics, including 
fundamental rights, popular participation mechanisms, and Congress; and (ii) the popular constituent 
initiative, providing that citizens representing five percent of the electorate may present constitutional 
amendment projects to Congress for Congress to summon a referendum to approve them. 
 431. At the moment of writing this paper, a referendum proposal has been approved by Congress 
in order to reduce the size of the Senate. In turn, the Government has submitted to Congress a draft 
Legislative Act by which the Justices of the Constitutional Court would not be elected by the Senate, 
but by members of the same Court, through the aforementioned “co-option” (cooptación) system. 
 432. One Justice belongs to the former guerrilla group “M-19,” and another one belonged to a 
faction of the liberal party until leaving the Court, when the former Justice became part of the 
independent party coalition named “Polo Democrático.” 
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so.433 For this reason, the Senate’s popular legitimacy is transferred 
indirectly to the Justices of the Constitutional Court. This is reflected, inter 
alia, in the formula that precedes all the Court’s judgments: “in the name 
of the People and by mandate of the Constitution.” 
Third, each Justice is elected for a non-renewable term of eight years. 
Everytime a term expires political forces bear a direct influence upon the 
composition of the Court. In practice, however, a few Justices’ terms are 
renewed on an individual basis during that period due to voluntary 
retirement and the rest are renewed simultaneously at the end of the term. 
This renewal process restricts the possibility of totally “packing” the 
Court, but in turn paves the way for debate on the Court’s most 
controversial case-law tendencies. Because they can not be forcibly 
withdrawn from their post, nor reelected, Justices fulfill their role with 
independence from the other branches of power. 
Finally, the Colombian constitutional judicial review process is 
participatory in nature for both abstract and concrete review, because (i) 
any citizen can file a constitutional actio popularis against laws of the 
Republic not subject to preliminary review or any legislative act or decree 
that has not been the object of a previous judgment with res judicata 
effects; (ii) any citizen can intervene in abstract review procedures by 
submitting written statements for or against the constitutionality of a given 
provision; (iii) the Court can invite any relevant authority, expert, or 
organization to participate in abstract review processes by presenting 
arguments that support or counter the constitutionality of a given 
provision; and (iv) as part of its broad evidentiary powers in tutela cases, 
the Court may take into account the opinion of any relevant expert and 
involve any interested party in the procedure as it deems necessary to 
adopt an informed, legal, and appropriate decision.  
C. A Response to the Objections to the Court’s Powers 
The foregoing considerations, in particular those that point out the 
differences between the Colombian and United States judicial review 
schemes, necessitate responses to major objections to the work and powers 
of Colombia’s highest constitutional judge as follows: 
 433. During the 2000 elections, only one of the candidates who had been included in one of the 
lists submitted by the President of the Republic was asked questions about the possibility of extending 
the recall to the whole Congress and acción de tutela against judicial decisions. This candidate was 
elected. 
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(a) In regard to the argument that the Court is anti-majoritarian because 
it is composed of a small minority of individuals with excessive powers, 
one could counter that the Court’s decisions are nevertheless subject to a 
considerable number of control mechanisms that are democratic in nature 
and entitle the people, directly or through Congress, to place clear limits 
upon this high tribunal’s work. This limitation is most notably imposed by 
amending the Constitution in a fast and relatively easy manner in response 
to the Court’s doctrine. The flexibility of the Colombian constitutional 
text, which was deliberately introduced by the Constituent Assembly as a 
means to control the work of the Court, guarantees that the constitutional 
judge will not have the final word.434
(b) There are several possible responses to the argument that the Court 
is restricting the dynamics and scope of the political system by deciding 
constitutional issues that should be matters of political debate. First one 
might say that the Constitution can be amended by such political forces 
directly or through Congress, so constitutional issues are not excluded 
from their reach. Second, political tensions and dynamics, as reflected in 
the work of Congress, can also place limits on the Court’s powers through 
instruments such as statutory or organic laws. Third, the system by which 
the Senate elects Justices is in itself a reflection of the prevailing 
tendencies within the political sphere to stimulate the Court to carry out its 
functions while bearing in mind the social context within which it 
operates. Finally, the visible flaws in the political system coupled with the 
prevailing patterns of inefficiency within Colombian public 
administration, lead people to seek the Court’s intervention because they 
see this as the only feasible manner of obtaining a State solution to their 
everyday problems.  
(c) Another objection is that the Court issues decisions on highly 
complex matters for which it has no technical expertise. The broad 
evidentiary powers open to the Constitutional judge may offer a counter 
argument to this objection. The Court may order and collect any legal type 
of proof that is deemed necessary to make a decision. In fact, the 
incorporation of expert opinions into the Court’s analysis, whenever they 
are necessary given the complexity of the case, constitutes an element of 
judicial caution repeatedly introduced into the work of this tribunal. 
Therefore, when the materialization of a constitutional right requires 
compliance with given technical conditions, the Court requires that such a 
 434. It should be underscored that the feasibility for amending the 1991 Constitution are in 
contrast with those imposed by the 1886 Constitutional text, on the grounds of which the Supreme 
Court of Justice struck down two important constitutional reforms. 
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right materialize in the terms of the technical recommendations issued by 
experts. For instance, in cases where human health was at stake, the Court 
ordered that the recommendations of a competent physician be applied. 
When it is necessary to carry out specific calculations to liquidate debts, 
such as retirement pensions, the Court has ordered that the liquidation be 
calculated and conducted by competent authorities in accordance with the 
corresponding technical formulae. This does not mean, however, that the 
Court has never ventured into highly technical matters. For example, in 
economic judgments, the Court has often been criticized for delivering 
decisions without taking their side effects into consideration—this 
happened in the public salaries judgment referred to in Part II.B.3 above. 
In that case, the Court eventually rectified its doctrine and included in its 
judgment long-term variables that took into account the real Colombian 
economic context, without actually imposing one technical formula for 
making the calculations; it left this task to the competent governmental 
technicians.435 Similarly, in cases regarding health, the Court always 
makes its decision based on what the competent physician recommends. In 
this field, the Court has made the most of its evidentiary powers, as 
demonstrated by its decision involving a child born a hermaphrodite and 
requiring treatment for the child. As referred to in Part II.B.1.a.i above, the 
opinions of several national and international experts were requested by 
the Court in this case and taken into account when delivering the decision. 
In sum, the Court has always sought and listened to the opinions of 
technical experts when deciding a given case, without attempting to 
replace the experts. 
(d) One final argument against the Colombian system is that 
historically, within the Latin American context, experience has shown that 
a Court that exercises its powers with independence and activism will not 
survive for a significant period of time. Therefore, it will not be long 
before the backlash of the public powers and political forces affected or 
controlled by the Court end up suppressing the Court’s very existence.  
Nevertheless, to address this final argument, one should bear in mind 
that: (i) the existence of the Court is a progressive step forward within a 
century-old tradition of constitutional judicial review;436 and (ii) it is 
 435. Whenever there has been dissent among the current members of the Court on economic 
matters, they have tended to be prudent and avoided imposing a given point of view. Nevertheless, 
they have required the utmost respect for the relevant constitutional provisions. 
 436. There might be debate and disagreement around the scope of the Court’s powers, but it is 
very difficult to envision a drastic reduction of its functions, or the suppression of the institution of 
judicial review by an independent organ. 
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unlikely that the Colombian Congress will “pack the Court,” by increasing 
the number of Justices and the majority required for adopting decisions. 
Justices are elected by the Senate every eight years, the Court, as an 
institution, is subjected to a political evaluation every eight years that 
determines its new composition in accordance with the political balance at 
that point in time. 
V. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL: FLAWS AND ASPECTS OF THE COURT’S WORK 
THAT REQUIRE IMPROVEMENT  
The purpose of this summary of the Court’s work is not to transmit the 
image of a “perfect” or “flawless” tribunal. On the contrary, as a key 
player in the new system of constitutional judicial review introduced in 
1991, the Court has faced the challenge of materializing a very innovative 
constitutional order within a highly complicated and violent reality. The 
Court has done so during a short decade of evolution. Consequently, many 
aspects of its decision-making process and its case law should be pointed 
out as areas where substantial attention and improvement are required, as 
described below. 
A. 
First, there are several critical issues that the Court has left out of its 
case law even though they are important components of Colombia’s 
everyday social and political life. The Court has not given the same degree 
of attention to these issues compared to other, sometimes equally, crucial 
matters. For example:  
(1) The issue of race, as mentioned in Part II.B.1.b.v above, has 
received scant consideration by constitutional judges nation-wide 
even though racism, which still prevails in Colombia, is one of the 
most silent structural traits of Colombia’s Hispanic socio-cultural 
heritage. 
(2) The principle of participative democracy, enshrined in Article 1 
of the Colombian Constitution and other basic precepts (such as the 
Social State grounded on the Rule of Law—Estado Social de 
Derecho-pluralism or human dignity), has not been developed or 
applied to its full extent in the Court’s case law, in contrast with 
other basic constitutional principles that have been addressed by the 
Court. Although it has been mentioned as an important general 
mandate in some of the Court’s decisions, especially those 
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concerning popular participation mechanisms or the participation of 
indigenous groups in the decisions that concern them, the broad 
reach and implications of participative democracy, as well as its 
necessary impact on all aspects of ordinary social and political life, 
have not yet been fully grasped or elaborated on by the 
Constitutional Court.  
(3) Some of the most salient and complex features of the new 
Administrative State designed by the Constituent Assembly (i.e., the 
most characteristic aspects of the new Public Administration 
established in 1991, such as the trend towards direct provisions of 
public utilities and services by private entities under State 
regulation; the new scheme of relations and control between the 
Executive and other independent regulatory agencies; the principle 
of administrative de-centralization; or, the functions and activities 
of the Administrative Police) have not yet been sufficiently 
explored by the Court. This lack of attention by the Court occurs in 
spite of the complexities of their application to the ordinary 
activities of the Public Administration and the important role the 
features of the new Administrative State play in the transformation 
of a traditionally distant, inefficient, and bureaucratic system into an 
effective and present network of committed public entities. 
(4) Although the constitutional principle of equality has given rise to 
a high number of decisions by the Court, and has been applied in a 
very diverse range of situations through conceptual instruments 
such as tests, much still needs to be done regarding its precise and 
accurate conceptualization. For example, much needs to be done in 
accordance with the constitutional distinction between equal 
treatment, equal opportunities, and equal protection.437  
(5) In spite of Colombia’s sad reputation as one of the most insecure 
countries in the world, the protection of personal security, 
especially of those groups or persons at great risk in the context of 
Colombia’s violent conflicts (i.e., political dissidents, human rights 
defenders, demobilized guerrillas, etc.), has not been addressed in a 
solid and consistent manner by the Court. 
(6) Finally, although social rights have been directly enforced in 
concrete cases, the Court has done so mainly in situations where a 
 437. COLOMBIAN CONST. art. 13.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol3/iss4/2
p529 Cepeda book pages.doc5/28/2004  
 
 
 
 
 
2004] COLOMBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 689 
 
 
 
 
 
 
statute can be invoked to support its holding and order. Therefore, 
the Court still has to develop a doctrine concerning the application 
of social rights to poor Colombian citizens wherever Congress has 
not enacted legislation to respond to social exclusion. 
B. 
Judicial caution has often led the Court, in difficult or innovative 
situations, to apply an excessive degree of self-restraint—depriving itself 
of a number of legal mechanisms that could allow the Court to grant more 
effective protection to the rights at stake in concrete cases. A number of 
examples have been mentioned. The first example is the Court’s decision 
to strike down the legal provision regulating acción de tutela against 
judicial decisions, as well as its highly restrictive admission of such tutela 
claims (only in exceptional cases in which a vía de hecho is present, as 
explained in Part IV.A.2.a above). The second example is the Court’s 
decision to strike down the provision that established the mandatory 
character of judicial decisions as subsidiary sources of law (see Part 
IV.A.2.a above), thus substantially restricting the mandatory character of 
its own judgments and precedents in other cases. The final example is the 
Court’s decision to declare the unconstitutionality of the provision by 
which lower judges could consult the provision in relation to the 
constitutional matters under their review.438 Moreover, because the Court 
has delivered its decisions on a case-by-case basis, it has not given full 
application to legal instruments that could allow it to protect, in a much 
more effective manner, the constitutional rights, values, interests, and 
principles it was mandated to preserve. For example, the Court has 
abstained from issuing general orders to the authorities that violate 
constitutional rights in concrete cases. The Court does this because it 
believes authorities must adopt policies or rules which will guarantee 
abstention from engaging in similar types of behavior that will disregard 
fundamental rights in the future.439
C. 
Moreover, it is clear that the Court lacks sufficiently effective 
mechanisms to monitor compliance with its decisions once they have been 
 438. See supra note 387. 
 439. Decreto 2591 de 19 de noviembre de 1991 (Decree 2591 of Nov. 19, 1991). 
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delivered. The follow-up of each case is left to the judge who adopted the 
original tutela decision, who is thus entrusted to secure the full application 
of the Court’s verdict and orders. Although it is possible to carry out a 
special type of contempt procedure whenever tutela decisions are not 
complied with by the relevant authority or private person, this procedure 
must be brought to the same lower judge. As a consequence, several 
holdings of the Court are systematically disregarded, not only by the 
authority or person against whom they were specifically directed, but also 
by all other relevant public or private entities that do not take the Court’s 
doctrine into account in their daily activities. This has led to the high 
number of “reiteration of doctrine” decisions issued by the Court, which 
come as a consequence of the lack of application of constitutional doctrine 
as precedent in concrete cases. As a primary effect of this situation, the 
number of decisions adopted by the Court has risen in a considerable 
manner in recent years, necessarily effecting the overall quality of the 
judgments. The Court has not actively contributed to the resolution of this 
practical problem. 
D. 
Due to the high number of tutela decisions adopted by the Court and 
the comparatively low number of “unification decisions,” doctrinal 
differences are significantly frequent among the judgments of the Court. 
This has affected its role as a harmonizer of constitutional doctrine to such 
an extent that in less than ten cases, the Court in plenary session has 
annulled the decisions of Review Chambers because they counter previous 
constitutional doctrine. 
E. 
Other types of flaws in the system are of a procedural nature. For 
example, given the high workload of the Court, public hearings are seldom 
conducted in both abstract and concrete review cases (although in the 
latter case, only the Full Chamber, while adopting a unification decision, 
can make use of public hearings). As a consequence, the debate and 
exchange of opinions which could substantially enrich the Court’s 
decisions are rarely available to the Court. 
These are only a few of the most notorious flaws in the Court’s work. 
However, as evident as they might be, the Court must strive to resolve 
these systemic problems. Nevertheless, when the role played by the 
Constitutional Court is observed from a global perspective, it seems 
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evident that this institution has been the subject of growing respect for the 
rule of law, the main enforcer of human rights, and the independent 
guardian of the supremacy of the Constitution. In addition, the Court has 
responded to the changing social needs that nurtured its creation in 1991: 
to preserve respect for human dignity and to defend a constituent 
consensus for Colombians to assume the risk of opening up democracy in 
order to construct a stable peace that is administered by legitimate 
institutions. The great question that remains open is whether, as the public 
opinion tendencies and powerful interests stop reflecting the original 
constituent consensus, the Constitutional Court will be one of the first 
casualties or whether the Court will continue to receive the same 
institutional respect of the last twelve years of dedicated and active work. 
TABLE 6: CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS OVERRULING THE COURT 
Constitutional Amendments approved by Congress through Legislative Acts 
Legislative Act 01 of 
1995 
Regulates in detail the participation of territorial entities in the 
National funds classified as “ordinary national income” and the 
destination that they should be given. Approved in response to 
decision C-520 of 1994, which gave strict application to the 
previous constitutional mandate, by which these funds should be 
applied exclusively to “social investment”, not personnel. 
Legislative Act 02 of 
1995 
States that military courts or tribunals can be composed of both 
active and retired military personnel. Approved in response to 
decision C-141 of 1995, which stated that only retired military 
personnel or civilians could be part of such bodies. 
Legislative Act 01 of 
1999 
Derogates the possibility, open since 1936, of carrying out 
expropriation for reasons of equity without previous 
compensation. Approved in response to several decisions, which 
struck down Bilateral Investment Treaty clauses (that) 
protect(ed)ing foreign investment by assuring payment of just 
compensation in cases of expropriation. 
Failed Legislative Act proposals 
Proposal launched by a group of Congressmen to prohibit the adoption of “modulative 
judgements” by the Court.  
Proposal launched by a group of Congressmen to forbid the admissibility of tutela claims 
against judicial decisions. 
Proposal launched by a group of Congressmen to impose the requirement of qualified 
majority voting to declare the unconstitutionality of a law  
Failed constitutional referendum initiatives 
Referendum initiative launched by the Catholic Church to introduce a constitutional 
article authorizing a Concordat with the Holy See, against decision C-027 of 1993, which 
struck down the central provisions of such treaty. 
Referendum initiative launched with Governmental support, to authorize the 
criminalization of the possession and use of personal doses of drugs, against decision C-
221 of 1994, which struck down the relevant provision in the Criminal Code. 
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PENDING REFERENDUM (OCTOBER, 2003) 
Referendum bill, introduced by President Alvaro Uribe Vélez to amend several parts of 
the Constitution, approved by Congress through Law 796 of 2003, summoning the 
referendum. The text of the referendum had three reforms, among a total of eight, which 
were directed to overrule previous decisions of the Constitutional Court: (a) the abolition 
of special pension rights for high officials, interpreted broadly by the Court in several 
tutela decisions; (b) the authorization to completely freeze public salaries which were 
(above two) minimum wages (for a period of two years for middle-rank salaries, and four 
years for high-rank salaries), partially and temporarily disregarding decision C-1064 of 
2001; and (c) an authorization to criminalize the consumption of personal doses of drugs, 
directed against decision C-221 of 1994. The third one of these was struck down from 
the text of the referendum on procedural grounds by the Constitutional Court, so it will 
not be submitted to the people on October 25, 2003, when the referendum will be held. 
The Government immediately introduced a constitutional reform bill to Congress, 
insisting on this amendment. 
TABLE 7-A: EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
COLOMBIA (1810-1957) 
Period BASIC 
FEATURES 
Main traits of the system Important cases 
1810–
1857 
No constitutional 
judicial review 
• None None 
1858–
1886 
Judicial review 
“on paper” 
• In 1858, the Federal 
Constitution empowered 
the Supreme Court to 
suspend laws issued by the 
federated states. 
• In 1863, the Federal 
Constitution introduced an 
actio popularis against laws 
approved by the federated 
states; the Supreme Court 
of Justice could 
consequently suspend the 
application of laws deemed 
unconstitutional, and send 
the corresponding statute to 
the Senate in order for this 
body to adopt a final 
decision. 
None. 
1886–
1910 
The foundations 
of effective 
judicial review 
• In 1886, judicial review of 
laws in force is abolished; 
only review of overruled 
presidential objections to 
bills for reasons of 
unconstitutionality is 
allowed.  
• Law 57 of 1887, article 5,
• In 1889, the 
Supreme Court of 
Justice states that 
the judiciary is not 
allowed to interpret 
the Constitution, 
nor substantive 
legislation, in a 
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Period BASIC 
FEATURES 
Main traits of the system Important cases 
states that whenever a given 
law is incompatible with 
the Constitution, the latter 
shall prevail. 
• Law 153 of 1887, article 6, 
states that laws issued after 
the promulgation of the 
Constitution shall be 
presumed constitutional. 
• Law 2 of 1904, article 2, 
introduces actio popularis 
against decrees issued by 
the President during states 
of siege. 
general and 
authentic manner; 
nor is it allowed to 
exclude the 
application of laws 
in force when it 
considers them 
unconstitutional. It 
only has 
jurisdiction over 
bills. 
 
1910–
1957 
The building of 
an effective 
judicial review 
tradition 
• Legislative Act No. 3 of 
1910 amends the 
constitution, introducing 
actio popularis against 
laws.  
• Law 96 of 1936 allows the 
Court to confront contested 
laws with the totality of the 
Constitutional text (not just 
with the provisions invoked 
in the charge). 
• Decree 1762 of 1956 
creates the constitutional 
chamber in the Supreme 
Court of Justice to propose 
to the Plenary Chamber 
decision drafts on actio 
popularis. The Government 
is given power to elect 
judges. 
• 1911 — First actio 
popularis case, 
upholding a law 
that assigned 
judicial functions in 
electoral matters to 
certain types of 
judges. 
• 1937 — Upholds 
law that grants 
Masonic societies the 
right to acquire legal 
personality. 
• 1938 — Upholds 
physical taking of 
property before 
payment of 
compensation 
(agrarian reform). 
• 1939 — Ascertains 
that State 
intervention in the 
economy may only 
be carried out 
through a 
congressional 
statute (banana 
industries case) 
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TABLE 7-B: EVOLUTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUDICIAL REVIEW IN 
COLOMBIA (1957–2003) 
PERIOD BASIC 
FEATURES 
Main traits of the 
system 
Important cases 
1957–
1990 
The consolidation 
of a judicial 
review tradition. 
• Plebiscite of 1957. 
The independence of 
the Supreme Court is 
protected by 
establishing the 
cooptation procedure 
for the election of 
justices. But justices 
should belong to the 
liberal or conservative 
parties (parity system). 
• 1960 Constitutional 
Amendment — 
Establishing that 
Congress could 
request, through a 
majority motion of any 
Chamber, the Supreme 
Court to decide on the 
constitutionality of 
state of siege decrees 
within a six day delay 
after the request. 
• Legislative Act No. 1 
of 1968 introduces a 
constitutional system 
of ex officio judicial 
review of states of 
exception decrees, 
setting strict procedural 
delays for resolving 
unconstitutionality 
actio popularis, and 
institutionalising 
(through a 
constitutional article) 
the Constitutional 
Chamber of the 
Supreme Court of 
Justice. 
  
 
 
• 1976—Upholds a law 
that limits foreign 
investment in the 
financial sector. 
• 1978—Upholds 
decrees authorizing de 
facto death penalties 
by the Armed Forces 
during certain planned 
crime-fighting 
operations. 
• 1978—Strikes down 
constitutional 
amendment 
summoning a 
Constituent Assembly. 
• 1978—Upholds a 
state of siege decree 
(highly restrictive of 
due process and basic 
liberties). 
• 1979—Strikes down 
huge constitutional 
amendment. 
• 1982—Strikes down 
tax reform decree 
issued on the grounds 
of economic 
emergency powers. 
• 1986–1988—Strikes 
down (some) state of 
siege measures 
adopted to counter 
narco-terrorism and 
guerrilla upsurge. 
• 1986—Strikes down 
law that approved 
Colombia-US 
extradition treaty on 
formal grounds. 
• 1990 Upholds 
summoning of the 
Constituent Assembly 
that adopted the 
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PERIOD BASIC 
FEATURES 
Main traits of the 
system 
Important cases 
current Constitution 
one year later.  
1991–? Strengthening of 
judicial power 
and activist 
enforcement of 
fundamental 
rights. 
• 1991 Constitution 
creates the 
Constitutional Court. 
Abstract review is 
expanded. Concrete 
review is introduced 
and given to any judge 
through acción de 
tutela. 
• Decree 2591 of 1991 
regulates acción de 
tutela. 
• Decree 2067 of 1991 
regulates the 
functioning and 
procedures of the 
Constitutional Court. 
• First Concrete 
Review Judgement: 
T-001/1992, per 
Alejandro Martínez 
Caballero and Fabio 
Morón Díaz, denies 
the claim filed by 
some public servants 
whose initial periods 
had been shortened by 
the election of new 
officials due to the 
promulgation of the 
new Constitution. 
• First Abstract Review 
Judgement: C-
004/1992, upholding 
the decree declaring a 
state of social 
emergency to allow 
for the increase of 
public officials’ 
wages, in the face of a 
police strike. 
• The Constitutional 
Court has rendered 
9442 decisions from 
1992 to 2002. 
TABLE 8: THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS OF THE COURT—
ABSTRACT REVIEW 
Year    Affirm Dissent Concur 
1993 Equality of 
religions 
Unconstitutionality of the 
main articles of the 1974 
Concordat between Colombia 
and the Holy See, which 
privileged the Catholic 
Church. 
C-027 8 1 0 
1994 
2001 
Abortion Constitutionality of the 
criminal provision penalizing 
abortion, given the prevalence 
of the right to life. Modified 
in 2001, upholding a legal 
exemption to punishment, 
whenever abortion is 
performed in “extraordinary 
circumstances”, such as after 
sexual assault. 
C-133 
C-647 
6 
5 
3 
2 
0 
4 
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Year    Affirm Dissent Concur 
1994 Personal dose 
of drugs 
Unconstitutionality of the 
criminal provision imposing 
penalties for possession and 
consumption of personal 
doses of narcotic drugs. 
C-221 5 4 0 
1997 Euthanasia Impossibility to criminalize 
doctors who apply euthanasia 
to terminally ill patients in 
conditions of extreme 
suffering and informed 
consent. 
C-239 6 3 3 
1997 Security 
services by 
armed 
civilians 
Constitutionality of provision 
allowing organized 
communities to provide 
private security services by 
armed civilians, insofar as the 
weapons they use have not 
been restricted to exclusive 
use by the armed forces. 
C-572 5 4 1 
1998 Journalism 
Law 
Unconstitutionality of 
licensing system for the 
exercise of journalism. 
C-087 9 0 1 
1998 Television 
Law 
Rejects unconstitutionality 
actio popularis against the 
law that prohibited the 
renewal of concession 
contracts with television 
providers, with the 
consequent exclusion of the 
news channels that criticized 
public figures during the 
“8.000 Criminal Process”, on 
the grounds that the 
discriminatory purpose or 
impact of the law had not 
been proven. 
C-456 6 3 0 
1999 UPAC 
decisions 
Unconstitutionality of the 
basic features of the system 
for financing the construction 
and acquisition of housing. 
C-383  
C-700 
C-747 
7 
6 
6 
2 
3 
3 
0 
2 
2 
2000 Female 
quotas 
Constitutionality of the law 
establishing mandatory 
participation of women in at 
least 30% of decision-making 
positions in the Executive 
branch. 
C-371 5 4 1 
2000 National 
Development 
Plan 
Unconstitutionality of the 
Law that approved the 
National Development Plan 
for 1999–2002, due to 
procedural defects. 
C-557 8 1 0 
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Year    Affirm Dissent Concur 
2000 
 
2001 
Increase in 
public salaries 
Unconstitutionality of part of 
the national budget, for not 
having appropriated enough 
funds to increase all public 
wages at least in a percentage 
equivalent to the previous 
year’s inflation rate (2000). 
Later modified in 2001, when 
the Court established that in 
times of fiscal deficit, public 
salaries above two minimum 
wages need not be increased 
in the same proportion as the 
previous year’s inflation rate. 
C-1433 
/2000  
 
C-1064 
/2001 
7 
 
5 
2 
 
4 
0 
 
0 
2002 National 
Security Law 
Unconstitutionality of a 
national security law that 
relied on the notion of 
“national power”, which 
implied incorporating 
civilians into the armed 
conflict and the fusion of 
separated powers. 
C-251 7 2 0 
More 
than 
one, 
1994- 
2003 
States of 
exception 
Unconstitutionality of decrees 
declaring or maintaining 
states of internal commotion 
or economic emergency, 
because constitutional 
requirements had not been 
met. In one case, the 
unconstitutionality was partial 
(1997). 
C-300/1994 
C-466/1995  
C-122/1997  
C-327/2003  
6 
7 
6 
5 
3 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
4 
0 
TABLE 9: THE MOST CONTROVERSIAL DECISIONS OF THE COURT—
CONCRETE REVIEW 
SUBJECT YEAR, Ref. RULE/DECISION Affirm. Dissent Concur 
Right to health  T-534/1992, 
among hundreds 
(“Necessary 
treatment” cases) 
The right to health, although not 
fundamental in itself, may be 
protected through tutela 
whenever such protection is 
necessary to preserve threatened 
fundamental rights, such as the 
right to life and personal 
integrity (concerning diagnose 
services, medicines, treatment, 
surgeries, etc.), or the right to 
human dignity. 
3 0 0 
 SU-043/1995 
(“Children’s 
fundamental 
right to health” 
cases) 
Children’s right to health is 
fundamental in itself. The right 
to health includes the right to 
receive treatment, even in the 
case of incurable diseases which 
can be controlled.  
9 0 0 
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 SU-480/1997 
(“AIDS patients” 
cases) 
AIDS patients who cannot 
finance their own treatment are 
entitled to receive it from the 
social security system, even if 
the medications or interventions 
they require have not been 
officially foreseen in the 
catalogue of available 
treatments. 
9 0 0 
 SU-819/1999 
(“Overseas 
treatment” cases) 
The right to health, under certain 
conditions, can entitle social 
security affiliates to receive 
treatment abroad, when no 
national treatments are available. 
9 0 0 
Indigenous 
Peoples’ 
Rights 
T-428/1992 
(“Road in 
indigenous 
territory” case) 
National authorities may not 
disregard the rights of 
indigenous communities while 
building infrastructure elements 
such as roads. Such/these 
decisions always must be 
preceded by an adequate 
consultation process with 
affected aboriginal groups. 
3 0 
 
 
 
 
1 
 SU-039/1997 
(“U’wa case”) 
Indigenous communities have 
fundamental collective rights to 
preserve their cultural identity 
and all that is necessary for that 
purpose. This includes the right 
to prior/before consultation 
whenever natural resources are 
to be exploited in their territory. 
On these grounds, an important 
oil exploration project in U’wa 
territory is barred (SU-039/97). 
5 4 0 
 T-523/1997 
(“Whip case”) 
Indigenous individuals have a 
right to be judged by traditional 
indigenous authorities, even if 
that entails the imposition of 
penalties that would be deemed 
unacceptable in a non-
indigenous context. 
3 0 0 
 SU-510/1998 
(“Protestant 
church case”) 
Indigenous authorities have the 
right to exclude non-indigenous 
religious groups or churches 
who preach and convert in their 
territory, in order to preserve 
their cultural integrity. 
6 3 0 
Right to 
minimum 
subsistence 
income 
T-426/1992 
among hundreds 
(“Vital minimum 
cases”) 
Whenever the minimum 
subsistence conditions are not 
satisfied, and there exists urgent 
or stringent circumstances, 
persons are entitled to demand 
positive actions by the State to 
fulfill their unresolved basic 
needs, even if that entails public 
expenditure. 
3 0 0 
Right to 
rectification 
T-066/1998 and 
dozens of others 
(“Fair 
rectification 
cases”) 
Individuals affected in their 
reputation by untruthful 
information about them 
disseminated through the mass 
media, have the right to 
rectification of such information, 
in conditions of fairness. 
3 0 0 
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Displaced 
population 
SU-1150/2000 
(“Forcible 
displacement” 
case) 
Individuals who have been 
forcibly displaced from their 
land due to violent conflict 
suffer from massive, multiple 
and continuous violations of 
their fundamental rights. These 
violations must be attended and 
solved by the State, in particular 
through the Executive, and 
through adequate programs that 
fulfill their basic needs. 
9 0 0 
Admissibility 
of tutela 
against 
judicial 
decisions 
T-006/1992,  
T-231/1994 and 
dozens of others 
(“Tutela against 
judgements” 
cases) 
Judicial decisions may be 
attacked through the acción de 
tutela whenever they result in 
gross legal irregularities (vías de 
hecho), regardless of their res 
iudicata effects. 
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Labour union 
rights 
SU-342/1995 
(“Trade union 
persecution” 
cases) 
Employers may not discriminate 
against workers who belong to 
trade unions, inter alia, by 
granting better working 
conditions or benefits to workers 
who are not associated therewith 
or by firing unionized workers. 
5 4 0 
Right to 
education 
SU-624/1999 and 
dozens of others 
(“Poor students” 
cases) 
Academic institutions may not 
exclude students who have not 
been able to pay their tuition 
fees, at least during the 
academic year. They may not 
retain grades certificates, even if 
there has been an unjustified 
lack of payment by the students’ 
guardians. 
8 1 0 
Right to free 
development of 
one’s own 
personality 
SU-642/98 
(“Personal 
appearance” 
cases) 
The State and private 
organizations may not interfere 
with individual life options, 
insofar as they do not 
unreasonably restrict or violate 
third parties’ rights or the legal 
order. This includes, inter alia, 
the right to determine one’s own 
appearance, especially within 
academic institutions.  
8 1 0 
Right to 
determine 
one’s own 
gender identity 
SU-337/99 
(“Hermaphrodite 
case”) 
Given specific circumstances, 
parents or legal guardians may 
not in principle grant substitute 
consent for the performance of 
sexual re-adequation procedures, 
without the affected minor’s 
acceptance of the intervention.  
9 0 0 
Sexual 
orientation — 
homosexual 
couples 
SU-623/2001 
(“Homosexual 
couples” case) 
Homosexual individuals may 
not be discriminated against 
because of their sexual 
orientation, but they may not be 
equated to heterosexual couples 
for purposes of constituting 
“family” or receiving social 
security benefits.  
5 4 0 
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Parliamentary 
inviolability 
SU-047/1999 
(“Impeachment 
of the President” 
case) 
Members of Congress may not 
be prosecuted for the opinions 
they issue in development of 
their functions or for the way in 
which they vote, even when they 
are reviewing the actions of high 
public officials in exercise of 
Congressional judicial powers.  
7 2 0 
Arbitral 
Awards ex 
æquo et bono 
SU-837/2002 
(“Awards in 
equity” case) 
Arbitral awards in equity (ex 
aequo et bono), produced to 
solve labour conflicts in which 
collective bargaining has failed, 
may not be arbitrary, and must 
be adequately motivated in order 
to respect the Constitution. 
9 0 1 
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